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Summary
The thesis compares the political development of
Social Credit in Alberta and the CCF in Saskatchewan.
Data was collected to assess each party against the main
features of populism, a political movement which is a
product of the impact of capitalism on the small
producer and in which opposition is directed against an
external group, the virtue of the common people is
emphasized, control over political institutions is
advocated by some form of direct relationship between
leader and people, and the ideology is reformist rather
than revolutionary. All these characteristics were
found in the Social Credit and CCF movements although
the former was authoritarian in organizational structure,
the latter more democratic. The CCF in Saskatchewan
was considered to be socialist only for its first two
years, after which the need to appeal to a rural, land¬
owning electorate led the party in a conservative
direction. Both parties are seen as popular responses
to experiences of deprivation during the depression of
the thirties. The greater severity of destitution in
Saskatchewan produced a hopeless apathy which accounts
for the later emergence of the CCF as a popular party.
Social Credit and CCF populism is interpreted as the
radical side of the oscillating political attachments
of a disunited petite bourgeoisie. Even within the
agrarian sector of the class, radical and conservative
orientations persisted side "by side, the balance
swinging during periods of depression towards the
radical pole. The authoritarian Social Credit League
developed out of the failure of an earlier democratic
populism to solve the problems of depression in Alberta.
Saskatchewan had always been controlled by parties
identified with eastern capitalism. Por this reason
the two types of populism were able to develop in
neighbouring provinces at the same time. Recent
industrialization has led to a decline of the rural
petite bourgeoisie and of populist politics.
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Chapter One
Introduction
"In order to understand men's conduct and experience
we must reconstruct the historical social structures
in which they play roles and acquire selves."
(H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills)
1,1. The Research Problem
In this century the prairie provinces of western
Canada have been the homeground of radical political
organizations which have controlled the governments of
Alberta and Saskatchewan. It is the task of this thesis
to explain the political development of Social Credit and
the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation in these provinces.
The growth of populism in the middle west of the
United States during the latter years of the nineteenth
century is well known to students of political sociology.
This has been described as the radicalism of small entre¬
preneurs in reaction against their perceived exploitation
by large scale capitalism. This populism was concerned
to use the power of the state to reform the capitalist
system in order to provide appropriate rewards to the
common people who produced the wealth and whose way of
living was considered morally superior. Later I shall
have occasion to refer in greater detail to American
populism, in particular to the Nonpartisan League of
North Dakota. Less well known, although there is a
2.
substantial literature of individual studies, are the
radical political developments in western Canada during
this century; this despite the fact that the Social
Credit League formed the government of the province of
Alberta from 1935 to 1971, while in Saskatchewan the CCF
provided the official opposition in the legislative
assembly from 1934 to 1944, after which it governed the
province for twenty years. It has been customary to
interpret the CCP as an agrarian socialist party and the
Social Credit League as a form of right wing reactionary
populism.1 In the 1968 edition of "Agrarian Socialism"
Martin Lipset concluded that, "There has not yet been an
adequate explanation, or even a detailed descriptive
account of the factors involved that resulted in such
2
different reactions from two quite similar social units."
Since then two studies have at least taken a comparative
perspective to the development of prairie politics, but
these studies contribute little to the problem which Lipset
set out. In "Democracy and Discontent", a slim volume of
secondary analysis, Walter Young reconstructs the history
of the Progressives of the nineteen twenties, the CCP
(which is treated as a national movement) and Social
Credit in Alberta. However, each political development
is treated in isolation, no attempt being made to present
1There have been some exceptions, but these are the
dominant interpretations since S.M. Lipset wrote his
"Agrarian Socialism" in 1950. Future reference will be
to the revised enlarged edition, New York, 1968.
2Ibid., p. xxii.
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an explicit comparison,^ David Smith's brief paper has
the merit of being the only explicit attempt to compare
the political development of Alberta and Saskatchewan
However, his contribution amounts to stating that
Canada's federal system of government made separate
development possible:
"...the federal structure permitted new move¬
ments to seek power locally without concern
for national success. It also permitted
such different movements as the C.C.P. and
Social Credit to exist and flourish side by
side."5
While this is true, it does not by itself account for
the separate political development of these provinces.
Thus the state of research on the topic remains as
Lipset described it in 1968.
In the course of the research I hope to demonstrate
that differences in party labelling have tended to
obscure major similarities between Social Credit and the
Saskatchewan section of the CCP. It is a major thesis
of the research that, until industrialization wrought
changes in the social structure of Alberta and
Saskatchewan, both the Social Credit League and the
Saskatchewan CCP were political organisations firmly in
the tradition of North American populism. It will be
recognized that there were differences - differences
•5
Walter D. Young, "Democracy and Discontent", Toronto,
1969.
^David E. Smith, "A Comparison of Prairie Political
Developments in Saskatchewan and Alberta", Journal of
Canadian Studies, vol. 4, 1969» pp. 17-26.
5Ibid., p. 24.
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primarily in the details of the reform programmes and in
the organizational structure of the political parties.
Two further themes of major importance in the research
are the problems of accounting for (1) the separate
expressions of populism in the two provinces and (2) why
populism should develop and decline in western Canada,
The secondary problem of accounting for the separate
development of Social Credit and the CCP as populism in
two areas of similar social structure is less daunting
than the original formulation by Upset, which created
conceptual difficulties because of a misinterpretation of
the extent of socialist influence in Saskatchewan, Such
questions of terminology are of more than passing
importance beoause they influence what we define as a
problem.
Several other problems of definition should be
cleared up before proceeding with the main analysis. In
the study I shall frequently refer to the political
organizations of the CCP and Social Credit as parties,
although Zakuta (and to a lesser degree Walter Young) has
claimed that the CCP of the thirties was a movement
rather than a party; it is also usual to refer to the
Social Credit movement,^ It is suggested that members
and leaders of a movement experience greater commitment
to a cause than is true of members of political parties.
^Leo Zakuta, "A Protest Movement Becalmed", Toronto,
1964; Walter D. Young, "The Anatomy of a Party: the
National CCP", Toronto, 1969; John A, Irving, "The
Social Cfedit Movement in Alberta", Toronto, 1959.
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Both CCF and Social Credit leaders often maintained that
they were part of a people*s movement rather than a
political party; the implication is that movements are
morally superior.
However, the social scientist is not obliged to
describe actors by using the same categories which they
themselves use. Somtimes, particularly with the CCP it
can be very misleading. The concept of social movement
receives a variety of definitions in the literature.
Some definitions are so general that they include
political parties and so make impossible the distinction
which Young and Zakuta draw between party and movement.
For example, Gusfield defines a social movement as
"socially shared activities and beliefs directed toward
the demand for change in some aspect of the social
7
order." This can include all political parties which
are not committed to the status quo. Other definitions
are a little more restrictive. Heberle states that the
basic criterion of a social movement is that it aims to
bring about fundamental changes in the social order,
especially in the basic institutions of property and
labour relationships. A sense of solidarity and group
identity is required but there is no formal organization
and no set territory. In the term there is often a
connotation of total personal commitment and diffuse
O
support. The criterion that there should be no formal
7
J.R. Gusfield, "Protest, Reform and Revolt", New York,
1970, p. 2.
Q
R. Heberle, "Social Movements", New York, 1951» p. 3»
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organization and no set territory exoludes Social Credit
and the CCP, since from their founding conventions they
had both characteristics,
A political party is a voluntary formal organization
with a formal membership, the extension of which defines
the boundaries of the organization. It must have a
public programme or polioy about issues of government.
Implicit in the programme must be an intention to parti¬
cipate directly in the formal institutions of government;
either existing institutions may be accepted, or the
intention may be to construct a new mechanism of govern¬
ment. Thus revolutionary and conservative parties are
accommodated by the definition. This is quite close to
Neumann's definition, although he requires that parties
be in competition, and so makes the concept of the one-
party state meaningless. A party is»
"...the articulate organization of society's
active political agents, those who are
concerned with the control of governmental
power and who compete for popular support with «
another group or groups holding divergent views.
Pressure groups are excluded from my definition because,
although they have membership boundaries and a policy
(usually a special interest), they do not operate as part
of the formal organization of government.
In all periods of their histories, Social Credit and
the Saskatchewan CCP conformed to the definition of a
political party presented here. Because they were
q
Sigmund Neumann, "Modern Political Parties", Chicago,
1956, p. 396.
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concerned with reforming society, they may also he
called social movements in the broad sense of the term,
and I shall occasionally refer to them in this way.
However, it is misleading to oppose the two categories
to the effect that the history of the CCP is analysed as
a transition from movement to party, because this diverts
attention from the pragmatic orientation of the CCF as a
political party in the thirties.
1.2. The Concept of Populism
The concept of populism is central to the work and
requires some explication at this point. Unfortunately
it has proved to be among the most elusive concepts in
contemporary political sociology. It has been applied
to the politics of such disparate groups as Worth
American cash crop farmers, the narodniki of nineteenth
century Russia, rural and urban movements during this
century in Africa, Asia and Latin America.
In 1967 a seminar was held at the London Sohool of
Economics in order to arrive at a definition of populism.
Participants were to consider whether there is any value
in a general concept covering all cases which have been
labelled as populist, or whether these cases are
distinctly separate to the extent that the general
concept should be abandoned. The published papers and
comments from this conference provide the most important
single source for the analysis of the concept of
8.
populism.Unfortunately the end product was a
conceptual fog of conflicting ideas. Participants
often disagreed about the essential characteristics of
the populist movements which they discussed, and were
unable At the end of the conference to produce an agreed
definition of populism. Those proposed varied from
ones which were so general in their emphasis on popular
participation as to be equivalent to many definitions of
democracy, to those which tended to emphasize the
characteristics of the particular movement which the
speaker had studied in depth. In part the failure to
agree on a definition reflects the difficulty of trying
to include in one concept a large number of political
movements which developed separately on different
continents and without Influence on each other.
Worsley correctly points out that, except for some nine¬
teenth century American farmers who called themselves
populists, the attribute of populism has been conferred
by observers on disparate political movements, the
members of which do not think of themselves as part of a
wider category.
"It may well be, then, that to speak of
populism as a genus is to assume what needs
to be demonstrated! that movements with very
different features, separate in time, space,
and culture, do possess certain crucial
attributes which justify our subsuming them
consciously and analytically under the same
rubric, *popullst', despite variations in
10
See Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner, eds., "Populism",
London, 1969; and for a report of the discussion,
Government and Opposition, vol. 3, 1958, pp. 137-79.
9.
their other circumstances."11
If we are to develop an adequate category of
populism it is essential to follow Worsley's procedure
of actually investigating what the "examples" throughout
the world have in common. However, when we attempt to
do this, similarities are found only at a highly
abstracted or general level. Attempts to be more
specific seem doomed. As an informative example, we
may take the paper by Peter Wiles, to whom populism is:
"...any creed or movement based on the
following major premiss: virtue resides in
the simple people, who are the overwhelming
majority, and in their collective traditions.
I hold that this premiss causes a political
syndrome of surprising constancy, albeit with
now more, now fewer, socialist overtones."12
Wiles' syndrome contains a list of 24 characteristics of
populism, and he recognizes that no single caBe will have
all of these. While this is to be expected in all ideal
type constructions, it is less acceptable that, for most
hypotheses in the detailed list, we can find examples of
political movements which have been classified as populist
and which contradict Wiles' assertions. This he himself
appears to recognize. It will labour the point if we go
through every item in the syndrome, but a few examples
may be given. There is little evidence that populism is
"moralistic rather than programmatic"? it tends to be
11Peter Worsley, "The Concept of Populism", in Ionescu
and Gellner, op. cit.. p. 219.
12
Peter Wiles, "A Syndrome, Not a Doctrine: Some
Elementary Theses on Populism", in Ionescu and Gellner,
op. cit.. p. 166.
10.
both. Not all populist leadership tends to be in
"mystical contact with the masses" - there was nothing
"mystical" about George Williams of Saskatchewan's CCP
or A.C. Townley of the Nonpartisan league. Populist
movements are not always "loosely organized and ill
disciplined"; they may have closely knit authoritarian
structures such as I shall demonstrate for Social Credit.
Elsewhere, Worsley has pointed out that Russian and
American populism differed in respects such as the social
base of mass membership, the origin of the leadership,
1*
and the preferred system of land tenure. The point is
that statements which attempt to be specific about the
form of organization and ideology of populism must
constantly be qualified by exceptions. This does not
mean that the category of populism must be abandoned, as
long as we recognize that it is a highly general
category, which must be qualified in much the same way
that categories such as socialism, communism and
capitalism must be qualified when we look at specific
examples. It is still valuable to know what disparate
events and situations have in common.
I shall now attempt to establish several very
general populist characteristics. At the end of his
review of populism in Russia, North America and the
"Third World", Worsley concluded that populism was a
"dimension of political culture in general" which
referred s
1*5
^Worsley, op. cit.. p. 243.
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"...not only to *direct' relationships between
people and leadership (which must, inevitably,
in any complex, large-scale society, be pre¬
dominantly sheer mystification or symbolism),
but, more widely, to popular participation in
general (including spurious 'pseudo' partici-
pation)."14
However, I believe that this is a more general definition
than is either necessary or useful? it casts the term
almost as a synonym for democracy. It is more useful to
restrict the category of populism, in so far as it refers
to participation, to Shils' earlier specification of a
particular kind of political participation. Thus I
would agree with Shils that, at the most general level,
populism involves lauding the virtue of the common people
and advocating the supremacy of the will of the people
over all opposition? and the belief that a direct
relationship between the mass of the people and the
15
political leadership is desirable. The movements
which are generally accepted as populist all developed
as a response to the impact of the capitalist organiza¬
tion of production on small producers. Populist anger
is directed against some outside group which is defined
as exploitative. And populist ideology is reformist
rather than revolutionary? some writers refer to
16
populism as having a Janus quality. Innovation is
UIbid.. p. 246.
15
^Edward Shils, "The Torment of Secrecy", London, 1956,
pp. 98-104.
16
E.g., Angus Stewart, "The Social Roots", in Ionescu and
Gellner, op. cit.. pp. 186-91? A. Walicki, "The Contro¬
versy over Capitalism: studies in the Social Philosophy
of the Russian Populists", London, 1969, p. 22.
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accepted provided the intent of the innovation is to
modify the existing order by making it more bearable for
the common, "simple", people. Occasionally, such inno¬
vation (e.g., the setting up of state owned grain
elevators in some parts of North America) has taken on a
socialist facade, but in populism there is never any
commitment to fundamental changes in property relations.
Populist ideology reflects a desire to shore up what
exists, or even to revert to some imagined golden age.
It will be clear to the reader that this general
populist type allows for considerable variation in its
components; it may further be biased by my greater
familiarity with North American than other populist
movements. There is no specification of what special
virtue the common people are supposed to have, or how the
general will is to become known. There is no specifica¬
tion of how a direct relationship between leadership and
mass is to be achieved. It is possible for the relation¬
ship to be an authoritarian one, in which the leader, who
claims to represent the general will and to have special
powers to bring it into effect, is accorded legitimacy
and allowed personal control of decision-making provided
that he speaks directly to the people. This I shall
call authoritarian populism. On the other hand, leader¬
ship may be subject to election from the mass, and there¬
after to grass roots control exercized through a
decentralized organization. The techniques of the
initiative, referendum, and recall have been frequently
13.
advocated in this form of "direct democracy", which I
shall label democratic populism.
Because populism often involves a critique of the
idea of party and other intermediate associations between
leadership and the mass, theorists such as Kornhauser and
17
Lipset have seen populism as a threat to democracy.
However, they define democracy in such a way as to be
equivalent to the institutions of western parliamentary
systems. Now populism involves a critique of some of
these institutions in that they are seen to stifle and
repress the wishes of the mass of the people, yet in so
far as one important aspect of democracy is the control
by people of their own lives, then populism can be
compatible with democracy. However, in its most
authoritarian developments, populism can lead to the loss
of civil rights, not only of minority out groups, but
also of the original mass base of the movement, in so far
as the authoritarian leadership can retain power
independently of the wishes of the mass. The point is
well made by Worsley:
"Populism is certainly compatible with demo¬
cracy, though this is often denied. In so
far as it ignores the need for institutions
and pluralism! in so far as it dislikes
factionalism; in so far as it distorts
social mechanisms which seem to it specialized
and bureaucratic, it appears to undervalue the
importance, and even the rights, of minorities,
and to depart from 'rule of law1. But there
is always a tension in our conception of a
17
William Kornhauser, "The Politics of Mass Society",
London, 1959; S.M. Lipset, "Political Man", London,
1959.
14
just society between the rights of minorities
and the rights of the majority. In so far
as populism plumps for the rights of
majorities to make sure - by 1intervening1 -
that they are not ignored (as they commonly
are) populism is profoundly compatible with
democracy."18
Focussing on the leadership, there is no requirement
that the populist leader must be, himself, one of the
people whose interests he claims to serve. Populist
ideology has often been elaborated and brought to the
people by intellectuals. Russian populism is the most
obvious example, and Horth American populism the moat
obvious exception, in that populism there has usually
lacked an intellectual spokesman. It has been stated
that the ideology is reformist, but this leaves a wide
scope for variation in the kind of reforms to be
proposed. Populism is a reaction to the impact of
capitalism, but the precise nature of the reaction may
well be conditioned by the stage in the development of
capitalism within the society where populism develops.
Finally, populism is directed against an out group (and
is prone to conspiracy theories), but this leaves the out
group undefined. Among the most common contenders have
been oolonial capitalist states, monopoly industry and
finance, industrial labour unions, Jews and other ethnic
and religious minorities.
Populism could be made a more specific category if
it were limited to only some of the historical events
which have been called populist, but populism for all
18Worsley, op. cit«. p. 247
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its imprecision is now so well established in social
science vocabulary that no amount of polemic will achieve
this limitation. A similar result can be effected by
leaying the general category and constructing sub types
of populism, based on variations within its components.
One such source of variation is the relationship between
leadership and the mass of the movement. Differences in
organizational control and legitimacy can produce what I
have called authoritarian and democratic populism.
Another basis of distinction might be the stage of
capitalist development. North American populism has
been conditioned by the way that large scale capitalist
organizations controlled and exploited the small
producers in frontier areas; the nationalism of "Third
world" populism is a product of the colonial stage of
European capitalism. Future reference in the thesis
will be restricted to populism as it has appeared in
North America. It is beyond the scope of this research
to do a full scale comparative analysis of populism and
to distinguish all possible sub types. In the following
chapters I shall try to show that both Social Credit and
the CCF are best described as variants of populism, the
former being authoritarian and the latter democratic
populism. More than this I shall try to explain the
differences between t&em and to relate western Canada's
populism to the social structure. To achieve this task
it is necessary to have information on the historical
origins of Social Credit and the CCF, on their policies,
16.
support, leadership and organization. Therefore, in
chapters two and three I provide a historical account of
the development of the prairie frontier region and the
response of the farming population to impact of eastern
capitalism until the depression of the thirties, the
period when both our parties were founded. Chapter four
includes a discussion of models for the rise of third
parties, in relation to which the impact of the depression
on social life in Alberta and Saskatchewan is described.
The history of policy and support for both parties until
the present is contained in chapters five to seven, after
which leadership, legitimation and party organization are
discussed. Finally, having presented all the available
data which bears on the research problem, each party is
assessed in chapter nine in relation to the concept of
populism which I have introduced. An explanation is
offered for the separate development of Social Credit and
the CCF in Alberta and Saskatchewan, and the history of
the populist movements is linked to other aspects of the
social structure.
1.3. Research on Class and Politics in Western Canada
Central to the investigation is the relationship
between the class position of the farmer and his
political involvement. Therefore, as a preliminary to
the research, I shall review several attempts to inter¬
pret the politics of the prairies in terms of social
stratification. Of these the best known is Lipset's
17.
1Q
analysis of Saskatchewan. 7 Unfortunately his work is
unclear because he wavers between nominalist and realist
conceptions of class without acknowledging any difference.
In the chapter of "Agrarian Socialism" where he deals
with the emergence of agrarian class consciousness, Lipset
bases his writing on a concept of economic class whereby
the class categories are defined by their relation to the
market, and he suggests that class consciousness develops
through the organized group action of farmers. Such an
approach to stratification is realist in the sense that,
"It considers social class as a real ensemble defined at
one and the same time by material facts and by the
20
collective consciousness which individuals form of it."
It is more in the European tradition than in the North
American approach to stratification. However, in his
class analysis of the social base of CCP support lipset
does not maintain his earlier usage in the same volume.
Silverstein adopts the later lipset approach for his
21
analysis of post war voting behaviour. In the
analysis of support we are returned to typical "American"
status group categories, as described by Aron*
"Individuals are differentiated from each other
by multiple criteria and social status or
1Q
^Lipset, "Agrarian Socialism", op. cit.
20
R. Aron, "Two Definitions of Class", translated and re¬
printed in A. Beteille, "Social Inequality", London,
1969, p. 76.
21
Sanford Silverstein, "Occupational Class and Voting
Behaviour" in Lipset, "Agrarian Socialism", op. cit.,
pp. 435-79.
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class is only one among several discrimina¬
tions determined essentially lay psychological
phenomena. Each is in the class which is
Imposed by the idea which others have of the
position he occupies. Each has a status
which is defined by the esteem of others.
The categories are descriptive of aggregates of
individuals and do not carry the implication that the
groups so defined are acting units. Thus when students
such as Lipset and Silverstein analyse political support,
the population is divided into such categories as middle
class and working class (where is the upper class?), or
manual and non-manual, with an additional category for
farmers, who appear to be difficult to fit into anything
else. No theoretical justification is given for the
system of categorization.
The status categories are based on occupations,
which are grouped, then ranked in a hierarchy. However,
the position of the farmer in the hierarchy is not clear
from Upset*s analysis. Furthermore, as lipset
2 3
concedes, the hierarchical position of a person (as
defined by occupational status) varies according to the
structure of the community of which he is part. For
example, a butcher may head the hierarchy in a small
prairie village, but not in a large urban area. The
ecological analysis of voting by Lipset and others does
not allow for such differences in status according to
who is doing the perceiving. Although students of
22
Aron, op. cit.. p. 75.
23
Lipset, "Agrarian Socialism", op. cit.. p. 200.
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stratification have shown that there is considerable
consistency across industrialized societies in the
ranking of occupations, this should not blind us to
local variations. In some communities certain occupa¬
tions may be ranked differently from the national
average. The degree of visibility of the occupation is
probably very important. Furthermore, even when all
agree that an occupation, such as that of doctor, is of
high status, this does not mean that any Individual
doctor will be accorded high status. His status will
be in jeopardy if he does not conform to the expectations
which most people have of the role of doctor. Status
depends on the viewer and to farmers the occupation of
farming would be very high on the status scale. Lipset
and Silverstein seem to have ignored this.
The test of any system of categorizing is how much
it helps us to explain a problem. To provide an
example, lipset correctly records that there are
important differences in political alignment in
Saskatchewan between small village business men and
farmers. I would argue that these differences are
better understood through an analysis of the class
positions of these groups and the interaction between
them than by using status groupings, particularly since
it is Impossible to decide from whose point of view the
statuses should be assigned. The small village
business man is usually a service provider, artisan or
retailer. Each is a small entrepreneur who employs
20.
little labour and lives by providing goods or services
at a profit. They are committed to capitalism because,
as individuals, they aspire to personal advancement
through the making of profit from their businesses.
Perhaps the retail merchant is the most interesting.
He is not a producer but he perpetuates capitalism
because in order to survive he must dispose of the
products of capitalist enterprise and at a price which
is large enough for him to retain a surplus as profit.
The alternative of being a wage earning distributor of
goods conflicts with his image of self independence.
He is further encouraged to perpetuate the status quo
because his living is threatened by agrarian co-opera¬
tives. During hard times the village middleman is
defined by the farmer as a non-productive parasite upon
the farmers1 labour. Consumers' co-operatives were
established by farmers in order to by-pass the village
petite bourgeoisie and so take away their base of
24>
exploitation. * In this context we would expect the
villagers to be susceptible to appeals from the liberals
and Conservatives to support the old parties, thus
saving the west from "socialism".
However, the very dependence of the village middle¬
men on the trade with farmers has made them good fodder
for reformist groups during depressions, provided that
the perpetuation of private enterprise is assured. The
2 A^For a history of oonsumer co-operatives see J.F.C.
Wright, "Prairie progress", Saskatoon, 1956.
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largest purchasing group for the goods and services of
the village business man is the farmer and his family.
When the price system operates to reduce the purchasing
power of the farmer, then the village business man will
also suffer. Platforms which propose monetary reform
in order to restore purchasing power to the consumer
will make a strong impact on this class. In this
regard it is important to remember that, although Social
Credit (a movement for monetary reform) came to power in
Alberta with massive agrarian support, the initial
enthusiasm and the secondary leadership came from the
petite bourgeoisie of the villages and towns (see chapter
5 below). Also, in 1935, the Reconstruction Party seems
to have derived most of its support from small business
91)
men who had previously been Conservatives. The CCF
found it difficult to win much support from this group
because of the CCF*s outspoken backing for co-operatives,
which contributed to the fear of socialism among the
business community.
E.J. Tyler has also tried to analyse the prairie
26
farmers as a social class. Tyler defines a social
class as:
"a group, classification or category of people
who exhibited, individually and as a group,
25•^J.R.H. Wilbur, "H.H. Stevens and the Reconstruction
Party", Canadian Historical Review, vol. 45, 1964,
pp. 1-28.
26
E.J. Tyler, "The Parmer as a Social Class in the
Prairie Region", in M. Tremblay and W.J. Anderson,
"Rural Canada in Transition", Ottawa, 1966, pp. 228-322.
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distinctive and distinguishable behavioral
similarities ascribable to their adherence,
either implicit or explicit, to a particular
pattern or set of norms."27
Thus the class is defined by concerted action and belief.
His classes have potential as acting units but there is
no reference in this concept to economic relations,
which I will now argue is essential to an understanding
of western political history. *
The most outstanding attempt to analyse the class
basis of prairie politics is to be found in C.B.
MacPherson's "Democracy in Alberta". This work is
basic to the present study. MacPherson considers that
the relationship of persons to the productive process -
in particular, "how much freedom they retain over the
disposal of their own labour, and how much control they
exercise over the disposal of others* labour" - provides
the most useful way of categorizing people in order to
28
understand political action. Members of a class are
liable to develop similar assumptions and outlook, as a
result of their common life experience. MacPherson
recognizes that this does not mean that all members of
a class, so defined, will always be conscious of their
class identity and act in terms of it. The petite
27Ibid.. p. 234.
28
C.B. MacPherson, "Democracy in Alberta", Toronto,
1953, p. 225. A similar interpretation of the class
position of the farmer is provided in a recent paper
by James McCrorie, "Change and Paradox in Agrarian
Social Movements: the Case of Saskatchewan", in R.J.
Ossenberg, ed., "Canadian Society: Pluralism, Change
and Conflict", Scarborough, Ont., 1971, pp. 36-51.
23.
OQ
bourgeoisie has seldom done so. It is precisely the
ambiguity of the olass position of this class which
allows MacPherson to account for the oscillation of the
petite bourgeoisie between conservative and radical
politics.
The petite bourgeoisie, as I use the term, refers
to the class of small scale entrepreneurs, self employed
and employing little or no labour from outside the
family. In the present time, as the scale of organized
production constantly increases, they form the
transitional, marginal remnants of a past era. (I do
not intend any pejorative implication when using the
adjective petit bourgeois.) The various sections of the
class are united only in their insecurity and their
belief that they are independent producers, a way of life
which should be preserved. The belief in independence,
although it is an important determinant of their action,
is an illusion because the petite bourgeoisie are sub¬
ordinate to large scale, labour utilizing capitalism,
which controls the price system. The small producer is
independent in that he may still retain the capacity to
decide for himself when and how to use his own labour.
"Prom this illusive consciousness, and from
their perennial insecurity arises the oscilla¬
tion between conservatism and radicalism which
is characteristic of the petite-bourgeoisie...
they are repeatedly driven by insecurity to
find a solid base somewhere. So they veer
29^See also the debate between MacPherson and Upset in
Canadian Forum, vol. 34, 1954-55, in which Lipset
appears to misunderstand MacPherson's position.
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between attachment to one class and to the
other; or rather, different sections of the
whole class veer at different rates of speed
and it may be in different directions at
different times, depending on changes in their
own position and on changes in the political
outlook and action of the other classes."30
While I agree with MacPherson that the petite bourgeoisie
is usually divided as a class and does, from time to time,
adopt radical postures (or at least sections do), this
radicalism is never revolutionary. It must be reformist
in character, never challenging the system of private
property relations, except where "unfair" profit taking
is thought to take place. Monopolies are fair game for
attack. Although insecure, and severely damaged by
price depressions which they cannot control, the petite
bourgeoisie, as producers of commodities, remain committed
to the capitalist system of property ownership. However,
at times, the impact of large scale capitalism is such
that certain sections of the class become fertile ground
for the generation and support of populist reform move¬
ments, which promise to erase the ills of the existing
system. Social Credit and the CCF are understandable as
political movements of the petite bourgeoisie of Alberta
and Saskatchewan in response to the pressures created by
eastern capitalism, which challenge local ideals of
independence and threaten, for the farmer, his ownership
of the land•
30
MacPherson, op. clt.. p. 226.
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1.4. Farmers and the Changing Glass Structure,
1921-1961
This section may be treated by the reader as an
appendix? it is intended to demonstrate the continuing
petit bourgeois character of prairie agriculture and the
changing position of the class in relation to other
classes over time, in so far as this is possible from
demographic data. (All tables referred to are in
appendix A.) In 1953, G.B. MacPherson wrote*
"The typical prairie producer has been from the
beginning an independent operator of an
individual or family enterprise? he has not
been reduced to the status of a wage-earner
dependent on employment. The extent to which
this independence has been maintained is shown
in the analysis of the class composition of
the Alberta eoonomy.•••"31
MacPherson then analysed the class composition up to
1946, the date of the last census for which results were
available to him. This section will extend his work in
two ways. In the first place, it will be extended in
time to 1961, in order to bring the data more up to date.
This will enable me to demonstrate that the quotation
above no longer stands because the processes of
industrialization and urbanization have reduced the
predominance of the petit bourgeois producer. The
typical producer is now a wage earner. Secondly, a
comparative dimension will be added, since the thesis is
concerned with comparing the political development of
Alberta and Saskatchewan. Although several writers have
31Ibid., p. 10.
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stressed the similarities of social structure between
the provinces, it would be extraordinary if no
differences were to occur, but the assessment of the
significance of these differences is a difficult
question. To facilitate this, similar data has been
collected for Manitoba (because it completes the prairie
region) and Ontario (the long settled metropolis).
All prairie provinces experienced a rapid growth in
population during the first three decades of the
twentieth century. Then Saskatchewan's population
actually fell from 922,000 in 1931 to a low of 832,000
in 1951. It has since recovered to 925,000 in 1961.
During the time when Saskatchewan was losing people, the
populations of Alberta and Manitoba continued to expand,
Alberta showing the highest rate of growth. The
changes in total population have been accompanied by a
decline of rural areas relative to urban ones, as rural
people have moved into the cities. There has generally
been a rapid acceleration of this trend since 1941
(graph 1). The decline of the rural farm population
has been following this trend in each of the provinces
surveyed, with Saskatchewan remaining the most rural,
Ontario the most urban, and Alberta having oaught up
with Manitoba in urbanization. Only about 20 per cent
of the people of the latter two provinces now live on
farms. Although Alberta was settled later than
Saskatchewan, it has had a higher proportion of urban
residents since 1901. Manitoba has been dominated by
a) Percentage of the population living in rural areas.
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the Winnipeg metropolitan area, which now includes more
than half the people of the province. The structure of
agriculture in the west has also changed as witnessed by
the decline of the rural farm population in absolute
numbers despite an inorease in the acreage of improved
land. How the main task is to assess the importance of
changes in the strength of independent producers as a
class in Alberta and Saskatchewan.
Using census data up to the 1946 Census of the
Prairie Provinces MacPherson was able to show that the
dominant class in Alberta was the class of small
32
independent commodity producers (petite bourgeoisie).
Using longer term data it is possible to demonstrate
that this is no longer true for Alberta; that
Saskatchewan, throughout the time period covered, has
been more dominated than Alberta by the farming petite
bourgeoisie, although by 1961 this dominance had also
been severely eroded in Saskatchewan; that Ontario
exhibited a very different structure of agriculture from
either and was urbanized much sooner; and that Manitoba
has generally occupied an intermediate position between
Alberta and Ontario.
Graph 2 shows the percentage of the labour force
which is employed in agrioulture. In all provinces
there has been a consistent decline in the relative
Importance of agriculture as an occupation (except for
1936) over the entire period 1921 to 1961. The
32Ibid., pp. 10-20.
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percentage employed in agriculture has declined in
Alberta from a peak of 53 per oent in 1936 to a low of
21 per cent in 1961. Saskatchewan has been even more
dominated by agriculture. The comparative employment
figures remained over 60 per cent until 1936, after which
agriculture declined somehwat slower than in Alberta
until by 1961 some 37 per cent of the labour force was
engaged in agriculture. The percentage employed in
farming in Ontario had already declined to 27 by 1931, a
statistic which fell to only 7 per cent by 1961, the
mark of a highly urbanized, industrial society.
Sinoe the depression, all the prairie provinces
show a firm trend towards a reduction in the number of
farms. Only a small proportion of the decline can be
attributed to changes in the definition of a farm as
that definition grew more restrictive. From a total of
100,000 farms in 1941, Albertan farms were reduced to
73,000 in 1961. For the same period Saskatchewan
showed a reduction from 139»000 to 94,000 farms. In
Ontario the trend was under way throughout the time
period 1921-61. Significantly Ontario shows a decline
in the percentage of all land which is farmland and a
decline in the number of improved acres. This serves
to show how urbanization has encroached on the country¬
side in that province. However, in the prairie
provinces both the total area in farmland and the
improved land has shown an increase over time as the
agricultural frontier pushes north and irrigation
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schemes make farming possible in dry areas# Except for
the period 1931-36 (the depression) the average size of
farms has increased in all provinces. By 1961 the
average area of farms in Alberta and Saskatchewan had
reached a full section or more (640 acres + ). The size
of farms in Ontario has increased steadily but remains
approximately 75 per cent smaller than the average in
the west. Manitoba again occupies a position midway
between Ontario and the other prairie provinces. Not
only has the average size been increasing in Alberta and
Saskatchewan but the proportion of farms over 640 acres
has grown rapidly. Farms of this size comprised 15.2
per cent of all farms in Alberta in 1931» 19.1 per cent
in Saskatchewan. By 1961 these figures had climbed to
28.9 per cent and 42 per cent respectively. In the
same year only 10.4 per cent of Ontario farms were in
this category. The trend towards larger farms in the
prairies has been encouraged by the need to increase the
size of holdings to provide a buffer against the effects
of poor crops or low prices. Large scale production is
also necessary to permit modern, expensive machinery to
be used profitably (Table 2). The increase in the size
of farms has been more the product of amalgamation and
renting than the extension of the agricultural frontier.
In western Canada today, many feel that changes in
the structure of agriculture spell the end for the
family farm and the rise of the corporation farm
operated by a manager. Part of the NDP appeal in 1971
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was a call to preserve the family farm. Statistics on
the tenure of farmland until 1961 do not support the
belief in the decline of the family farm (except in
absolute numbers). Table 3 shows that only in Ontario
has the percentage of farms operated by a manager ever
exceeded 1 per cent. In the three prairie provinces
the proportion of manager operated farms actually
declined from 1951 to 1961. Although data is not
available, it seems reasonable to suppose that it is the
largest and most prosperous farms which are operated in
this way, rather than the small holding. Since 1941
both Alberta and Saskatchewan show a large drop in the
percentage of farms which are tenant operated (24.6 per
cent to 10.1 per cent in Saskatchewan, 17.1 per cent to
9.2 per cent in Alberta). These figures reflect a
greater security for the family farm. While the per¬
centage of farms owned by the operator has declined
everywhere (51.5 per cent are owner operated in
Saskatchewan, compared with 80.1 per cent in Ontario -
1961), this has been countered by a rise in the per¬
centage of farms where the operator has added to his
acreage by renting neighbouring land. The conclusion
from table 3 must be that the farms which do remain in
operation are, for the most part, in the tradition of
the family farm.
There has also been some concern in recent years
that farm operators as a group are ageing and that their
children do not want to or cannot afford to take up
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farming. Table 4 indicates that the percentage of
operators over 60 years old in Alberta and Saskatchewan
remains below that of the provinces where agriculture
has been longer established. Furthermore, the per¬
centage of operators under 25 years old is higher in the
west. Therefore, the trend in age is not yet dangerous
for the future of the farm. The ageing of farm
operators of the west must be seen in the context of the
history of settlement. In 1921 the age structure was
much more oriented to youth because the task of
pioneering was a young man*s job* Thus the age of
farmers in 1961 did not pose a serious threat to the
future of farming. However, if young people are not
prepared to take over the farms, then the future of the
farming is indeed bleak. Unfortunately, there is no
data on this aspect of prairie farming.
Although the changing importance of agriculture as
an occupation has been demonstrated for Alberta and
Saskatchewan, no breakdown of the persons occupied in
agriculture has yet been given which would show the
class composition of the farming population. In table 5
we see that the majority of those employed in agriculture
in all the provinces reviewed should be considered as
petite bourgeoisie in the sense I defined it earlier.
It is worth emphasizing that wage earners have usually
numbered less than 20 per cent of the agricultural labour
force. In Saskatchewan there is a long term trend
towards a decrease in the percentage of wage labour in
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agriculture. The 1961 figure for Saskatchewan is 11.3
per cent compared with 16.9 per cent for Alberta and
24.1 per cent for Ontario. There ia also a long term
tendency for the number of workers hired the year round
to decrease. This evidence is supported by the fact
that the percentage of all farms which employ any hired
labour has fallen every census year since 1936 (except
1951). By 1961 over 60 per cent of farms in all the
prairie provinces employed no hired labour at all.
Thus the effect of increasing the average size of farms
has been more than countered by labour saving mechaniza¬
tion. (However, the very largest farms do tend to
employ labour more than do others.) Not only are fewer
farms employing any hired labour, but those that do are
using that labour for shorter periods on average. Again
Table 5 shows that for farms having any hired labour the
average weeks of hired labour has decreased constantly in
all provinces but Ontario. Since 1936 Saskatchewan
farmers have employed less hired labour than any others.
It follows from these figures that agriculture is carried
on, in all provinces surveyed, by the resident farmer and
unpaid family labour. MacPherson has estimated that
some 5 per cent of prairie farms produce mainly for sub¬
sistence rather than the market, and that a further 5 per
cent depended substantially on hired labour.^' This
latter figure seems somewhat high for Saskatchewan in
present circumstances, since the total number of workers
53Ibid., pp. 16-18.
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hired the year round is approximately 4 per cent of the
farm labour force and these workers are concentrated on
fewer farms than before. Overall it seems safe to
conclude that the occupation of farming in the west, and
particularly in Saskatchewan, has been overwhelmingly
dominated by family units of independent commodity
producers, but that this class is now losing its
numerically dominant position in the class structure.
Chapter Two
Metropolitan Domination: Confederation
and the National Policy
Any attempt to explain the origins and dominance on
the prairies of both the CCF and Social Credit as
protest organisations muBt be incomplete if it excludes
an account of the policies and conditions against which
these political movements were directed. To do this it
is necessary to place western development as a whole in
the context of Canadian history from the middle of the
nineteenth century.1 The main theme of this history is
how a metropolitan elite from eastern Canada initiated
and put into effect a set of policies, the intention of
which was to contribute to the wealth of the metropolis
by exploiting the people and resources of satellite
2
regions. The National Policy, as it became known
during John A, MacDonald's administration, was in fact a
group of separate but interrelated policies on trans¬
portation, immigration, and tariff protection for manu¬
facturing industries. The overall aim of the National
1S.D. Clark points out that the failure to do this is a
major weakness of Upset*s pioneering research on the
CCP. See Clark*s review of "Agrarian Socialism", in
American Sociological Review, vol, 16, 1951, pp. 425-24.
2
A prominent sohool of Canadian historians interpret
Canadian history in terms of the domination of metro¬
polis over hinterland. See J.M.S. Careless,
"Frontierism, Metropolitanism, and Canadian History",
Canadian Historical Review, vol, 35, 1954, pp. 1-31.
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Policy was to build a transcontinental Canadian nation.
However, it also became clear that the main beneficiaries
of the policy were to be the eastern capitalists, who
would gain from the creation of new markets in the west
and from a protective tariff. Neither the liberal nor
Conservative Parties, the only ones to hold office, made
any major changes in the National Policy until it was
judged complete and successful by 1930. The confedera¬
tion of Canada in 1867 was an essential component in the
programme of metropolitan domination, although the argu¬
ment cannot be defended that regional exploitation was
the only, or even the dominant reason, why many
politicians supported confederation. An understanding
of Canada's federal structure is very important to the
student of western protest because the federation
provided the financial power and legal mechanism with
which to implement the National Policy, as well as the
framework in which all political protest organizations
had to operate if they were committed to peaceful
change. The federal structure makes possible the
different political development of Alberta and
Saskatchewan although it is not the explanation of the
differences. In the light of these comments the
process of confederation, the distribution of power in
the federal structure, and the National Policy will be
analysed below. The brevity of the treatment reflects
not the importance of the subject matter, but rather
the easy availability to the interested reader of many
36.
detailed accounts by historians, economists and
•5
political scientists.*'
2.1. The Origin of Confederation
Confederation is the usual term applied to the
federal union which has since 1867 comprised the state
of Canada. A federal state is essentially one in which
the sovereignty of the state is divided between a
central government and the government of the units which
comprise the state. The British North America Act
(1867) federated only the colonies of Nova Scotia, New
Brunswick and Canada. The province of Canada had been
created in 1841 by combining the ex French colony of
Lower Canada with English speaking Upper Canada. Under
the British North America Act the old divisions were re¬
established as the provinces of Quebec and Ontario.
However, the Act made provision for the later entry into
confederation of any, or all, of the remaining British
territories in North America. Leaders of Prince Edward
3
Among the most valuable studies are: D. Creighton,
"John A. MacDonald", vol. 1, "The Young Politician",
Toronto, 1952, and vol. 2, "The Old Chieftain", Toronto,
1955; R.M. Dawson, "The Government of Canada", 4th ed.
revised by Norman Ward, Toronto, 1963; V.C. Fowke,
"The National Policy and the Wheat Economy", Toronto,
1957; H.A. Innes, "Essays on Canadian Economic History",
Toronto, 1956; A.R.M. Lower et al.t "Evolving Canadian
Federalism", Durham, N.C., 1958; J.R. Mallory, "The
Structure of Canadian Government", Toronto, 1971} W.L.
Morton, "The Critical Years", Toronto and Montreal,
1964; Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-
Provincial Relations. Ottawa, 1940 (hereafter called
Rowell-Sirois Report); and P.B. Waite, "The Life and
Times of Confederation", Toronto, 1962.
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Island and Newfoundland had participated in the
discussions leading to confederation hut did not choose
to join until 1873 and 1949 respectively. British
Columbia became a province in 1871 with the promise from
the federal government that a transcontinental railway
would be built within ten years. In 1870 all land
north of the 49th parallel and lying between Ontario and
British Columbia became dominion lands. This area
(Rupert's Land and the North-West Territories) had been
granted by royal charter in 1670 to the Hudson's Bay
Company for the prosecution of the fur trade. Out of
this land the province of Manitoba was quickly carved in
1870. Thirty-five years later the provinces of
Saskatchewan and Alberta were created from the former
Hudson's Bay territory.
Much of the published history of confederation is
concerned with the fine details of political manoeuvering
which took place from the first great debates in the late
fifties, through the Quebec and Charlottetown conferences
of 1864, to the London meeting of 1866, and the final
proclamation of the British North America Act one year
later. This need not detain us here, but what jjs
necessary is to consider the forces which made the idea
of confederation attractive to Canadian politicians.
In particular, it is necessary to understand that the
origins of the National Policy can be discerned among
the goals advanced for confederation.
The decision to enact confederation occurred
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because it appeared to the political leaderB of the
colonies that a federal union was the only solution to a
constellation of local problems; the only solution,
that is, which would be acceptable to the enfranchised
population. Some had more to gain than others, which
is apparent in the hesitancy of the maritime colonies to
enter confederation. Co-operation from the maritimes
was the first preference of Canadian leaders, but if it
were not forthcoming, the problems within the province
of Canada were so pressing that some form of federation
was seen by many as essential. What then were these
forces and fears, which were of sufficient strength in
the decade of the sixties to bring about confederation?
Most important were the internal political troubles of
the province of Canada, a growing fear that American
imperialist policies were a threat to the independence
of the British colonies, and the long term danger to the
colonial economy brought about by a combination of
Britain's adoption of free trade policies, the failure
to extend the reciprocity treaty with the United States,
and the completion of the frontier settlement within the
colonies themselves, which had previously been a stimulus
to trade and industry.
Within the province of Canada tensions were always
high as a result of the religious and ethnic differences
between the two halves of the union. Lower Canada was
predominantly French and Catholic, Upper Canada was
English and protestant. Each part was equally
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represented in the legislative assembly. The governing
groups (party is hardly an appropriate term for the
unstable and undisciplined coalitions, which arose and
disappeared with amazing speed) tended to split
ministerial posts and public funds fairly evenly between
Upper Canada and Lower Canada, but the structure of the
union could not survive changing circumstances. Upper
Canada was increasing its population much faster than
Lower Canada. Led by George Brown of the Toronto
Globe, reformers in the English sector were demanding
representation by population so that they could control
the union government. Then they would not have to
experience what they considered were the injustices of
A
legislation such as the Separate Schools Act. Among
the French, representation by population was resisted,
even by the radicals, because it was felt that the
separate existence of French culture was threatened by
this proposal. For the same reason the extension of
the frontier by annexing the North-West Territories was
opposed in Quebec. It was felt that such a move would
serve to relocate the centre of power in the union in
5
favour of the English. In such a state of tension and
conflict it was essential to bring about some form of
change in the structure of government. The possibilities
were a complete dissolution of the union or some form of
^"A.R.M. Lower, "Colony to Nation", Don Mills, Ont., 1964,
p. 304.
5
Rowell-Sirois Report, op. cit.. p. 21.
40.
federation. To understand why the latter was chosen we
must turn to the other foroes acting on the British
colonies at this time. The internal problems of the
province of Canada would be of no importance to the
study of western politics had they not been so crucial
in deciding the form of union in British North America.
But for the dogged resistance of French Quebecers,
Canada might today be a unitary state rather than a
federation, and western politics could not have developed
as they did.*'
The second major force conducive to confederation
was the long standing fear in the British colonies that
they might be abosrbed by the United States since, by the
middle of the century, Britain no longer wished to under-
7
take the defence of her American colonies. Uneasy
relations with the expanding American giant were
reflected in the War of 1812-14, the Oregon boundary
dispute, and fishing quarrels, but the most immediate
American aggression arose out of Anglo-Canadian attitudes
during the Civil War. Warner goes so far as to claims
"The Civil War was probably the greatest
catalyst in precipitating confederation....
Americans were bitterly hostile to Britain
and to Canada, and some had not scrupled to
urge that the colony be seized to replace the
southern departed states...the Imperial
cabinet had hastened to reinforce Canada and
warned the colonials to prepare to defend
g
It is well known that MacDonald, Gait and most Maritime
politicians would have preferred a legislative union.
7
'Lower, op. cit., p. 316; Rowell-Sirois Report,
op. cit.. p. 20.
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Q
themselves."
Subsequently, Warner argues that the fear of American
q
aggression was groundless, yet the available evidence
was ample to justify fear from the point of view of the
colonist. As the American railroads pushed ever closer
to the Pacific during the fifties and sixties, the
settlement frontier was being moved westward with equal
haste. However, it was also extending north, and in
conjunction with the aggressive rhetoric of those
American politicians who believed in their 'Manifest
Destiny' to control the continent, there was much in
this process of expansion to strike fear into the hearts
of those in Upper Canada who saw their own future pros¬
perity in the development of the North-West Territory.
The French were no less fearful of the effects of
American control than the old Empire Loyalists of the
English colonies. They were persuaded that the best
defence of the French way of life lay in the guarantees
written into the proposed federal constitution.10 At
this time the colonies were separate and tied directly
to a Britain which was unenthusiastic about defending
them. Separately, the colonies were too weak to
O
Donald F. Warner, "The Idea of Continental Union",
Lexington, Kentucky, I960, p. 49.
9Ibid.. p. 58.
10It should not be assumed that all colonists were
repelled by the idea of annexation, Warner, op. cit..
points out that many business men were attracted to
union with the U.S.A. after the reciprocity treaty
was broken off. However, this sentiment was not
shared by the leading politicians.
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withstand American pressure. Thus many Canadians felt
that only in a federation of the colonies did they have
any chance of preserving a British oriented society in
North America.
The third important pressure for confederation was
generated by the declining economic prospects of the
colonies, particularly after the United States dis¬
continued the Treaty for Reciprocity in Trade (1865).
In the debates on economic affairs, which preceded
confederation, we can see the first hesitant steps of
English Canadian politicians in evolving a policy which
would use the federation as a tool to create a vast
hinterland for the purpose of stimulating commerce and
trade in the St. Lawrence valley. Fowke points out
that several prominent leaders in the legislature of the
province of Canada saw the federation of the eastern
colonies as but a beginning for a new nation.11 Of
these men the most prominent was George Brown, He is
reported to have moved the assembly with such comments as:
M...if the mind stretches from the western
bounds of civilization through those great
north-western regions, which we hope ere long
will be ours, to the eastern slope of the
Rocky Mountains, what vast sources of wealth
to the fur trader, the miner, the gold hunter
and the agriculturist, lie there ready to be
developed."12
Yet even Brown realized that such expansion was for some
future date. The new constitution would be constructed
11
Fowke, op. cit.. pp. 34-39.
12
Quoted in Fowke, op. cit.. p. 35.
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so as to make the dream possible, but it cannot be
ignored that most men were moved by more immediate
economic concerns. For many the main economic issue
was whether inter-colonial trade would expand after
confederation and benefit all areas.
The two decades before 1867 were ones of prosperity
for the Maritimes. Lumbermen, farmers and fishermen
together made up over half the occupied population.
Forest products and fish were the two great export
staples, and these supported the shipbuilding industries
and carrying trades. New Brunswick's prosperity was
most dependent on lumber, and Nova Scotia, although its
economy was more diversified, relied heavily on the
success of her fishermen, who sailed in locally built
schooners to cream the shallow banks off Newfoundland.
In 1866, fish accounted for 40 per cent of the total
value of Nova Scotia's exports. Prince Edward Island's
specialized agricultural products were directed to
supplying the other maritime colonies. With the
closely integrated economies so dependent on export
success, changes in the terms of trade could easily
upset the golden age that existed prior to confederation.
(Subsequent history has not borne out these hopes. The
poverty and stagnation of the Maritimes in this century
can be seen as the produot of an earlier capitalist
development of natural resources, which allowed only a
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temporary prosperity. )
Returning to the 1860s we find that the best timber
resources had been used up. In addition, Britain had
adopted free trade policies, which meant that Nova
Scotia's main market for cod (the West Indies) was now
open to competition from New England fishermen# Worse
still, the sedond most important market for fish had been
the United States, but after the Reciprocity Treaty had
been ended, the free entry of fish was no longer
possible# If these troubles were not enough, even for
the stubborn Maritimers, the coming of the steamship was
making the local, sail based, shipbuilding industry
14
obsolete.
A seafaring people, the maritimers had had little
intercourse with central Canada other than the meagre
St. Lawrence traffic in coal and flour# They were
aware that they would benefit from the improved communi¬
cations that a railway to Lower Canada would bring. It
was, however, an expensive project and negotiations
repeatedly broke down in the years before confederation#
13
See A.G. Prank's analysis of metropolis-satellite
relations in "Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin
America", New York, 1967# Early development of
natural resources controlled by an external metropolis
leads to "passive capitalist involution" or under¬
development when the protection and expansion of the
satellite economy is no longer of primary concern to
the leaders of the metropolis. For an account of
Maritime history based on Prank's work see Bruce
Archibald, "Atlantic Regional Underdevelopment and
Socialism" in L. LaPierre et al># ed., "Essays on the
Left", Montreal and Toronto, 1971.
14
On the Maritime economy at confederation see Rowell-
Sirois Report, op. cit.# pp. 22-25.
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The hope that confederation would bring an intercolonial
railroad, and with it a continental hinterland for
Halifax and St. John, was instrumental in bringing New
15
Brunswick and Nova Scotia into the new dominion.
In central Canada, men of commerce expected that
the railway would open new markets and would give their
products access to the ice-free ports of the eastern
coast. With the tariff barriers removed intercolonial
trade would be stimulated. This was the wish of those
in central Canada who had suffered like the Maritimers
when relations with Britain were weakened and free trade
with the United States became impossible. The economy
of central Canada was centred on farming and the forests,
although manufacturing industries, most of them small
and decentralized, had sprung up to supply the local
market. A period of prosperity was ending for two main
reasons. First, the St. Lawrence transportation system,
a water and rail network constructed at great cost to the
public purse, had been intended to tap the trade of
America*s middle western regions. However, the success
of this venture was doomed when the American trade
16
barriers cut out much of the traffic on this route.
The second factor was that the province of Canada had
run out of frontier areas which could be settled
15
Lower, op. oit.. pp. 315-6j Rowell-Sirois Report,
op. oit.. p. 25.
^H.A. Innes, "Transportation as a Factor in Canadian
Economic History", in Innes, op. cit.s Fowke,
op.cit.. p. 34.
46.
successfully. Such areas had previously acted as a
stimulus to investment and the expansion of trade and
17
industry. Further evidence of economic contraction
was that immigration was declining and Canada was losing
a third of her natural increase to the United States.
This evidence of decline was recognized and stressed by
18
several speakers in the confederation debates. The
solution envisaged was the building of a stronger united
economy and expansion into the North-West Territories.
After much intrigue and heated discussion the
impact of the forces outlined above (plus, no doubt,
hopes of personal power) was that the majority of
elected politicians in Canada, New Brunswick and Nova
Scotia voted for a federal union. What was the
structure of the federation and how did the National
Policy evolve from these hazy beginnings?
2.2. The Locus of Power in Confederation
It is not surprising that the government of Canada
was modelled after that of Britain, the main difference
being that Canada was created a federal state. What is
of concern at this point is the distribution of powers
within the federation and its influence on party
organization. Much of Canada's constitution is
17'The pioneer has usually been regarded as economically
unimportant in early Canadian history. Powke's work
is a vital correction and demonstrates the importance
of the pioneer to the province of Ontario. Op. cit.«
pp. 9-24.
18
Fowke, op. cit.. pp. 36-37.
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unwritten, but the founders of the dominion did attempt
to specify in the British North America Act the spheres
of jurisdiction of the separate governments. Section 91
of the Act1^ confers exclusive authority on the dominion
parliament to legislate on the following: amendments to
those parts of the constitution which deal with federal
matters (but not the power to redefine what is a federal
matter)? public debt and property; regulation of trade
and commerce; raising money by any means of taxation;
20
unemployment insurance ; borrowing money on public
credit; currency and coinage; banking; bills of
exchange and promissory notes; interest; bankruptcy
and insolvency; military affairs; navigation and
shipping; postal services; census and statistics;
Indian affairs; criminal law and prisons; and several
other minor powers. In addition, the section is intro¬
duced by a general residual clause empowering the
dominion parliament to "make Laws for the Peace, Order
and good Government of Canada, in relation to all
Matters not coming within the Classes of Subject by this
Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the
Provinces." Section 92 also gives power to the
dominion over all interprovincial communication and over
those works within a province, which are defined as "for
the general Advantage of Canada." The central
19
^It has been reprinted in many sources including
Dawson, op. cit.
20
British North America Act, amended 1940.
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government also has the right to disallow a provincial
law within one year of its proclamation.
The exclusive powers of the provincial legislatures,
as set out in section 92, include the following: amend¬
ment to the provincial constitution, except as it
21
concerns the role of the Lieutenant-Governor ; direct
taxation; borrowing on the credit of the province; the
management and sale of public land and resources;
provincial prisons; hospitals and other health institu¬
tions; municipal institutions; local licences; the
incorporation of companies with provincial objectives;
the administration of justice in the province; property
and civil rights; and all other matters of a purely
local nature. Education is entrusted to the provinces,
subject to limitations protecting the rights of minority
groups and the protection of denominational schools
established prior to confederation. Both the dominioil
and the provinces can legislate on matters of agri¬
culture, but dominion laws take precedence if there is
any conflict*
Any law passed by a legislature may be challenged
on the grounds that it is outwith the powers of that
legislature, in which case the judiciary rule on the
validity of the law. Since the clauses of the British
21
The Lieutenant-Governor represents the Crown in the
provinces, is appointed and removed by the federal
government, and undertakes at the provincial level
tasks similar to those of the Governor-General of
Canada. He may withhold assent from provincial
bills, a fate which some Social Credit legislation
was to suffer.
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North America Act are ambiguous in the specification of
spheres of power, the judiciary have played an important
part in shaping the constitution. Until 1949 the final
court of appeal was the Privy Council, and thereafter
the Supreme Court of Canada. Both courts have
vacillated in their interpretations of the peace, order
and good government clause of section 91» and the vague,
civil rights and property clause of section 92. Lower
records that from about 1890 until 1930 the judicial
committee of the Privy Council cut into the dominion
government*s authority by defining the residual powers
clause as applicable only in emergencies. A corres¬
ponding emphasis was given to the right of provincial
governments to legislate for civil rights and property.
After 1930 some tendency to restore federal powers was
noted, but there remained considerable inconsistency in
22
the court decisions.
As the Rowell-Sirois report correctly argues, it is
impossible ever to know for certain how much centraliza¬
tion the framers of the British North America Act
intended. Nevertheless the majority of constitutional
historians are convinced that a strong central government
23
was aimed for. They are able to quote statements from
22
A.R.M. Lower et al.. op. cit. There is a huge litera¬
ture on this subject, most of it critical of the Privy
Council decisions. For an excellent review and more
favourable reaction see Alan C. Cairns, "The Judicial
Committee and its Critics", Canadian Journal of
Political Science, vol. 4, 1971, pp. 301-345.
23
E.g., Rowell-Sirois Report, op. cit.. pp. 34-35.
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prominent leaders such as John A. MacDonald and Alexander
Gait in which they make clear their preference for a
legislative union. The English business minority in
Montreal were assured that their interests would be
protected since the federal government would control all
matters relating to commerce. lower presents evidence
that James Madison, the prominent American advocate of
centralization, was a strong influence on MacDonald.^
His intention that Canada should have "a powerful
Central Government, a powerful Central Legislature, and
a decentralized system of minor legislatures for local
25
purposes" is reflected in the granting to the dominion
government of all powers not explicitly given to the
provinces, the power to appoint the Lieutenant-Governors
of the provinces, and the power of disallowance. Even
allowing for the tendency of the courts to limit the
impact of the residual powers clause, the clarification
clauses give to the dominion the power to legislate in
the crucial areas of the economy and communications.
Only the dominion government can raise money by both
direct and indirect taxation, which gives it a greater
capacity than the provinces to undertake expensive
projects.
The centralization of economic powers in the
dominion government has had important consequences for
party politics. A party which can win power only at
OA
^Lower et al.. op. cit.. pp. 13-15.
25
^MacDonald, quoted in Dawson^ op. cit.. p. 30.
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the provincial level will be unable to bring about major
changes in economic life within the province, because
the constitutional validity of its laws can be
challenged in the courts. Furthermore, an unsympathetic
federal government can disallow provincial legislation,
or bring financial pressure on the poorer provinces.
It was a crucial reason for the failure of Social Credit
in the depression, that it was a party restricted to
Alberta; yet its reform programme involved national
economic changes, and was either disallowed by the
Liberal government or referred to the courts where the
most important bills were declared ultra vires. Later
the Saskatchewan CCF government was to face financial
and Jurisdictional limitations on its programme,limita¬
tions which could have been overcome had the national
CCF party held power at Ottawa.
The federal structure of the constitution also
influences political party organization. Canadian
parties tend to be fairly loose federations of provincial
units and are in this Bense a mirror image of the formal
constitution. A party may evolve separate provincial
and federal platforms to cope with the problem of the
division of powers. The federal structure has been a
greater influence on the organization of the CCF than
Social Credit, because the CCF began as a national
organization, with provincial sections retaining
considerable autonomy. Gradually the CCF has become
more centralized. Its national organization has never
52,
been controlled from Saskatchewan, whereas the Social
Credit league was very much a provincial party, with a
national extension controlled from Alberta (at least
until W.A. Bennett became powerful in British Columbia).
The division of powers may also be an important
factor in explaining why third parties have received
greater support in provincial politics than in the
federal sphere. For example, while the electorate of
Alberta and Saskatchewan were returning Social Credit
and CCF candidates to the provincial legislatures in the
nineteen-fifties, they were also sending a large group
of Conservatives to Ottawa. Perhaps third parties
receive greater support in provincial politios because
they are seen to have a chance of winning, whereas new
parties on the national level seldom appear likely to win,
2.3. The Development of the National Policy
Despite judicial restrictions, it seems to be an
unavoidable conclusion that the Canadian federation is
highly centralized, and that whichever group holds sway
with federal government opinion can advance its interests
throughout the country. Traditionally the Liberal and
Conservative Parties have both been receptive to the
interests of eastern business. The National Policy was
intended to build a commercial metropolis for the east
by extending the satellite area throughout British North
America. This would have been impossible without the
enlarged financial and legislative powers of the central
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government. The remainder of the chapter will trace
the history of the National Policy from confederation
to 1930.
At confederation the acquisition of Rupert's Land
and the North-West Territories was seen as a long term
goal. However, the timing of expansion was speeded up
because pressure in the United States was building up.
In 1868 the American Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations passed a resolution in favour of peacefully
annexing the British territories in the west. American
commercial expansion was following the extension of the
railways. Most disturbing to Canada was the plan to
build a transcontinental Northern Pacific railroad close
to the international border as a prelude to commercial
and political control of the west. The intent of this
26
construction programme was known to Canadian leaders
and brought immediate action in the acquisition of the
Hudson's Bay lands for the purposes of the dominion.
Next year (1871) British Columbia became a province,
thus creating a transcontinental Canadian state.
This land, aoquired as a new Canadian frontier to
encourage trade and settlement, required a rail link to
make it possible, and settlement was also considered
necessary to keep the United States out. Therefore, a
policy was adopted to build a transcontinental railway
in spite of the immense technical difficulties of
^See Chester Martin, "'Dominion Lands' Policy",
Toronto, 1938, pp. 225-226.
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crossing 1100 miles of the forest, rock and swampland,
which make up the Canadian shield, and then the
mountains of the west. Difficult enough for the United
States, the task wits Immense for a country with Canada's
meagre resources. The problems were increased by the
nationalistic requirements that the route be entirely
within Canadian territory and that American investment
be excluded. MaoDonald's government failed to convince
two competing groups of business men to combine to build
the railway, but eventually, in 1873# the government
incorporated the Canadian Pacific Railway Company with
27
Sir Hugh Allan at its head. The company was promised
a subsidy of thirty million dollars and fifty million
acres of arable land, but it never started construction
because a bribery scandal erupted concerning Allan and
MacDonald's Conservative Party. The government was
defeated and a Liberal administration followed. The
railway was now to be pursued in a different way -
constructed in small sections, the costs coming from the
public purse.
Mackenzie's Liberal administration came to office
at the start of a depression in business and commerce
that was to last until 1878 when fresh elections were
held. With the Conservatives returned to power, rail
construction was pursued with renewed vigour. By 1880
27
Some standard references on the CPR arei H.A. Innes,
"A History of the Canadian Pacific Railway", Toronto,
1923; G.P. de T. Glazebrook, "A History of Trans¬
portation in Canada", Toronto, 1938; Pierre Berton,
"The National Bream", Toronto and Montreal, 1970.
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the government had found a new capitalist syndicate
willing to construct the remainder of the railway. A
second Canadian Pacific Railway Company was established
and received a large government subsidy of $25 million,
25 million acres of land, a monopoly for 20 years, tax
allowances, and several minor concessions. The epic
task was completed in six years; the Canadian wilder¬
ness had been mastered at last. Although other rail¬
ways were later constructed by private enterprise and
then rescued financially by the government (which
combined them into the Canadian National Railways), the
completion of the Canadian Pacific marked the end of one
part of the National Policy. Yet success for the whole
had to await the twentieth century because the period
from 1873 to 1895 was one of depression relieved only by
short term improvements. Settlement of the west and
industrialization of the east advanced but slowly in
this period.
We turn now to the second major part of the
National Policy, namely industrialization through the
28
protective tariff. When MacDonald became Prime
Minister again, in 1878, this was high on his priorities.
Earlier tariffs had been established first for revenue
and secondly for protection. The priority in
considering rates of duty was now to be reversed. As
28
The best concise account is W.A. Mackintosh, "The
Economic Background of Dominion-Provisional Relations,"
Appendix 3 of the Rowell-Sirois Report, op. oit.. re¬
published by McClelland and Stewart, Toronto and
Montreal, 1964.
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early as 1872, with North American free trade an
impossibility, MacDonald told the editor of the Toronto
Mail that "the paper must go in for a National Policy in
tariff matters, and while avoiding the word 'protection*
must advocate a readjustment of the tariff in such a
manner as incidentally to aid our manufacturing and
pq
industrial interests." Speaking to business men
before the 1878 election he is quoted as saying, "I
cannot tell what protection you require. But let each
manufacturer tell us what he wants, and we will try to
•*0
give him what he needs." The demands for protection
were stimulated by the continuing depression in the
seventies, and in 1879 a complex protective tariff was
introduced, which discriminated against highly processed
or finished imports. In cotton and woollen textiles,
and iron and steel products - the industries where
competition had been greatest - the tariff was made very
protective. Further adjustments brought the tariff to
its most complete form by 1887.
Tariff policy was related to the settlement policy
in that the west was to become a new market to be
exploited by the growing eastern industries. The
connection with rail policy was clearly stated by
Charles Tupper when he introduced the Canadian Paoific
Rail.Bill to parliament:
2Q
^MacDonald to Patterson, 24-2-72, quoted in Creighton,
"John A. MaoDonald", vol. 2, op. cit.. p. 120.
30
MacDonald, quoted in Fowke, op. cit., p. 65.
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"...we must look upon that western country as
a field for the manufacturing industries of
the older and more settled parts of Canada.
Every person acquainted with this country
knows we have exhausted to some extent its
bread-growing power, but under the National
Policy that Canada has adopted, we must look
forward not only to building up thriving
centres of industry and enterprises all over
this portion of the country, but to obtaining
a market for these industries after they have
been established; and I say where is there a
greater market than that magnificent granary
of the North-West.♦.let us (by supporting the
Canadian Pacific Railway) strengthen the
hands of those who are engaged in a great
national enterprise, upon the success of
which the rapid progress and prosperity of
the country depends."31
The prosperity for industry which Tupper glowingly
anticipated in 1880 was to be nearly two decades away.
Not until the middle eighteen-nineties were economic
circumstances favourable to expansion. At that time
industrialization and urbanization were proceeding
rapidly in Europe, which brought an increasing demand
for food and raw materials. This was accompanied by a
dramatic fall in transportation costs and a consequent
increase in the relative value of imports. Low rates
of interest in Europe also encouraged investment in the
new countries. Furthermore, by 1900, improvements in
farming techniques permitted western Canada to partici¬
pate fully in this expansion.
The economic development of the east required large
scale immigration to the prairies. Fortunately for
Canada the completion of the Canadian Pacific was
•=51
Charles Tupper, 15-4-88, in R. Brown and M. Prang,
"Canadian Historical Documents", vol. 3, Scarborough,
1966, p. 26.
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closely followed by the settlement of all the good farm
land in the American middle west, so that by the end of
the century Canada's prairies were a growing attraction
to prospective immigrants. Land which had been granted
to neither the railroad companies nor to the Hudson's
Bay Company was made available to settlers in quarter
sections (160 acres) at a nominal fee (Dominion lands
Act, 1872). The land was so divided that adjoining
quarter sections were usually available for purchase
from the government or from one of the companies
referred to above.
The Conservative federal government tried to
promote immigration by advertising in Europe and by
subsidizing transportation, yet the rate of population
growth in Canada during the last decades of the nine¬
teenth century remained far below that of the United
States. The immigration policies were intensified by
Clifford Sifton in the Liberal government of 1896.
Services to assist immigrants from Europe were improved
and a special attempt was made to attract people from
the American middle west. The agricultural areas of
Manitoba were well settled by about 1900, while settle¬
ment in Alberta and Saskatchewan was sparse. But from
the turn of the century there was an immigration
explosion that continued, interrupted only by the First
World War, until all the best lands in the west had been
occupied. This point was reached around 1930. The
increase was most dramatic in the decade 1901-11, when
59.
the population of Saskatchewan increased from 91»279 to
492,432, and that of Alberta from 73,022 to 374,295.32
In some years as many as 40,000 homesteads were filed
and even the inner triangle of the prairies, the short
grass, semi-arid region, was occupied# This area was
better suited to large scale livestock rearing than to
wheat farming, and, therefore, many of these farms were
abandoned by 1921# On the social origin of the new
settlers in Canada there is very little information, but
we know they came as individuals, families and groups of
families from all over Europe, from Britain, and from
the United States# The highly varied ethnic origin of
the prairie population can be appreciated by consulting
Table 10 of Appendix A#
Business men had long awaited this inflow of
immigrant settlers# It must be remembered that the
protective tariff was established to develop industries
to supply a market which did not yet exist, and by means
of a transportation system as yet incomplete# The
business men had to wait twenty years for the market to
develop, during which time the tariff remained in force#
The Liberal Party, although the party of free trade, made
only minor alterations when it came to power in 1896#
The eastern business world could wish for no more
encouraging sound than the Liberal Prime Minister,
Wilfred Laurier, speaking about the new settlers*
%2
Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Census of Canada, 1961,
Bull. 1*1-10, Table 6#
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"They will require clothes, they will require
furniture, they will require implements, they
will require shoes - and I hope you can
furnish them to them in Quebee - they will
require everything that man has to be
supplied with. It is your ambition, it is
my ambition also, that this scientific tariff
will make it possible that every shoe that
has to be worn in those prairies shall be a
Canadian shoe) that every yard of cloth that
can be marketed there shall be a yard of
cloth produced in Canada) and so on and so
on..."33
The opportunity was taken, because Mackintosh reports
that during the period 1895 to 1920 there was a high
rate of investment encouraged by the hopes of profit
from exploiting the natural resources of the country,
and especially the wheat producers of the west. The
expansion of the wheat economy is indicated by the
increase in the total value of wheat exports. In 1890
it was an insignificant $14 million, but by 1920
exported wheat was worth $279 million, by far Canada's
55
most valuable single commodity. Development of the
west brought commercial and financial gain to central
Canada. The tariff raised the price of imports to the
consumer, thus directing the demand of wheat producers
for goods and services to Canadian business. Montreal
made the biggest gains in commercial activity, Toronto
and Ontario in Industrial development. These were the
controlling centres of Canada's economic integration.
Laurier to Canadian Manufacturers Association,
1905, in Brown and Prang, op. cit*. pp. 98-99*
'^Mackintosh, op. cit.. p. 41.
"ibid., p. 46.
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The war effort ensured further development of manu¬
facturing, especially in iron and steel, machinery and
textiles. It also saw increasing use of domestic
sources of investment funds.
The rapid expansion reached a peak in 1920 after
which there was a sharp fall in prices. Unemployment
reached 16.5 per cent in 1921 but improved quickly.
Hardest hit were farmers who produced for the export
market. Their purchasing power was estimated to have
dropped by 59 per cent from 1920 to 1924. It then
recovered to the 1920 level during the next two years.
This brief review of the main features of
confederation and the policies of the federal government
provides a historical background, which is necessary to
understand the people in the west, who depended on agri¬
culture for a living. I have claimed that the frontier
society was created in the interests of the business
classes of metropolitan Canada. The immigrants,
attracted by the promise of the new country, peopled a
hinterland, which the metropolis could exploit. The
frontier was necessary to the metropolis, but the
metropolis always controlled the direction of develop¬
ment through the influence of business in the federal
government. Government controls were only exercised
when the weakness of the small producers was seen to
^6Ibid.*« P* 73
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threaten future prosperity in the east.^
The reader at this stage might imagine that the
inhabitants of the wheat lands were passive in the face
of problems of development. This was far from true
because many defined themselves as objects of
oppression, and fought -back both economically and
politically. Their criticisms and their struggles
during the working out of the National Policy form the
subject of the next chapter.
11
"Fowke, op. cit.. p. 93.
Chapter Three
Early Responses to Metropolitan Domination
It has been suggested that the west was created as
an agricultural hinterland to serve the interests of the
metropolitan east. Further, it has been suggested that
the relationship of metropolis to hinterland is one in
which the metropolis exploits the hinterland. The
people who came to settle the west certainly defined
themselves as an exploited group and periodically they
combined to fight back against the domination of the
eastern metropolis. The CCP and Social Credit were
both examples of such reactions, but the present chapter
is concerned with earlier expressions of discontent,
which relate to the main focus of the study in two ways.
First, many farmers who were either leaders or
supporters of the CCP and Social Credit had been active
in both Canadian and American organizations, which
flourished in the early decades of the twentieth century.
Thus they had undergone a long term socialization
experience in the philosophy and practice of co-opera¬
tion. The new organizations founded in the thirties
carried on the tradition of co-operative action.
Secondly, the reasons why Social Credit won power in
Alberta, and the CCP in Saskatchewan, are closely
connected with the history of political activity by
agrarian organizations in these provinces. Social
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Credit replaced a farmers1 organization which had been
in power for 14 years, while Saskatchewan had had no
history of direct control by an agrarian party when the
CCF became popular. For both these reasons it is
important to give considerable attention to the develop¬
ment of the agrarian response to domination before the
depression.
The first protest organizations developed at a time
when the economy of the prairie provinces was based
almost entirely on the growing of wheat as a cash crop,
although there was more variety in the longer settled
parts of Manitoba, The difficulties faced by wheat
farmers in both the United States and Canada have been
recounted many times1; these problems need only be
summarized here. For a start the climate is such that
the correct amount of rain at the right time is not
guaranteed. Each year crops may be subject to damage
by drought, unseasonal frosts, insect pests, as well as
dust storms in which the precious top-soil is blown
away. Yield per acre is, therefore, extremely variable
from one year to the next.
The price that the farmer received for his wheat
depended on a combination of how it was graded, the cost
^•g., S.M. Lipset, "Agrarian Socialism", 2nd edition,
New York, 1968; Paul F, Sharp, "The Agrarian Revolt in
Western Canada", Minneapolis, 1948; John D. Hicks,
"The Populist Revolt", Minneapolis, 1931; Robert L«
Morlan, "Political Prairie Fire: The Nonpartisan
League, 1915-1922", Minneapolis, 1955; Harald S,
Patton, "Grain Growers1 Co-operation in Western Canada",
Cambridge, Mass., 1928,
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of transportation, and world demand. The price of
wheat on world markets, which the individual farmer
could not influence, was highly variable. Given all
this the farmers still complained that the price which
they actually received was lower than it should have
been for the following reasonst
1. Elevator companies undergraded the wheat whioh the
farmer brought to his local elevator. At the large
terminal elevators wheat of different grades was
mixed and sold by the companies at the price of the
higher grade.
2. Elevator companies formed a cartel to keep prices and
storage charges high.
3. Kailroad rates in the west were exorbitant compared
with charges in other parts of the country.
4. In Canada farmers were especially bitter about the
protective tariff, which, they complained, raised the
cost of goods they had to purchase, especially
implements and household goods*
5. It was claimed that banks charged too high a rate of
interest on the loans which farmers required to
develop their land and for general expenses incurred
before money was received for the year's crop.
6. In giving credit banks were favouring large companies
over the small ones, and in this way they helped
maintain oligopoly in the grain business. The large
milling and grain companies were able to control the
price of wheat on the Winnipeg market.
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This does not exhaust the list of grievances, for which
the most complete evidence is the Report of the
2
Saskatchewan Elevator Commission, In sum, it is clear
that the farmers of the west considered themselves to be
harassed at every major point by external forces,
whether of nature or man# They were prevented from
receiving what they felt was a fair return for their
effort, and responded to their circumstances by founding
a series of reform organizations,
5,1, First Attempts at Organization
Most studies of agrarian organization in western
Canada begin with either the Grange or the Territorial
Grain Growers Association, But predating both was the
Manitoba and North-West Farmers Union, active as a
pressure group during the 1880s, It was founded in
southern Manitoba in 1883 at the conjunction of the
collapse of a land boom, low yields, and low prices for
3
wheat. Any ratepayer could join if he subscribed to
the declaration of rights and demands which included:
"Absolute control by the province of Manitoba
of its public lands and natural resources;
the granting of power to the municipalities
to erect their own grain storage elevators,
warehouses and flour mills; the appointment
2
Report of the Elevator Commission of the Province of
Saskatchewan, Regina, 1910,
3
^Donald F, Warner, "The Farmers' Alliance and the
Farmers' Union: an American-Canadian Parallelism",
Agricultural History, vol, 23, 1949, PP» 9-19; Louis
A. Wood, "A History of Farmers' Movements in Canada",
Toronto, 1924.
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of grain inspector® under provincial
authority; the construction of the Hudson
Bay Railway; and the removal of duties on
agricultural implements and building
materials, together with a lowering of such
other duties as bore on articles of daily
consumption."4
In subsequent years most of these demands were to be
repeated throughout the west. The Union failed to
achieve any favourable results and fell into disrepute,
especially when it advocated an end to immigration. By
1885 it was defunct, but pressure continued for many of
the reforms referred to above. Warner, for example,
records that pressure against the railroad persisted
until 1888, when the Canadian Paoific monopoly in
5
Manitoba was rescinded. For our purposes the Manitoba
and Borth-West Farmers Union is relative unimportant
because it preceded the main influx of settlers to
Alberta and Saskatchewan. Most of the farmers who came
to this territory were unfamiliar with the precedent in
Manitoba.
For early inhabitants of the Horth-West Territories
the first contact with organized farm protest was
probably The Grange (sometimes called The Patrons of
Husbandry), which flourished for a few years in the area
at the end of the nineteenth century. However, the low
tariff policy of The Grange was little different from
that of the Liberals, and after early success in
^ood, op. cit.. p. 123.
5
Warner, op. cit.
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politics the organization disappeared from the prairie.^
The problems of the wheat economy continued into
the twentieth century, as did the arrival of pioneers,
many of whom came from the United States, where they had
experience in organizations such as the Farmers* Alliance
and the populist parties. In the first years of the new
century these men were to combine in much more effective
organizations than had existed in the latter part of the
7
nineteenth century.
1901 was a crisis year on the prairie, paradoxi¬
cally, because it was the year of the largest crop ever
known. Farmers were entitled to load their crop
directly into freight cars at local loading platforms,
or, indirectly, by dealing with a line elevator company.
When the boom crop arrived, the railway was unprepared.
Freight cars were in short supply, and those that were
available were given first to the elevator companies.
This served to aggravate the problems of farmers, who
were already concerned at the difficulty of getting
their only source of income to market. The issue
Sfood, op. clt.. chapter 12.
7
'The history of these organizations has been written
many times. The summary here is in debt primarily to
the following! Hugh Boyd, "New Breaking! an Outline
of Go-operation among the Farmers of Western Canada",
Toronto, 1938; lipset, op. cit.. chapter 3; William
A. Mackintosh, "Agricultural Go-operation in Western
Canada", Toronto, 1924; Hopkins Moorhouse, "Deep
Furrows", Toronto and Winnipeg, 1918; W.l, Morton,
"The Progressive Party in Canada", Toronto, 1950;
Patton, op. olt.! William K. Rolph, "Henry Wise Wood
of Alberta", Toronto, 1950; Sharp, op. cit.: and
Wood, op. oit.
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spurred on some men in the well established Indian Head
settlement to promote a permanent organization to look
after the interests of grain growers. The outcome of
an informal meeting in December 1901 was the formation
of the Territorial Grain Growers' Association. This
organization immediately advocated and won a law to
ensure that the available grain cars would be distri¬
buted in the order they were applied for. The crop of
1902 was even larger than in the previous summer, and so
was the transportation problem. Under the new law the
Territorial Grain Growers challenged the Canadian
Pacific Railway on the grounds that it had again given
preference to elevator companies in the distribution of
freight cars. In winning this case the Territorial
Grain Growers* Association received much publicity, which
was followed by a rapid increase in membership.
When the provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan were
created in 1905t the Territorial organization was re¬
named the Saskatchewan Grain Growers' Association. By
this time the success of the old Territorial organization
against the Canadian Pacific Railroad had encouraged the
establishment of the Manitoba Grain Growers' Association,
which had similar aims and constitution to the older
body. The two organizations made Joint representations
to government. In the newer territory of Alberta, the
United Farmers of Alberta was not formed until 1909,
when the small Alberta Farmers' Association and the
Society of Equity amalgamated.
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3.2. The Beginning of Economic Co-operation
Among the most active of farmers in the Territorial
Grain Growers' Association were those in the Sintulata
district of Saskatchewan. In 1905 they sent E.A.
Partridge to Winnipeg to study the workings of the 'grain
trade. His observations led him to conclude that the
farmers should themselves start a company to transport
and sell grain on the Winnipeg exchange, thus cutting
out the profits of middlemen. He received little
support from the formal organizations, but in his home
district farmers were enthusiastic. They decided to
set up a Grain Growers' Grain Company to operate in the
1906 season. Early problems of financing a charter and
buying a seat on the exchange were overcome, only for
the other members of the exchange to ban the farmers'
company after it had been but six weeks in operation.
However, the exchange was in Manitoba, and by this time
the Manitoba farmers* organization was supporting the
Grain Growers* Grain Company. Such pressure was brought
to bear on the provincial government that it, in turn,
forced the Winnipeg exchange to readmit the farmers'
grain company. The company barely survived its first
trading year, but thereafter expanded and prospered
under the guidance of T.A. Crerar.
A major event during this period was the founding
of the Grain Growers Guide, a journal dedicated to
educating the farmer and which supported the idea of
populist democracy in opposition to the "corrupt",
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corporation dominated party system. Partridge became
its first editor, but he soon resigned when his socialist
ideas were not accepted by his associates. Shortly
after its first appearance the Guide was accepted by all
the farm organizations as their official paper. It was
to become a major influence among farmers, and its
columns are a valuable source of agrarian opinion and
debate.
As we have seen criticisms of the elevator
companies was widespread on the prairies, and it was in
the elevator business that the next major organizing
activity took place. During 1907 Partridge promoted a
plan for the state ownership of elevators, which was
quickly endorsed by the provincial farm organizations.
His plan called for the federal ownership of terminal
elevators and provincial ownership of line elevators.
During the next three years, much pressure was brought
on all governments concerned, but this resulted only in
procrastination of a definite decision. In the end the
federal government would not support state ownership,
agreeing only to improve inspection procedures.
However, the provincial governments depended on agrarian
support if they were to be re-elected, which encouraged
them to take some action because the feelings of the
farmers remained firmly behind the Partridge plan. As
an indication of the strength of opinion, petitions
containing about ten thousand names were handed to both
the Manitoba and Saskatchewan governments.
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In 1909 the Manitoba government reversed its
earlier statement that state control was unconstitu¬
tional, and requested the Manitoba Grain Growers1
Association to provide a plan for consideration in
drawing up an elevator bill. The chief suggestions of
the farmers' organizations were that the purchase price
of existing private elevators should be the cost of
building a replacement, and that control of the
elevators should be vested in an independent commission
of three members appointed by the Manitoba Grain Growers'
Association and removable by either a two-thirds majority
in the legislature or by the provincial Court of Appeal.
These requests were then ignored by the government with
the result that the Manitoba Elevator Act of 1910
provided for arbitration when the value of an elevator
was in dispute, required that the commission be appointed
by the cabinet and be subject to cabinet control, and
1
Included a clause whereby no elevator could be purchased
or built unless a petition were received with the signa¬
tures of at least 60 per cent of farmers who were in the
area to be served by the proposed elevator. The
Manitoba Grain Growers' Association predicted failure,
but still asked farmers to support the Act. Patton
concluded from his Investigation that "the statutory
conditions under which the Manitoba elevator system was
established was such as to make losses in its operation
8
more or less inevitable." The outcome of this fiasco
8
Patton, op. cit.. p. 90.
73.
was that the Grain Growers* Grain Company paid the
government a rent of 6 per cent of the total oost of the
elevators and took over their operation. A loss in the
first year was followed by years of increasing profit.
Controlling its own elevators the Grain Growers' Grain
Company was now able to improve its competitive position
and its service to patrons. In Thompson's terms it had
reduced uncertainty by extending control over its
Q
environment.
Meanwhile in Saskatchewan the Liberal government
had been more cautious. In response to pressure from
the Saskatchewan Grain Growers' Association, premier
Scott decided to appoint an investigating commission to
study the feasibility of government owned storage
facilities. Reporting in 1910, the commission rejected
public ownership and suggested that the solution to the
problem "must be sought along the line of co-operation
by the farmers themselves assisted in the matter of
finance by a provincial loan."10 At the firBt legisla¬
tive session of 19H» the main recommendations of the
commission plus some amendments from the Grain Growers'
Association provided the basis of a bill to establish
the Saskatchewan Co-operative Elevator Company. The
bill, which was accepted by the farmers' organization,
provided for a board of six directors, who would take
Q
^James D. Thompson, "Organizations in Action", New
York, 1967.
10Report of the Elevator Commission of the Province of
Saskatchewan, Regina, 1910, pp. 96-98.
74
subscriptions and form locals of the company. Shares
were in $50 units and were sold only to farmers, each of
whom could hold no more than ten. A local could be
formed when enough shares were sold to pay for the
construction of an elevator, but the government would
advance 85 per cent of a local's capital on a long term
loan basis. When 25 such locals had been formed the
Saskatchewan Co-operative Elevator Company could start
business. Profits were to be distributed according to
the amount of business brought to any elevator. Prom
46 elevators in 1911 the company expanded to 137 in the
1912 crop year. Nearly 13,000,000 bushels of grain
were handled for a membership of 13,156 (out of a total
11
of 95,013 farmers). The new company was now strong
in the province, although supported by a minority of
farmers. Its support came from the earliest settled
regions, where many farmers, who had come with hopes of
quick wealth, had had their hopes shattered by a
combination of poor crops and exploitation. After the
Grain Growers* Grain Company had relieved the Manitoba
government of responsibility for its elevators, "in both
provinces the solution of the elevator crisis was found
in the assumption of elevator operation by farmer-owned
12
companies on a competitive basis."
In Alberta, the last area of the prairie to be
settled, production of grain had expanded more rapidly
11
Patton, op. cit.« p. 111.
12Ibid.. p. 112.
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than the construction of elevators, although in Alberta
the problem was less than elsewhere. The demand for
government-owned elevators was always resisted by the
ruling Liberal party. But the extension of production
of marquis wheat and the success of the Saskatchewan Co¬
operative Elevator Company brought an increase in demand
for farmer-controlled elevators. Under pressure from
the United Farmers of Alberta the Liberals enacted (in
1915) a bill which permitted the formation of the
Alberta Farmers* Co-operative Elevator Company, which
was similar in most respects to the one in Saskatchewan.
All marketing was done through the agency of the Grain
Growers' Company in Winnipeg. Although never as large
as the Saskatchewan company, the Alberta Elevator
Company operated at a profit during the four years of
its existence from 1913 to 1917.
The formation of the United Grain Growers* Company
provides an excellent example of that class of organiza¬
tion, which is established by the merging of two older
organizations with complementary interests. The co¬
operative elevator companies had their main strength at
the initial loading points, whereas the power of the
Grain Growers' Grain Company lay in the marketing of the
crop and at the terminal elevators. As noted above,
the Alberta Farmers' Elevator Company.worked in close
co-operation with the Grain Growers' Grain Company. In
1911 the latter company had at last received a federal
charter which gave it enlarged powers, which permitted
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the company to deal in all farm products and in all
substances related to agricultural production. The
subsequent expansion of operation increased the chances
of overlapping and rivalry between farm organizations.
For example, by 1914 both the Saskatchewan Grain Growers'
Association and the Grain Growers' Grain Company ran co¬
operative trading departments in Saskatchewan. The
case for a united farmers' company was proposed by
Crerar to such effect that in 1915 a shareholders
meeting of the Grain Growers' Company resolved to have
the directors carry out a plan for federation. The
Alberta Farmers' Co-operative Elevator Company responded
with a similar resolution, but in Saskatchewan the
acceptance was indefinite and lukewarm, since the
powerful Saskatchewan Co-operative Elevator Company had
less to gain than any of the other parties.
"Controlling as it did a large volume of grain
in the principal producing province, the
Saskatchewan Company was in fact reluctant to
relinquish its profitable and well established
commission and sales business, for participa¬
tion in the earnings of a central company, in
the determination of whose policy and methods
it would have only a partial voice."13
When firm proposals for a complete merger, rather than
the establishment of a joint central company, were
presented the Saskatchewan Company withdrew completely.
The other two companies, with overwhelming support from
their membership, continued negotiations leading to the
formal establishment in 1917 of the United Grain Growers*
Company to be managed by T.A. Crerar.
13Ibid., p. 169.
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3.3. The Development of Political Action among
the Farmers
The above section has dealt only with early
attempts to organize in the economic sphere, in
particular, the storage, transportation, and marketing
of crops. More important for the aim of this study is
to trace the origins of political action and to show how
it came to be increasingly dominant as a way of
protesting. Of course, farmers hoped by political
action to increase their living standards just as they
hoped to do this by economic co-operation. The history
of agrarian politics on the prairie shows a transition
from predominantly pressure group action to the support
(if not the founding) of new political parties. A
brief review of this political history follows.
During the 1890s The Grange had succeeded in having
a few independent farmer candidates elected to government
bodies, but in this decade and the first ten years of the
next century, farmers usually confined their political
activity to lobbying the established political parties.
The farmers were concerned not only with the problems of
marketing but also with the tariffs on goods coming into
the country, which had the effect of raising the costs
of farm production. The resistance of governments,
particularly in Ottawa, to agrarian demands produced a
growing movement among western farmers for independent
political action. Prom 1913 several conventions passed
resolutions for the establishment of a third party
78.
14.
similar to the British Labour Party. All that
actually happened was that watered-down initiative and
referendum laws were introduced to Alberta and
15
Saskatchewan in 1913. In this we see the influence
of American populist thought. (Although the public
voted heavily in favour of direct legislation laws in
Saskatchewan, the law was repealed, the premier arguing
16
that its total support was insufficient. )
Agrarian discontent continued through the First
World War, aggravated now by the issue of conscription,
to which farmers were generally opposed. (It was this
more than any other issue which brought the more conser¬
vative farmers of Ontario into political action.)
South of the border in North Dakota, farmers faced with
problems similar to those of the Canadian prairie farmer
had formed a Nonpartisan League to protect their
interests. The strategy of the League, guided by A.C.
Townley, was to gain power by taking over the nomina¬
tions of the North Dakota Republican Party. The
League's programme was for the state control of all
those aspects of the farmers* environment, which could
not be controlled without direct government intervention.
The main proposals were fors
14
Saskatchewan Grain Growers' Association Convention,
1913, minutes. Archives of Saskatchewan.
15
Wood, QP» clt.. p. 286; and Elizabeth Chambers, "The
Referendum and the Plebiscite", in N. Ward and D.
Spafford, "Politics in Saskatchewan", Don Mills, Ont.,
1968.
^Chambers, op. cit.
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1. State ownership of terminal elevators, flour mills,
packing houses and cold-storage plants.
2. State inspection of crop grading and grain dookage
(charges against loss of grain in handling).
3. Exemption of farm improvements from taxation.
4. State hail insurance based on a tax on the acreage
under crop.
17
5. Rural credit banks operated at cost.
It is important to observe that this was not a programme
inspired by theoretical socialism, no attempt being made
to remove control of property or other possessions from
the majority of people in the state, i.e., the farmers
themselves. The policy of the Nonpartisan League is of
particular importance for Canada because it became
influential north of the 49th parallel.18
The Nonpartisan League was introduced to Saskatchewan
by S. Haight who settled near Swift Current in 1916. He
promoted the League to such effect that by 1917 there
were some three thousand members in Saskatchewan and two
iq
thousand in Alberta. A newspaper was started in each
1^Pred E. Haynes, "Social Politics in the United States",
Houghton Mifflin, New York, 1924, p. 309.
1R
The best accounts of the rise and decline of the Non¬
partisan League are: Paul Possum, "The Agrarian Move¬
ment in North Dakota", Baltimore, 1925} Morlan, op.
cit.,; Theodore Saloutos, "The Rise of the Nonpartisan
League in North Dakota, 1915-1917", Agricultural
History, vol. 20, 1946, pp. 43-61; Theodore Saloutos,
"The Expansion and Decline of the Nonpartisan League in
the Western Middle West, 1917-1921", Agricultural
History, vol. 20, 1946, pp. 235-252; Sharp, op. cit.
1^Wood, op. cit.. p. 294.
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province and both advocated a reform programme similar
to that of North Dakota. Candidates were put forward
in provincial elections but the only successful one was
endorsed by the other parties as well.
The fate of the Nonpartisan League in Saskatchewan
was determined by the closeness of ties between the
Saskatchewan Grain Growers* Association (which by 1916
had 28 thousand members from a possible 104,000) and the
Liberal government. Morton records that most legisla¬
tion demanded by the grain growers was enacted by the
20
government. Many men moved from the Grain Growers*
Association into the government. Cabinet ministers such
as W.R. Motherwell, J.A. Maharg, G. Langley and C. Dunning
retained their membership in the organization. Given the
close ties between the organized farmers and the
provincial government it is not surprising that the
League made little headway in Saskatchewan. It did
thrive in Alberta and, as will be demonstrated, contri¬
buted in a major way to the entrance of the United Farmers
of Alberta into politics.
Meanwhile, in Saskatchewan, high prices and the
failure of the federal government to reduce tariffs,
prompted the Saskatchewan Grain Growers* Association to
adopt in 1917 the Farmers* Platform of the Canadian
Council of Agriculture, an interprovincial organization,
which had been founded in 1910. The platform:
20
Morton, op. cit.. pp. 35-6.
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"contained declarations in favour of tariff
reductions on farm supplies and the
necessities of life, extension of Imperial
Preference and renewal of Reciprocity
negotiations with the United States, greater
dependence on direct taxation for federal
revenue, nationalization of railways, non-
alienation of natural resources, women's
suffrage, provincial autonomy in liquor
legislation, etc."21
This platform, or the New National Policy as an enlarged
version was called in 1918, was endorsed by the
provincial farm organizations of Alberta, Manitoba and
Ontario as well. Peelings among the farmers were so
strong that in October, 1919» independent agrarian
candidates won federal by-elections in Saskatchewan,
Ontario and New Brunswick.22 Motherwell, the defeated
Liberal in Saskatchewan, was a former president of the
Grain Growers' Association. These three independent
candidates were, in effect, the first MPs elected on the
Progressive ticket. In provincial elections the most
outstanding event was the victory of the United Farmers
of Ontario, who formed a government with the help of
Independent Labour members in 1919*
The Progressive Party is a major landmark in the
development of political action because it constitutes
the first formal agrarian political party in Canada.
In 1920 a conference called by the Canadian Council of
Agriculture, and attended by delegates of all major
farmers* organizations, recognized T.A. Crerar as head
21
Patton* op. cit.. pp. 388-9.
22Wood, op. cit.. pp. 350-1.
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of what was now called the National Progressive Party.
From the beginning the new party was not united behind
the leadership of Crerar, The internal divisions are
2*5
recounted in detail by Morton. Crerar saw the party
as a national unit and aimed to include all members of
society in its membership. In this he was supported by
most Saskatchewan, Manitoban and eastern members.
Henry Wise Wood, however, promoted a philosophy of
government by co-operating interest groups and argued
that the Progressive Party should be restricted to the
economic class organization of farmers. In this Wood
had the support of Albertan members and a few from
Saskatchewan. A further division was over state or
free market control of the price of wheat. Saskatchewan
farmers were especially keen on state control and could
not be ignored by Liberals such as Crerar. Before
describing the fate of the Progressives at Ottawa, it
will be necessary to return again to the history of the
Nonpartisan League and the United Farmers of Alberta in
order to understand the divisions within the Progressive
Party, which brought about its early decline.
It is probable that the divisions in the Progressive
camp would have been less severe had not Alberta farmers
been subject to the influence of Henry Wise Wood.
Paradoxically, Wood was antagonistic to party politics
and his influence would not have been so great had he not
been pressured by the Nonpartisan League. As we have
23
Morton, op. cit.. chapter 4.
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seen the League flourished and declined rapidly in
Saskatchewan. In Alberta, a more diversified province
economically, there were less close relations between
organized farmers and the Liberal government,
particularly after that party was split by a scandal
over the allotment of contracts on the construction of
PA
the Great Waterways railway. Morton argues that this
split in the Liberal Party was never effectively healed
25
and it created a climate receptive to protest movements.
In these circumstances the Nonpartisan League remained
strong, its most influential member being William
Irvine, who edited the organization's newspaper in
Calgary. In Canada, the policy of the League was
strongly in favour of independent party organization,
and ties between farmers and government were much less
in Alberta than in Saskatchewan. Wood was the
president of the United Farmers of Alberta, and it was
the strength of the League as a possible major
competitor which may have changed his mind about
bringing the United Farmers into politics. (By 1919
the Nonpartisan League was absorbed into the United
Farmers of Alberta, but not before the principle of
political action was accepted.) Thus Morton considered
that Wood changed his mind because:
"...his hand was forced, and he chose rather
to lead his followers where they were going
2A
L.G. Thomas, "The Liberal Party in Alberta", Toronto,
1959.
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^Morton, op. cit.. p. 36.
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in any event than to remain fixed by his own
doubts. In particular, the invasion of
Alberta by the Nonpartisan League, the
militantly class conscious farmers* organiza¬
tion which arose in North Dakota in 1915»
threatened to stampede the U.F.A. membership
into politics despite their leaders'
opposition."26
The absorption of the League into the United Farmers
of Alberta may have stimulated the political awareness of
members of the organization, but in so far as it was
active politically, it was dominated by the populist and
group government theories of Wood. In order to under¬
stand Wood's thought it is necessary to know something of
his social history. Rolph's biography provides by far
the most complete account of Wood and the organizations
27
in which he played a part. Wood was born in Missouri
into a prosperous farming family; his father fought for
the south but surprisingly emerged from the war in a
healthy financial condition. For a mid-western farmer's
son Wood was well educated, spending two years at
Christian University, Missouri. For a time he was an
active member of the Campbellite sect, or Church of the
Disciples. These people "placed their emphasis on
fellowship and following the way of life advocated by
28
Jesus" rather than on dogma or organization. (The
religious philosophy of fundamentalist sects such as the
26
W.L. Morton, "The Social Philosophy of Henry Wise
Wood, the Canadian Agrarian Leader", Agricultural
History, vol. 22, 1948, p. 120. (My emphasis.)
2^Rolph, op. cit.
28Ibid., p. 10.
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Campbellites is entirely consistent with the political
philosophy of self help through co-operative action.
A close relationship persisted on the prairies between
religion and politics, climaxing in the appeal of
William Aberhart, fundamentalist preacher and Social
Credit leader.)
To return again to Wood's biography, he remained
interested in literature and philosophy after leaving
university. He became familiar, for example, with some
of Marx's writing, but rejected the revolutionary
exhortations therein. By the 1880s Wood had become a
leading cattle breeder in northern Missouri. He joined
the Farmers' and labourers' Union; became a free mason;
refused a Democratic nomination to the state legislature;
organized a successful mutual telephone company in
opposition to Bell; studied but was not active in the
Alliance and Populist organizations. He grew up in a
region subject to a political philosophy described by
Hicks as follows:
"(It)...boiled down finally to two fundamental
propositions: one, that the government must
restrain the selfish tendencies of those who
profited at the expense of the poor and needy;
the other, that the people, not the pluto¬
crats, must control the government."29
When he finally entered politics through the United
Farmers of Alberta, Wood was guided by these principles.
However, his reluctance to enter politics at all has
been ascribed by Rolph to his experience in Missouri
2Q
^Hicks, op. cit.. p. 406.
86.
with political patronage and bargaining, and especially
the defection of agrarian leaders to the old parties.
Wood had become successful not as an owner, but as
the manager of his father's farm. In order to get
inexpensive land of his own, he joined the thousands who
were moving north to Canada. In 1905 Wood started a
wheat farm on the Canadian frontier near Calgary and was
active in the Society of Equity, subsequently a part of
the United Farmers. In politics Wood at first
supported the Liberal Party. It is noteworthy that in
the same year he became president of the United Farmers
of Alberta (1916), Wood tried for but failed to receive
the Liberal nomination in Calgary West. This is
important for two reasons. First, that Wood was
prepared to be actively involved in politics at this
time casts some doubt on the usual reason put forward
for his reluctance to bring the United Farmers into
politics, i.e., did he feel threatened by the political
opinions of other members of the organization, especially
William Irvine. Secondly, at a time when he had already
read extensively in politics, philosophy and economics,
Wood was willing to work within the Liberal Party, the
party of the status quo. This gives some support to
MacPherson's assessment that the politics of farmers in
Alberta had always been the politics of a liberal,
"50
petite bourgeoisie. The political opposition of
30
MacPherson, op. cit. This is a major theme of his
work.
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farmers at this time was an attempt to ameliorate
capitalism from the standpoint of the small, independent
producer.
Wood's political philosophy of group government was
a proposal to alleviate the ills of industrial
capitalism, and it was a philosophy which owed much to
his knowledge of the populist tradition of the United
States mid west. According to Wood, social life in
industrial society is a histoiy of competition and
conflict between a plutocracy and the masses. Within
this competitive society only the plutocracy was
organized. This enabled the industrial producers to
exploit others, who participated in the market only as
individuals. Farmers were especially exploited.
Wood's solution lay in co-operative production and class
organization; the organized strength of each class
would then prevent the exploitation of any one class:
"When you get class and class equally
efficient in competition, as the less
developed classes develop higher, I don't
think the conflict in the last analysis will
be very destructive. I think that before it
reaches the acute stage the better judgement
of all will prevail."31
To say the least this approach naively assumes common
interests and the inability of one organized group to
dominate others. However, in a province where farmers
were demographically so dominant it proved attractive,
especially when it was coupled with a rejection of the
31
Wood, as quoted in W.L. Morton, "The Social Philosophy
of Henry Wise Wood, Canadian Agrarian Leader", op.
cit., p. 118.
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party system. Both Liberals and Conservatives were
denounced as autocratic and committed to the "moneyed
interests", that constant focus of populist anger.
Instead of a party system Wood supported political
representation by democratically organized occupational
groups, each nominating its delegates to the legislature
and instructing them about what to support. Failure to
comply would lead to the recall of the member. The
organization of a new party was rejected because it was
believed that parties led invariably to corruption.
Instead a new co-operative government would be formed by
32
the elected representatives of class organizations.
The opinions of Wood dominated in rural Alberta and
had far reaching consequences for the success of the
Progressive Party. Although he was against class war,
Wood also opposed creating a political organization open
to members other than farmers. This meant that there
could be no official co-operation between farmers and
33
labour in areas such as Edmonton and Calgary.The
presence of United Farmers of Alberta members among the
Progressive candidates in the 1921 federal election led
to charges by the opposition that the Progressives were
a class party. Although denied by T. Crerar, the party
leader, the charge was buttressed by Wood*s statements
in Alberta, for example, - "...we are now an economic
32
MacPherson, op. cit.
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group preparing to take action."-5^ (In practioe there
was little attempt to win the labour vote. Ever since
farmers had opposed the Winnipeg general strike of 1919
there had been tension between farmer and worker.)
Clearly, by limiting their appeal to farmers, there was
no hope that the progressives could dominate a federal
government, although in an agrarian province such as
Alberta this might be possible. Populist influence can
be seen in the decentralized organization of the party.
Candidates were selected and elected completely by the
efforts of the local constituency members. Fearing the
corruption of traditional parties, there was only a house
leader, no national organizer, and no central party fund.
Despite its "loose" organization, the Progressive Party
won 65 seats in the 1921 federal election and formed the
second largest group in parliament.
At Ottawa those Progressives who were influenced by
Wood were opposed to party government with its divisions
into cabinet, supporting party and opposition. Thus
the commitment of many western members to constituency
autonomy and group government was responsible for the
Progressives in parliament refusing to become t]ae
official opposition. T.A. Crerar then resigned his
leadership and, in return for a few concessions from
MacKenzie-King, rejoined the Liberal Party. Subse¬
quently the majority of eastern Progressives followed
34.
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suit. The breakdown of the Progressive Party has been
ascribed by Morton to the failure to accept the title of
official opposition. This failure was perhaps
inevitable given the fundamental divisions within the
party between populist followers of Henry Wise Wood and
the more conservative members, who were little more than
Liberals outside the Liberal Party. Also, the opposition
of United Farmers of Alberta to official labour membership
would have prevented the party from acquiring a wide
enough social base to form a government. Even those who
wanted a composite, national party had been vehement in
their opposition to the Winnipeg general strike of 1919#
Defection to the Liberals after 1922 gives credence to
the claim that people like Crerar were really Liberals
in disguise. They were also supported by such staunch
Liberals as John Dafoe and his Winnipeg Free Press.^
Dafoe argued that the Liberal Party acted like Conserva¬
tives, any sign of true Liberal action being crushed by
37
big business and finance. His strong support for the
Progressives suggests that they were in large part
bourgeois and "true" liberals. Thus, although the
rejection of parliamentary institutions by the progress¬
ives defines the beginning of their decline, they had
never been, for the most part, anything but liberals.
Lipset is only partly accurate in his statement that:
36
Ramsay Cook, "The Politics of John W, Dafoe and the
♦Free Press'", Toronto, 1963.
37
Morton, "The Progressive Party...", op. cit., pp. 25-6.
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"The Progressive movement failed principally
because it was more a product of immediate
discontent than of long term crisis. It was
not the expression of a self-conscious class
demanding deep-rooted change. The farmers
turned to independent political action
because of the threat posed to their way of
life by the post war crisis. Once the
conditions which before produced the protest
disappeared, the mass movement died."38
As I have recounted, the immediate discontent to which
lipset refers was only the immediate appearance of long
term problems which afflicted the farmers. These
problems, particularly vulnerability to market changes,
did not disappear in the twenties, but returned with
greater impact in the following decade. Furthermore,
the farmers of Alberta who followed Wood did identify
themselves as a class, but Lipset is correct in that
few were demanding "deep-rooted change"; they wanted to
improve capitalism.
The more radical populists from the United Farmers
of Alberta, together with a few isolated members from
Saskatchewan, continued to be elected as Progressives to
the federal government where they joined the two labour
members to form the Ginger Group. We shall see in a
later chapter that this group was to bevthe chief source
of the pressure for a co-operative commonwealth party.
In provincial politics the United Farmers of
Alberta were highly successful. Although receiving
only 28.8 per cent of the popular vote in 1921, the
United Farmers benefited from the biased distribution of
7Q
Lipset, op. cit.. p. 82.
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seats, which has always favoured the parties with rural
39
strength, and won 63 per cent of the seats. ^ This
large proportion of seats may have led MacPherson to
conclude that Alberta from 1921 has been characterized
by a quasi-party system, by which he means, in part,
that one party has held the vast majority of seats at
any one time.4® If a high percentage of the popular
vote is taken as an important indicator of dominance,
then one party dominance appears much less, because no
party has ever won more than 56 per cent of the popular
vote. The United Farmers' government did last for
fourteen years and the operation of United Farmers'
democracy in action has been acutely examined by
MacPherson.41 The direct responsibility of the MLA to
his constituents quickly gave way to cabinet control.
Cabinet and premier operated according to the usual
cabinet system. This process was probably hastened by
Wood's personal refusal to accept the premiership,
because others among the farmers were less committed to
delegate democracy. The constituency association also
became subservient to the annual convention in the
formulation of policy, and the convention itself was
soon dominated by government ministers, especially on
issues which were defined as critical by government
■"^Appendix B.
4°MacPherson, op. cit., chapter 8, the general
conclusion to his analysis.
41Ibid., pp. 62-92.
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members. The theory of group government, which
required that the cabinet be composed of representatives
of the different economic classes, was abandoned even
before the first election. One Labour member was sub¬
sequently made Minister of Labour, but this was the only
concession to theory. MacPherson argues that in spite
of the loss of constituency autonomy when the United
Farmers began to operate like a conventional political
party, some of what the farmers had attacked in politics
was avoided. Nomination and financing of candidates
was done in the constituency and not controlled by a
party "machine". It did not develop the characteristics
of party which had been denounced. The United Farmers'
government did not become conglomerate, unprincipled,
develop a central machine, or place itself at the
disposal of outside interests. In short the United
Farmers was what I have defined as a democratic
populist party.
The United Farmers organization is important in the
study for two main reasons. First, it reflects the
continuous pragmatism of prairie politics. The United
»
Farmers of Alberta promoted co-operation among producers
and generated opposition to financiers and industrialists
from the east. It was not rejected by the farmers until
the severe economic crisis of the thirties implied that
it had failed. The Social Credit League then replaced
the United Farmers as the governing party. In fact,
the theory of Social Credit was first introduced to the
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province by members of the United Farmers organization,
locals of which became centres for the distribution of
Social Credit ideas. Many of those who were subse¬
quently to support Aberhart and the Social Credit League
were actually introduced to this new panacea through the
United Farmers. Secondly, the United Farmers, through
the radical members who made up the Ginger Group in
Ottawa, was of considerable importance in the negotia¬
tions leading to the founding of the CCF. Of the CCF
Morton has written:
"While it is true that the new organization
was in its inception an attempt to apply
Wood's doctrine to a combination of groups,
the spirit was different. The Cooperative
Commonwealth Federation, properly for a
political party, did not content itself with
Wood's long perspective or with waiting for
the millenium to be accomplished by group
organization but set out to capture national
power."42
The combination of the introduction of the ideas of
Social Credit by the United Farmers and the part played
by some members in establishing the CCF implies that
both these organizations were within the agrarian
populist tradition (a major point which must await the
documentation of later chapters).
The strong liberal orientation of many prairie
farmers is most obvious in the province of Manitoba.
In 1920 the Manitoba Grain Growers' Association became
the United Farmers of Manitoba. Leaders of the
42
Morton, "Thrt Social Philosophy of Henry Wise Wood...",
op. cit., p.,123. Morton tends to overstate the
influence of Wood and the United Farmers of Alberta in
the founding of the CCF.
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organization were loath to withdraw support from the
Liberal government, resolving only that "the question of
taking provincial action be left entirely at the
43
initiative of each local constituency." In the
election of 1920 fourteen independent farmer candidates
were elected. A minority Liberal government was then
defeated in 1922, after which the United Farmers formally
4-4-
entered the election and achieved a working majority *
Thereafter farmers governed in conservative fashion until
1928 when the farm organization withdrew from politics
leaving a "progressive" government directly supported by
4.5
the Liberals.
Meanwhile in Saskatchewan political activity had
been less dramatic. The Liberal government held a snap
election in 1921, before an independent opposition could
be mobilized, and regained power, claiming all the time
that Saskatchewan Liberals were independent of Ottawa.
Having skilfully avoided a clash with the Saskatchewan
Grain Growers' Association, the Liberals continued in
office until 1929. This long term in office (1905-1929)
is usually attributed to the party's highly organized
election activities and a well developed system of
patronage. It is also recognized that the Liberals
^Quoted in Wood, op. cit.. p. 342.
44Ibid., pp. 341-3.
45
M.S. Donnelly, "The Government of Manitoba", Toronto,
1963,pp. 63-4.
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4.6
were generally sympathetic to agrarian demands.
3.4. The Intension of Co-operative Activities
in the Twenties
Not only were the early nineteen-twenties
characterized by the founding of independent political
organizations by farmers, but also by the extensive
development of co-operative marketing, especially the
wheat pools. This provides some evidence to reject
Lipset's thesis that in the great plains:
"Political action usually arises during a
depression or during a major social crisis
such as war, whereas cooperation occurs most
frequently in periods of prosperity.... In
a depression, farmers are less likely to
accept gradualism when immediate action is
called for."47
We are then forced to ask why political action and wide¬
spread co-operation occurred together during the post
war agricultural depression. It is quite clear that
both reactions are complementary and can develop together.
Two pressure groups were chiefly responsible for the
establishment of the wheat pools in Canada, these being
the United Farmers of Alberta and the Farmers* Union of
Canada. Despite its national title the latter was a
radical splinter organization, which separated from the
Saskatchewan Grain Growers' Association in 1921.
The price of wheat, we know, was highly variable
4.6
Escott M. Reid, "The Saskatchewan Liberal Machine
before 1929", Canadian Journal of Economics and
Political Science, vol. 2. 1936. pp. 27-40.
4.7
Lipset, op. cit.. p. 83.
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from year to year, and farmers were also forced to sell
in the fall when prices were at their lowest. There
had been a long standing debate over whether marketing
should be subject to government control or remain free.
In 1919 a federal Wheat Board was set up, but its
policies were opposed because Canadians felt that they
were not getting such high prioes for their produce as
were Americans, However, the ending of the Board in
1920 coincided with a large fall in the price of wheat.
The Canadian Council of Agriculture now looked round for
alternatives and some members were influenced by the
success of Aaron Sapiro and California Fruit Growers'
Association, the members of which pooled their produce
in co-operative marketing. Wood, who was on the
Council's investigating committee, favoured a voluntary,
co-operative pool, but received little support outside
Alberta, In parliament the new Progressives pushed so
hard for a Wheat Board that the government did introduce
some compromise legislation. These proposals were
found unacceptable by farm leaders, and the bill to
establish the Board was rejected by the Manitoba legisla¬
ture (support from the provinces was legally required
for the bill). The rejection of compulsory market
legislation resulted in attention being focussed again
on the idea of a co-operative pool. Still Wood and the
United Farmers delayed so much that the Calgary Herald
took the initiative of bringing Sapiro to Alberta.
Under his influence a board of directors chaired by Wood
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was established on August 16th, 1925• The Alberta
Wheat Pool required that farmers sign contracts to
deliver wheat to the Pool organization. The Pool would
then market the wheat, and of the total return for the
year, each farmer would receive an amount proportionate
to how much he had contributed to the total Pool. If
the operation were to be successful, a large proportion
of the total acreage would have to be signed up, in
order that the Pool would have some control over prices.
Therefore, a target of 50 per cent of the crop was
agreed and a vigorous campaign followed. 45 per cent
of the wheat acreage was actually contracted, marketing
was undertaken, and Pool members received higher payouts
48
on the 1923 crop than did non-members.
In Saskatchewan the new Farmers' Union rejected all
remedies that had been tried so far, proposing instead a
strong international union of farmers who would then be
able to control the marketing of produce to greater
49
effect. * Following the failure of the national Wheat
Board proposals, the Farmers' Union promoted the pool
idea. Sapiro was invited to Saskatchewan, where again
he converted many farmers to the pool marketing system.
However, leaders of the older co-operative organizations
were at most lukewarm towards the pool, feeling that it
would eventually encroach on their territory by entering
^8Rolph, op. cit.. chapter 7.
49
^On the Farmers' Union of Canada see especially Duff
Spafford, "The 'Left Wing', 1921-1931", in N. Ward and
D. Spafford, op. cit.
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the elevator business. When only 37 per cent of the
1923 crop had been signed up it was decided to delay
formal operations of the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool until
1924. Within two years over 50 per cent of farmers in
the province had signed contracts. 1924 also saw the
setting up of the Manitoba Co-operative Wheat Producers
and a central sales agency to co-ordinate the activities
of each pool. Prom 1925 to 1928 the Pools were success¬
ful to the extent that members received several cents
per bushel more than did non-members.
It soon became evident that to be more efficient
the Pools would require their own elevators. Elevator
companies, both private and co-operative, had resisted
the formation of the Pools, because they anticipated a
loss of business. Yet despite the opposition of its
leaders, the Saskatchewan Co-operative Elevator Company
voted in 1925 to merge with the new Wheat Pool. There
followed a rapid growth in the number of co-operatives
for the marketing of livestock and dairy produce, and
50
also consumer purchasing co-operatives. Educational
work was also extended, particularly after the Farmers'
Union and the Grain Growers' Association were reconciled
and formed a new organization, the United Farmers of
Canada (Saskatchewan Section). Within the United
Farmers organization, old members of the Farmers' Union
formed a radical Farmers* Educational League to promote
50
For a full review of consumer co-operation see J.F.C.
Wright, "Prairie Progress: Consumer Co-operation in
Saskatchewan", Saskatoon, 1956.
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the idea of a co-operative commonwealth. These farmers
wanted a compulsory pool, which would give greater
control of the market, "but were opposed on this issue by
Pool leaders in all the provinces. Before the great
depression began the United Farmers made little impact
on the much larger Wheat Pool, but thereafter became
very influential. However, the details of agrarian
history in this period are directly connected with the
origin of the CCF and Social Credit league, and will be
reserved for the discussion of the founding of these
organizations.
3.5. A Comparative Note on American Cotton
and Fruit Farmers
While it may be somewhat of a diversion, it is
perhaps useful to conclude this chapter with some
reference to other types of farming in North America,
lest we fall into the trap of accepting generalizations,
which refer to farmers as a whole, when our evidence is
restricted to those involved in wheat production. To
some degree the relative neglect of farming areas other
than the large grain producing states has led to the
acceptance of statements such as the following, which
refers to the Greenback, Farmers' Alliance, and Populist
organizations:
"An examination of the electoral support of
these agrarian movements reveals a consistent
pattern. It was the economically and
climatically vulnerable wheat belt that
formed the backbone of all the protest
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movements, from the Independent parties of.
the 1870s down to the contemporary CCP in
Canada."51
This statement is wrong in several respects. It should
not be assumed in the first place that election results
give ground for generalizing about all the protest move¬
ments. As we have seen with reference to western
Canada, many were non-political in the sense that they
did not aim to participate directly in government. More
important, the historian Saloutos, among others, has
located an important source of agrarian protest that is
CO
outwith the wheat belt. Through The Grange, The
Agricultural Wheel, the Southern Alliance, the Southern
Cotton Association, and the Farmers* Union, southern
United States cotton farmers expressed discontent and
influenced the agricultural thinking of other areas.
The important Alliance and Farmers' Union organizations
both originated in the south. Saloutos argues that
agrarian reaction against racial and religious out-
groups (most where white fundamentalists), and against
labour and commercial organizations of the city, were
reactions of despair from a people who felt they were
losing control of their lives. He claims that in many
other respects they were progressive, being ahead of
both government and other agricultural circles in their
thinking. For example, the cotton farmers were ahead
51
Lipset, op. cit.. p. 24.
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of the New Deal in advocating methods of control such as
limiting crop acreage, withholding produce from market,
fixing minimum prices, and co-operative buying and
selling. This was part of the policy of the Southern
Alliance in the 1880s. Neither the production of wheat
nor the variability of climate would seem to be the
critical factor in North American agrarian protest;
more important seems to be the production of a single
crop sold for cash in an open market, and in particular
when that market is international (which increases
insecurity)
In the political sociology of agriculture a lack of
comparative analysis has encouraged the acceptance of
the following generalization: the most radical farmers,
those who first organize and support protest organiza¬
tions, are the largest and most prosperous single crop
producers; small producers, especially those near a
subsistence level, are most conservative# A consider¬
able body of evidence has been gathered to support this
theory with reference to wheat producers. However,
Chambers' history of California farm organizations casts
doubt on the validity of the statement as a generalization
53^In fact, a similar generalization has been put forward
by Lipset himself in another place. See S.M. Lipset
et al.. "The Psychology of Voting", in G. lindzey,
"Handbook of Social Psychology", vol. 2, Addison-
Wesley, Cambridge, Mass., 1954, especially p. 1137.
However, his formulation re North America in "Agrarian
Socialism", op. cit.. remains uncorrected in the 1968
edition.
103.
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about all types of agriculture. ^
Chambers records that many crops are grown in
California, but on any one farm there tends to be
specialization in one crop. Success has always
depended on an uncertain water supply, a large number of
migrant labourers, and the sale of perishable goods on
markets thousands of miles away in sufficient quantity
to cover high costs of production. Careful planning
and exact timing of crop operations is essential. The
following make up the classes of producer:
1. A few large "industrial" farmers tilling thousands of
acres with the help of large numbers of migrant
labourers.
2. Substantial commercial farmers with heavy capital
investment.
3. Small and part-time farmers, who work on too small a
scale to provide an adequate return - the largest
group.
4. The poverty stricken migrant labourers.
These differences were reflected in the support of the
different farm organizations.
The California State Grange, dormant since 1880,
experienced a large revival during the depression of the
thirties. For the most part members were the small or
part-time farmers from the northern region of the state.
For some The Grange was basically a fraternal
54^Clarke A, Chambers, "California Farm Organizations",
Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1952.
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organization, but for many more it was a vehicle of
protest. The Grange was continually to the left of
other farm organizations on key issues such as the rights
of labour and state control of irrigation.
The California Farm Bureau Federation was originally
formed as an extension of the Colleges of Agriculture,
i.e., as an educational organization. Membership was
widespread but concentrated in the richest regions and
included many members of the prosperous categories (1
and 2 above). Close relations were maintained with
other farm organizations in the country, apart from The
Grange. As a response to the costly and violent farm
strikes of 1933-34» the Associated Farmers were organized
by an agricultural-industrial coalition, and were
directly supported by the Farm Bureau. The new organiza¬
tion was concerned solely with opposing the development
of unions among the migrant labourers. The Associated
Farmers undertook intense "red" baiting and vigilante
action, including some instances of severe violence.
They co-operated with the Farm Bureau to promote anti-
labour legislation and to keep the level of state relief
payments low, thus forcing wages down. Grange members,
who employed little labour, were for the most part
opposed to these activities.
Thus, while similar to wheat farmers in their
economic situation (although they required more migrant
labour), the large farmers in California were conserva¬
tive, even reactionary, whereas the small farmers were
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somewhat more to the left. The proposition outlined
earlier is deficient probably because it takes no
account of either cultural history or of the direction
of radical action, whether reactionary or innovatory,
when a large body of landless labourers participate in
the production process. In the case of California
fruit growing the migrant labour is of crucial
importance. Where the technology of production
requires a large labour force, as in California fruit
and southern cotton production, the political organiza¬
tions of single crop, large scale, farmers will be
conservative.
This brief comparison with fruit and cotton growers
reinforces the thesis that agricultural producers in
North America are pragmatic in politics. Except for a
few of their leaders, they have not been concerned with
the theoretical implications of economic and political
policies for the whole of society. Where their
activities have seemed consistent with socialist
doctrines this has been in some types of agricultural
production in which state control of opposition forces
is to the advantage of the farmer, and the farmer has
not been hesitant to use the state to further his own
interests.
Chapter Four
Third Parties and the Depression
Since both Social Credit and the CCF developed
during the depression as new third parties, it is
appropriate to examine theoretical studies of the rise
of third parties in Canada, On the basis of the
criticism of the work of Pinard and MacPherson1 a
revised model will be presented and some supporting data
on the structural sources of third party protest will be
sketched out,
4,1, Models for the Rise of Third Parties
Perhaps the best attack on the problem of how third
parties develop in Canada can be mounted by examining
how Pinard has interpreted the work of MacPherson and
substituted his own theory. Figure 1 is a reproduction
of Pinard's schematic model, at the structural level, of
both his own and MacPherson's theory,
looking first at Pinard*s interpretation of
MacPherson, we find that it is deficient in several
respects. There is no sign that Pinard recognizes that
MacPherson's model for the rise of third parties is only
implicit and incidental to the main theme of his work.
His study involves third parties because his area of
"^Maurice Pinard, "The Rise of a Third Party", Englewood
Cliffs, 1971; C.B, MacPherson, "Democracy in Alberta",
Toronto, 1953.
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Figure 1. Models for the itise of Third Parties.
MacPherson's Model Pinard's Model
Quasi-colonial economy
and homogeneous class
composition
j
Hon-party ideology and
aspirations
Rise of third parties
I
Establishment of a quasi-
party system (one-party
dominance system)
Structural cleavages
(economic, ethnic, etc.)
and/or structural attach¬
ments and/or flagrant
corruption aided by single
member plurality electoral
system
\f/
(Alienation from one of
the major parties)
4
Emergence of a one-party
dominance system
4
(Search for alternative to
party in power)
i'
Rise of third parties
Sources Adapted from M. Pinard, "The Rise of a Third
Party", Englewood Cliffs, 1971, Figure 4.1,
p. 67.
By structural attachments Pinard means the
degree to which social relations in the
community are close-knit.
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investigation was the province of Alberta, but
MacPherson's main aim was to establish the conditions
for the development of a quasi-party system. To Pinard
the quasi-party system is equivalent to one-party
dominance. The latter term refers to a political
system dominated by one party but in which other parties
continue to exist. It is operationally defined as a
party system in which the main opposition party gets
p
less than one—third of the votes. For MacPherson the
quasi-party system is something more than this, because
it shares some of the attributes of other political
systems.
"It shares the attributes of a non-party
system in its emphasis on •business govern¬
ment •, that is, on administration rather than
policy formation as the function of government
and as the government's main claim on the
electorate. It shares, too, some of the
qualities of a one-party system, especially in
its rejection of the orthodox notion that
party is beneficial, and in its belief in the
general will of the community."3
MacPherson concludes that the Alberta system is sui
generis and calls it quasi-party; it is not equivalent
to one-party dominance. More important than this
definitional issue is the fact that MacPherson's theory
does not require that a new part;'- be the basis of the
quasi-party system. Thus MacPherson's theoretical
concern is only incidentally with the rise of third
parties, and Pinard's argument that MacPherson's theory
2
Pinard, op. cit.. p. 37.
3
MacPherson, op. cit.. p. 239.
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requires that third parties precede the development of
quasi-party systems is wrongIt is wrong because
MacPherson makes no claim for this and because Pinard
has not appreciated precisely what the quasi-party
system is.
Pinard has also misread the structural conditions
which MacPherson stated were necessary for the develop¬
ment of his quasi-party system. MacPherson did argue
that the quasi-party system would emerge from a quasi-
colonial economic condition, but he added qualifications
- that the economy should be in a state of an undefined
"mature capitalism", and that the population should be
homogeneous and petit bourgeois relative to other areas.
He did not state as his critics have claimed that
5
Alberta was a one class society. MacPherson actually
wrote:
"The quasi-party system, as it has emerged in
Alberta, may be seen as a response to the
problem of democratic government in a
community mainly of independent producers
which forms a subordinate part of a mature
capitalist economy."6
Overall, I am forced to conclude that MacPherson has
relatively little to say about the rise of third parties
Pinard, op. cit.t p. 69. He does correctly point out
that MacPherson is inconsistent as to whether Alberta
ever did have an alternate two-party system out of which
the quasi-party system developed.
5
See, e.g., Pinard, op. cit.. p. 69} and the debate
between Lipset and MacPherson - S.M. Lipset, "Democracy
in Alberta", Canadian Forum, vol. 34, 1954, pp. 175-7
and 196-8; C.B. MacPherson, "A Reply", ibid., 1955,
pp. 223-5.
C.
MacPherson, op. cit.. p. 239.
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other than those in Alberta, and that Pinard has created
7
a straw man.
Pinard's own model (figure 1) is specifically one
of the rise of third parties. Several structural
strains are presented, which, alone or in combination,
lead to a rejection of one major party in an alternate
party system. This means one-party dominance, a situa¬
tion which may be stable for long periods. However,
during periods of critical stress, voters search for
alternatives, and, finding the old opposition parties
weak, will support a new party.
There are several problems with this formulation.
Pinard emphasizes the prior necessity of one-party
dominance, stating that "one-party dominance precedes
and is a factor in the rise of new movements; it does
8
not follow from the rise." It is easy to agree with
Pinard that a weak opposition party makes it easier for
a new third party to become popular, but one-party
dominance is not a necessary condition of the rise of
third parties. Pinard presents no specification of why
it must be the case that structural strains lead to the
rejection of one major party and support for the alter¬
native, rather than to no response or to the rejection
of both existing parties. All of these possibilities
7
MacPherson does have a general theory about quasi-party
systems but has not faced the problem of why the Mari-
times, where all his pre-conditions are present, did
not develop a party.system like Alberta's.
g
Pinard, op. cit.. p. 69. Printed in bold type.
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seem plausible. Finally Pinard claims predictive power
for the theory, but it breaks down where it should have
been most certain of success. In Pinard's terms Alberta
had a one-party dominance system for 35 years (i.e., the
Social Credit government), but in 1971 it was replaced
not by a third party but by the "weak" Conservative Party.
In view of these deficiencies I have developed
another model which is less deterministic, more
conditional in form. It is not intended as a tightly
knit theoretical system; it is more a speculative
listing of plausible relationships which should be
investigated in trying to understand the rise of a third
party. It seems sensible to agree with Pinard and
MacPherson by assigning initial importance to structural
divisions or strains in society. These need not be
economic, as in MacPherson's model, although economic
class divisions have been the main force behind prairie
third parties. However, to provide a more general
model, my argument is that some form of structural
cleavage (economic, ethnic, etc.) is a necessary, but not
always sufficient, condition for the development of third
parties. As Pinard states, there must be some rejection
by the people of existing parties if a new one is to
become popular. However, it is here that we must supply
a missing link between structural strain and the
rejeotion of existing parties. This we might call the
experience of deprivation or felt deprivation. (Later
the use of relative deprivation theory in this context
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will be assessed.) Furthermore, the deprivation must
be connected by the people to the existing parties.
Whether structural cleavage leads to felt deprivation,
rejection of the existing major parties, and to the
further step of supporting a new third party will depend
on the presence of a number of facilitating conditions,
one of which is Pinard's one-party dominance. Others
might include what Pinard calls structural attachments
(or close-knit communities), and open corruption.
Internal social homogeneity is not necessary, but where
the population experiencing the deprivation is divided
on other issues, then we might expect more than one
third party to be supported. Even given all the
conditions suggested above, a third party will not be
founded and supported unless both resources are
available (money, leaders, etc.) and people retain
enough hope to believe they can do something to Improve
their circumstances.
In Alberta and Saskatchewan the strain which pre¬
cipitated the rise of Social Credit and the CCF as third
parties was the impaot of the depression. Therefore, a
general outline of the depression and its impact on
social life will follow. In the context of this dis¬
cussion I shall try to show that the Palliser Triangle
was so destitute that experiences of deprivation could
not be transformed into active support for the CCF (the
Triangle was mostly in Saskatchewan). This helps to
explain why the CCF was slower to develop in Saskatchewan
than was Social Credit in Alberta.
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4.2. The Depression of 1929-39
4.2.1. In Their Own Words
•This section contains a series of anecdotes which
are of major importance because they describe from
personal experience a kind of living which could other-
q
wise only be inferred from economic data. Under the
combined impact of depressed prices and drought, living
conditions on the farms deteriorated badly. This
description of diet comes from one of the areas of
Alberta least affected by the drought.
"I spent most of 1934 with my uncle and aunt.
Unhappily they had even less to eat than
people on relief in Edmonton. We lived for
most of that year on potatoes. The crop had
been good and they had a great unsaleable
surplus. So we had potatoes varied with
eggs, varied with an occasional chicken which
had stopped laying, and potatoes varied with
potatoes. There must be a hundred ways of
cooking potatoes and my aunt tried them all.
Some of the leafy weeds made excellent greens
and my aunt used to mix some of the spicy
weeds in with the potatoes."10
The Reverend Sandy Nicholson, stationed at Hudson Bay
junction in the northern park belt of Saskatchewan,
became an organizer for the OOP, and a federal M.P. for
MacKenzie in 1940. His diary of conditions on the
northern frontier area is now quite famous. It
deserves another exposure.
q
The reader might usefully consult the novels and auto¬
biographies of the period. See especially, Ross
Annett, "Especially Babe", New York, 1942; Sinclair
Ross, "As for Me and My House", Toronto, 1966; W.O.
Mitchel, "Who has Seen the Wind", Toronto, 1947; James
H. Gray, "The Winter Years", Toronto, 1966; N.B. James,
"Autobiography of a Nobody", Toronto, 1947.
"^Russell Shepherd, quoted in James H. Gray, "Men against
the Desert", Saskatoon, 1967, p. 120,
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"Friday, March 29th (1935).... They had
gone to the neighbours for additional food
supplies and we had potatoes, butter and a
pie as 'extras' for breakfast.... Supper
with S M . Bread, butter, tea (cream and
sugar); no meat, fruit or syrup. It is
hard for bachelors to get adequate relief he
complained.... We went to J R 's for the
night. J and the man who is 'batching'
with him slept on the floor while P and I
had the only bed in the shack. They had a
cup of tea and bread without butter before we
went to bed.
"Saturday, March 30th.... J had hot cakes
for us for breakfast with syrup he made from
white sugar and water. He had a drink made
with roasted wheat which he called 'Bennett
coffee'. We had dinner at K 's. They had
three fried eggs for four peopTe and some
potatoes, tea, bread and corn syrup. Relief
allowances were always so low that food was
very scarce at the end of the month they
complained. We went to E T 's for the
night. I had known E wTTen T~taught school
at Davidson 15 years before. Dry years drove
him north. He has a small 2-roomed log house.
"Sunday, March 31st. What poverty! Their
tea kettle sprung a leak last fall and the
trouble with the relief system said P was it
assumed that people never required a new lamp
chimney, tea kettle, or wash basin. Por five
years they had been seeing one utensil or
implement after another wear out without being
able to replace it. Mr. and Mrs. J P
kept us for the night. J homesteaded near
Strasburg about 30 years ago. He put up good
buildings - later bought another quarter on
which he paid-$2,000 cash. Finally he lost
the half because he could not meet his payments.
Mrs. P in her early fifties is almost blind
because she cannot get the necessary medical
care for her eyes."11
These comments highlight the problems of poor housing,
diet, debt and health which confronted the people. In
the worst hit areas this was added to by drought lasting
Rev. A.M. Nicholson, extract from his diary, quoted in
G.E. Britnell, "The Wheat Economy", Toronto, 1939,
pp. 211-2.
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up to eight years. The condition of the animals
suggests the state of the country as a whole.
"Things got so had in some of those years that
the cattle seemed to go a little crazy.
They'd eat anything in sight and the vets
used to find such weird stuff in the stomachs
of the cattle that they had to coin a new
word to describe it. You won't find it in
any of the textbooks, but hundreds of cattle
died in those days from what they called
'hardward disease'. They would eat door
knobs or pieces of iron, or hinges that fell
off gates, they were that desperate to get
something into their stomachs."12
Conditions got so bad in the Palliser Triangle that:
"The Mounties used to say that they were
busier gathering up people who had been
driven insane by the depression than in
chasing crooks. There was one occasion when
I was getting a ride back from school to
Moose Jaw (in the centre of the dried out
area) and we were stopped by the Mounties.
They were searching for a farmer who had
disappeared. His section and a half farm
had once been excellent land but it had grown
no crop in five years. The day before the
Mounties stopped us, people going past had
noticed this man driving his binder up and
down a field in which nothing was growing.
He had stopped andishouted to one of them:
"'Look at this for a stand of wheat! If it
will go to a bushel, it will go 50 bushels
to the acre! Best crop I ever saw! Best
crop I ever saw!'"13
Poverty in the countryside meant depression for the
urban industries and retail trades which depended on
purchases by farmers. A salesman describes his
experience:
"I went to work for Westinghouse after gradua¬
tion and in 1929 was calling on the power
12
Kick Painter, quoted in Gray, "Men against the
Desert", op. clt.. p. 205.
13
^Dan Cameron, ibid., p. 167.
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companies of Alberta, selling generators,
turbines and transformers. The heavy end of
the electrical business died in 1930 but
7/estinghouse kept me on by switching me to
appliances. It got to the point where all I
ever sold were fuses, light bulbs and radio
tubes. But I kept trying and when I found a
store that was still in business I sure gave
him service.
"I had a good customer in Hanna which in 1939
was the only town in the whole of eastern
Alberta that had any survival potential...."
Relief expenditure in Alberta was concentrated on
relieving the plight of the urban unemployed. In
Saskatchewan, by far the largest amounts were paid out
to the rural municipalities, which had become incapable
of relieving their own poor. Part of the relief was
given in the form of agricultural supplies in order that
new crops could be planted and livestock survive the
winter. It was often woefully inadequate. The Regina
Star published a letter which described how a government
official had treated a farmer:
"Dear Sir, Re Peed and Fodder, 1935-36. We
are in receipt of yours of the 28th in which
you apply for twenty bushels of feed wheat to
feed your hogs and chickens. In reply we
wish to advise that owing to the low market
for chickens at the present time and further
that no revenue may be expected from that
source during the winter, the government does
not deem it advisable to supply feed to
winter chickens. We would therefore ask you
to dispose of them in order to purchase food
for your hogs."15
It was pointed out that the farmer could get little for
his chickens if the price was low and that he had asked
"^Alvin Geddes, ibid., p. 66.
"^Letter to the editor, Regina Star, 26-12-38.
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for feed for laying hens. Eggs were a reasonable
market proposition. However, now the farmer would have
neither hogs nor hens since the money for selling
chickens would be insufficient to feed the hogs.
4.2.2. Impact of Depression and Drought
The string of quotations which were given above
present something of the experience of living in Alberta
and Saskatchewan of the thirties, but they are based on
personal observations of particular events. Therefore
they cannot alone describe the impact on the total
society. For this we must turn to statistical data,
but always keeping in mind what these abstractions meant
in the everyday experience of the people.
Because Canadian prosperity depended on the export
of primary products, the depression in prices from late
in 1929 quickly drew Canada into economic trouble.
Table 4.1 shows that the most rapid and severe effect
was experienced by exporters of farm products. The
decline in industrial production and in employment was
slower and less severe. For those depending directly
on the sale of exports, declining income was only
partially compensated by the fall in price of the goods
and services which they had to buy.1** Saskatchewan,
where wheat had usually accounted for about 80 per cent
16
Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion Relations
(Rowell-Sirois Report), Ottawa, 1940. Reference
will be made to the 1954 edition in 1 vol.. Book 1,
p. 144.
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Table 4.1. The Decline in Export Prices and Economic
Activity. 1929-53.
Prices A11 Index TnHBy rt-p
of 17 Pri°es whole- of ?f-,
. or farm n _ _ industrialmajor products sf e emPloy- production—
(a) prices mentexports
1929 July 100 100 100 100 100
1930 June 82 70 90 93 80
1930 December 66 42 80 87 74
1931 June 62 42 74 83 64
1931 December 61 41 72 80 61
1932 June 54 37 68 72 59
1933 December 47 30 66 67 52
(a) Includes wheat, barley, potatoes, cheese, bacon
and cattle.
Sources Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-
Provincial Relations, Ottawa, Book 1, p. 144•
of the total value of agricultural products, experienced
the brunt of the depression in prices. Wheat production
was less dominant in Alberta and the economy as a whole
was less directly dependent on agriculture. neverthe¬
less, agriculture was by far the largest industry in both
provinces. "In 1936 agriculture accounted for 79 per
cent of the total value of all production in Saskatchewan,
compared with 62.9 per cent in Alberta, 39.8 per cent in
17
Manitoba...." When the export prices for Canadian
wheat and cattle fell by 57 per cent and 38 per cent
17
Britnell, op. cit.. p. 33.
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respectively, Alberta and Saskatchewan were the hardest
1 ft
hit. Prom 1929 to 1933 incomes declined by 72 per
cent in Saskatchewan and by 61 per cent in Alberta, the
iq
two largest reductions among Canada's provinces. The
relative position of western export producers was made
worse by the early imposition of higher tariffs on
imports, which was intended to cushion the effects of
the depression on eastern manufacturers by holding up
the price of goods. This policy was severely criticized
by western radicals and later by a government commission,
which reported that:
"The increase in protection widened the
domestic market for the Canadian producer and
thus helped to maintain employment and income
in the manufacturing industry. But had
tariffs not been raised the purchasing power
of exporters would have been greater, debt
defaults would have been less and the expan¬
sion of industries such as gold mining and
electric power would have been more rapid.
It is possible that these circumstances would
have contributed just as much to the main¬
tenance of the market for Canadian manufactures
as did the rise in duties, and that the
national income would have remained at the
higher level."20
Apart from the collapse of prices two other factors
complicated the position of western farmers. The years
1926 to 1929 were ones of good yields and high prices
for wheat. This encouraged farmers both to expand
their holdings and to increase mechanization (by
incurring debts) in the expectation that good times
18
Rowell-Sirois Report, Book 1, p. 144.
19Ibid., p. 150, Table 50.
20Ibid., p. 159.
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would continue. a similar process was evident in
earlier periods of prosperity, although debt charges
were not so great a burden when good quality, free home¬
stead land was still available. Table 4.2 gives a
Table 4.2. Estimated Farm Indebtedness of Prairie
Provinces, 1931 > •
Type of Debt Amount Percentage
Mortgages and agreements
of sale S488 million 75.2
Implement companies 49 7.6
Banks 48 7.4
Stores 10 1.6
Other 55 8.5
Total 650 100.0
Sources W.A. Mackintosh, "Economic Problems of the
Prairie Provinces", Toronto, 1935, p. 266.
conservative estimate of the total private farm debt at
S650 million, of which roughly 75 per cent was con¬
tracted for land purchase. At interest rates of at
least 8 per cent this created a heavy burden of fixed
charges, which were bearable in boom periods but ruinous
when gross income fell sharply. "At 8 per cent the
interest charge would be $2 per acre of wheat or at the
farm price of 1932 (30 cents) nearly 7 bushels of the
21
average yield of 15 bushels per acre of wheat." The
second major addition to the price problem was that of
21w.a. Mackintosh, "Economic Problems of the Prairie
Provinces", Toronto, 1935, p. 259.
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prolonged drought, complicated by disease and insect
plagues. Fanners who were afflicted in this way soon
found that low prices were accompanied by a low yield
per acre.
Drought, disease, insects and debt did not affect
all parts of the prairie equally. Therefore, statistics
such as for the average decline in income hide great
regional differences. The most badly affected region
was Palliser's Triangle, where tens of thousands became
destitute. Palliser's Triangle is named after the
region's first surveyor, who pronounced it unfit for
agricultural settlement. The apex is just south of
Saskatoon, in central Saskatchewan, and the baseline
lies along the United States border from south-east
Alberta to south-west Manitoba. Sixty per cent of the
total area is in Saskatchewan. Palliser's assessment
was not completely accurate because in the best years
the world's highest quality wheat could be produced here,
but the rainfall was unreliable and the threat of an
early killing frost ever present. In bad times the
people were kept on the land by the conviction that next
year would bring a bumper crop, thus earning for the
region the name which best describes its character,
"next-year country". Part of the region's difficulty
resulted from the settlement policy of establishing
farmers in quarter sections. Unfortunately, the region
was only capable of supporting a sparse population of
large scale ranchers and grain growers. Ranching had
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to be on large spreads because the land would not
support a high density of cattle per acre; wheat
growing was best carried out on full section farms (or
larger ones if possible) because a large total acreage,
even when yields or prices were low, might still provide
enough cash to get by. Many suffered as they learned
this lesson. In 1927 the Palliser Triangle produced
S90 million of wheat; in 1936 it produced S3 million.
The dry summers of the depression years intensified
the problem of soil erosion because the moisture, which
helped to hold soil down against the wind, was obviously
missing. In some areas crops were only possible by
summerfallowing every third year. The soil was ploughed
and left black during the summer months in order to
absorb the summer rain, some of which would be retained
to help the following season^ crop. However, if there
was no rain this bare earth was subject to wind erosion.
During the "dirty thirties" the wind could blow away the
entire top soil down to the hard bed. Country roads,
blocked by snow drifts in winter, were now blocked by
dirt drifts in summer. Worst of all, soil blowing from
abandoned land could upset the earth on hundreds of
21
acres nearby and destroy occupied farms. ^ A dust
storm is described by a farmer near Hanna, Alberta:
"...away off to the northwest a heavy black
cloud is forming between sky and earth.
22
Gray, "Men against the Desert", op. cit.. p. 21.
2^Ibid., p. 33 and pp. 2-3.
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Black, yes, black as night. It sweeps
towards us rapidly forty, fifty, sixty miles
an hour. We turn, each individual one of us,
looking for the nearest shelter. Teams are
unhooked as quickly as possible, and if no
. stable room is near, turned with their heads
away from the storm. Those of us with
tractors either make for shelter or stay with
the machines as long as possible.... The air
gets colder. The huge black wall is only a
mile away. A minute, and with a blast like
the roar of a thousand lions it is upon us.
We are alone in a sightless mass of hurtling
soil, stinging sand and thumping clouds. We
lose all sense of direction.... This is the
black blizzard.
"For hours the tortured soil is torn and
ravished until the storm ceases. Then we
look out on the fields that we have tilled.
They are as smooth as if polished by a giant
plane. Here and there a few wheat plants,
stricken, stand on roots still remaining in
the hard subsoil. With tomorrow's sun they
will probably fade and die. Millions in rich
topsoil is gone forever. That is the black 2a
blizzard, the most appalling thing in nature."
The technology to defeat the dirt desert was created by
the scientists in the experimental stations scattered
throughout the prairie. Funds came from the Prairie
Farm Rehabilitation Administration, which was established
by the federal government in 1935 to save the Palliser
Triangle for human habitation. Slowly the land was
brought back to grass and, eventually, to commercial
25
grain production and cattle ranges.
2^J.K. Sutherland, quoted in Jean Burnet, "Next-Year
Country", Toronto, 1951, pp. 6-7,
25
Gray's ,"Men against the Desert" is a history of the
Prairie Farm Rehabilitation Administration, Its
crowning achievements were the post war irrigation and
recreation developments on the South Saskatchewan
river. The South Saskatchewan Dam will bring stable
producing conditions to hundreds of thousands of
acres.
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Part of the task of the agricultural experimental
stations was to solve the problems of disease and insect
pests, which ravished the south country in those years
when the rain was sufficient to grow crops. This was
also achieved but not before grasshoppers had infected
60,000 square miles in Alberta and 100,000 square miles
in Saskatchewan.
"By far the worst pests were the grasshoppers
that came on the winds from Montana and North
Dakota in numbers beyond all calculations,
even beyond the exaggerative genius of the
yarn spinners of the prairies. Single
flights would descend out of nowhere, devour
everything in sight and move on. They ate
the handles off pitchforks, armpits out of
shirts on farmers' backs, clothes off the
line. A single flight was once trapped by a
cold wind over Lake Winnipeg, fell into the
water and when blown toward land covered the
shoreline for 20 miles to a depth of several
feet."26
As we might expect the depression produced the
greatest disruption of social life within the Palliser
Triangle. One of the most obvious consequences was a
great migration comparable to the westward trek of the
American dirt farmers from the plains of the Mississippi
basin. How many people abandoned their farms is not
precisely known, but the Royal Commission on the South
Saskatchewan River estimated that the prairies lost
247,000 people from 1931 to 1941» with 73»000 leaving
the Saskatchewan section of the Palliser Triangle. They
left not in a publicity catching mass, but in a slow
persistent trickle. Some headed for the cities; others
26Ibid., p. 36.
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searched for new land in central British Columbia or the
Peace River district of northern Alberta. Still others
migrated within the boundaries of Saskatchewan. Taking
only what household goods and equipment could be carried
(there was usually little enough left anyway), an
estimated 10,000 farm families moved by wagon over the
dirt roads from south Saskatchewan to the northern park-
27
lands. For a brief period this trek received official
government support, but not after it was realized that
the abandoned farms were making life more difficult for
those who remained, because these farms were subject to
soil drifting which nobody was trying to control. Still
the trek north continued. Some of those who moved
suffered as much as their neighbours who remained to sit
out the dirt and drought. In the north they found un¬
cleared, unbroken land of poor soil quality. Only the
earliest migrants could become established easily; the
others became an impossible relief burden for the
northern municipalities. With the help of the Northern
Saskatchewan Re-establishment Board the migrants survived
the first years, but not without great hardships, such as
the extracts from Sandy Nicholson*s diary describe.
Because relief expenditure took up so much of
municipal and provincial budgets, there was little money
left over to pay for the services which were the usual
responsibility of these governments. Health, education
and communication services suffered most severely in the
27'The migration is described in ibid., chapter 11.
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dried out area. It was hard to retain doctors in rural
areas where incomes were so reduced that even the doctors
found it impossible to remain debt free. A number of
municipalities had hired doctors on a salary basis, but
now found it difficult to maintain them, since so few
people were paying taxes. Thus the inequalities in
adequate provision of health services, which are a well
known phenomenon of rural areas, were exacerbated by the
depression. Diets were so poor that, for the first
time, signs of scurvy were reported to the government by
doctors, whereupon 782 freight cars loaded with fruit,
vegetables, fish and cheese were distributed among the
28
poor.
In education, the rural districts had their usual
disadvantages multiplied. The provision of primary
schools was the responsibility of the local rural
municipality, as was the appointment of teachers,
although educational standards were the subject of
inspection by the province. With primary education
based on local finance it was inevitable that the
quality of education would suffer. Worn out books were
not replaced; buildings went without repair; salaries
dropped by over 50 per cent in some cases, with teachers
being paid in promissory notes. Secondary education
became non-existent in several rural areas. Jean
Burnet describes how the rural population around Hanna
became apathetic towards their education system. There
op
Britnell, op. cit.. p. 170.
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was little interest in school board meetings, and taxes
for education purposes became impossible to collect.
On the low salaries offered, only poorly qualified
teachers could be obtained. Burnet quotes an inspector
of schools located near Hanna: "The majority of these
schools present the appearance of weather-beaten
desertion. The teacher has nothing to work with except
a scarred and cracked blackboard, some chalk and what
pa
material her ingenuity can improvise."
Religious organizations were unevenly affected.
It seems that churches suffered while sects flourished.
"The activities of the churches in rural communities
were seriously curtailed, though to some extent the
"50
social welfare services were expanded."-^ This was, of
course, the period of high popularity for the funda¬
mentalist evangelist sects, which were responsible for
the southern prairies being called the Bible Belt.
They offered hope to all those who had lost confidence
in secular institutions and even in the established
churches. It will be shown in the next chapter that
part of the widespread political success of Social
Credit can be attributed to the sectarian religious
influence of its leader, William Aberhart.
The extent of destitution in the Palliser Triangle
has been discussed in some detail in order to show that
here the deprivations were so great that a mass third
2Q
^Burnet, op. cit.. p. 135.
30Ibid., p. 144.
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party movement was unlikely. Whereas the failure of
both provincial and federal governments to control
depression conditions provided the main source of
political capital for the new protest parties, the
severity of depression in parts of Saskatchewan also
created a major hindrance to the immediate success of
the Saskatchewan CCF. While there was some early
success for the CCF within the Triangle (in 1934), by
1938 support for the CCF was much greater in the con¬
stituencies which fringed this area. In the worst hit
region there was a constant lack of funds, which were
necessary to publicize and organize a new party. More
important, it seems that the people had lost hope and
with it the motivation to work for a new party. In his
study of the rise of Social Credit in Quebec in the
sixties, Pinard also found that the poorest people were
least likely to be among the first supporters of the new
protest party.
"In trying to account for this generalization,
many other faotors have been considered....
The lack of hopefulness seemed to account for
the lower degree of support for the new party
among the poor."31
Such a result is consistent with the model outlined
earlier in this chapter.
Alberta in general fared better than Saskatchewan
and was able to support a stronger protest movement in
the thirties. Every region suffered from the fall in
farm produce prices, but Alberta farmers had higher cash
31
Pinard, op, cit.. p. 158.
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incomes than Saskatchewan ones, because the average
yield per acre during 1930-37 was only a little below
32
normal and 60 per cent greater than in Saskatchewan.
Another indicator of the comparative impact of the
depression is the dollar value of retail sales. Again
Saskatchewan shows a greater loss than Alberta, but
Ontario survived better than either (Table 4.3).
Table 4.3. Index of Net Value of Retail SaleB in
Alberta, Saskatchewan and Ontario. 1930-37.
1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937
Alberta 100 76.1 65.6 61.8 69.0 74.0 78.7 86.3
Saskatchewan 100 70.8 59.2 54.5 59.4 63.2 69.7 68.3
Ontario 100 86.6 71.8 67.4 74.9 78.0 83.0 92.9
Source: G.E. Britnell, "The Wheat Economy", Toronto, 1939»
p. 198.
The rise of a new party is conditional on the
rejection of the existing parties. Therefore, the
account of the depression will conclude with some
indication of how the governing parties tried to control
the disaster. The problems of debt adjustment and the
burden of relief were the burning political issues for
prairie governments during the thirties. As income
fell farmers found themselves unable to meet the heavy
fixed charges which they had incurred in prosperous
times. The hint of a good crop brought creditors to
x?
Rowell-Sirois Report, op. cit.. Book 1, p. 170.
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the doorstep. Failure could mean proceedings for fore¬
closure or eviction (either from mortgage companies or
from rural municipalities to which taxes had not been
paid). After several year3 of consecutive disaster in
the dry country it became obvious that government inter¬
vention was necessary.
In Saskatchewan, debt adjustment legislation was
passed in 1933, which prevented civil action by
creditors without the permission of a government Debt
Adjustment Board. Creditors were restricted to the
proceeds of one-third of the crop in any one year, less
one year's taxes. In 1935 the personal covenant clause
was removed from all future mortgages and agreements of
sale. These Acts, however, were only Intended to delay
payments and did not meet the agrarian demand for a
33
reduction in the amount of indebtedness. The federal
government had established a Review Board to consider
debt reductions in individual cases, but the process was
slow and the results were "insignificant when related to
34
the total burden". ^ As times grew worse the
Saskatchewan Liberal government negotiated an agreement
on voluntary debt adjustment with the Dominion Mortgage
and Investments Association. This included the
cancellation of debt incurred for direct relief up to
•^Britnell, op. cit.. pp. 33-4.
34.
Ibid., p. 84. This was part of Conservative Prime
Minister R.B. Bennett's attempt to introduce a
Canadian New Deal Programme in 1935. Most of the
legislation was later declared unconstitutional.
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January 1st, 1935, of tax arrears (excluding 1935 and
1936), and of unpaid interest up to January 1st, 1935.
In full form this agreement applied only to 174 rural
municipalities in the drought areas. Under this legis¬
lation the total reductions effected by 1937 amounted to
$88 million out of a total debt in 1936 of $525 million.
However, the new debt which accumulated * i next summer
brought the total back up to about $525 million by the
■515
end of 1938. In other words the Saskatchewan
programme failed.
Until 1936 debt adjustment legislation in Alberta
was similar to that operating in the rest of Canada.
A minimum of assets were set aside for the maintenance
of the debtor and an administrative agency was "empowered
to stay proceedings on secured debts under circumstances
36
defined by the legislature." The policy changes of
the Social Credit government will be considered in the
next chapter.
The other great issue was relief, the burden of
which was by far the greatest on Saskatchewan. The
cost of providing relief (which was barely enough to
allow survival) amounted to 13.3 per cent of the total
provincial income in the years 1930-37. This compares
37
with an average for all provinces of 3.6 per cent. '
35Ibid., pp. 84-8,
36
J.R. Mallory, "Social Credit and the Federal Power",
Toronto, 1954, p. 99.
37^ Rowell-Sirois Report, op. cit.. Book 1, p. 164.
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For the whole period relief expenditures amounted to a
yearly average of 60 per cent of the total receipts of
*2Q
the province and its municipalities. The dominion
government was forced to provide 85 per cent of the
funds for relief, partly in the form of direct payments.
"Direct and guaranteed Dominion loans supplied
35 per cent of the total outlay, Only about
15 per cent of the funds required for relief
were raised by the province and the munici¬
palities, Nevertheless the share (50 per
cent) of the burden left as the responsibility
of the provincial and municipal governments
involved the addition of large amounts to the
provincial debt.... Between 1930 and 1937
the total debt of the provincial government
was more than doubled,"39
By 1937 the interest charges on the provincial debt
amounted to 23 per cent of the total revenue.
Having been spared the worst of the crop disaster,
Alberta was in a much better position with regard to
relief expenditure, the total amount being equal to the
average for all provinces* Here the main problem was
unemployment in Calgary and Edmonton, The loss of farm
purchasing power precipitated a contraction in trade and
industry, to which was added the influx of people who
had left the land in hard hit areas of south-east
Alberta and Saskatchewan.4® The generally healthy
condition of Alberta does hide pockets of destitution as
severe as anything across the border (such as the Hanna
region described by Jean Burnet), The greatest problem
38Ibld.. p. 170.
39Ibid.
40Ibid., pp. 170-1.
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for the United Farmers* government was the huge
provincial debt, which had accrued as the province tried
to tame the frontier by building roads, schools and
other amenities on borrowed capital. The position when
the Social Credit government took office was described
as follows:
"The Saving Certificate Fund was bankrupt; no
adequate provision had been made for maturing
obligations; interest on the public debt
absorbed 45.47$ of the total revenue; the
revenue was quite inadequate to meet current
expenditures; the finances of the province
had been bolstered up for years by a continu¬
ous policy of borrowing which had inflicted a
net funded debt of over S153»923,027.49 on
taxpayers; and, in short, the affairs of the
province had been permitted to drift into a
highly unsatisfactory state."41
In both provinces there was much evidence in the
daily affairs of people that their existing parties were
not coping with the depression. It has been shown that
the structural strains required for the development of
third parties were present in the depression, that there
were strong grounds for the experience of deprivation
and the rejection of existing parties. It has also
been argued that the impact of the depression was too
severe in some areas to generate mass support for a new
reformist party. In the last section of the chapter
I propose to find out whether relative deprivation
theory can contribute to explaining this aspect of the
development of the third parties, and to discover
whether students using this theory can specify the
4.1
Report of the Social Credit Board, quoted in Mallory,
op. cit.. p. 126.
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conditions under which felt deprivations are trans¬
formed into active protest.
4.3. Relative Deprivation and Prairie Third Parties
It has recently "become fashionable to explain
social protest and revolution as a function of the mass
perception of relative deprivation; that is, people's
perception that they are "being prevented from realizing
aspirations which they have come to define as their
legitimate right.^ The "objective" deprivation is
less important than how the actor defines his position
in relation to some reference point. Such a reference
point might be found in memories of the past achieve¬
ments of his own membership group, or in the success
which he attributes to some other group in his
contemporary sooiety.
As a theory to explain the rise of protest organi¬
zations, relative deprivation requires a time dimension,
such as we find in Davies* J curve theory of the origin
of revolution. Revolution, he argues, does not follow
from a long period of abject poverty, rather it is
4.2
On relative deprivation theory see especially, James
C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution", American
Sociological Review, vol. 27, 1962, pp. 5-19? James
A. Geschwender, "Explorations in the Theory of Social
Movements and Revolutions", Social Forces, vol. 47,
1968, pp. 127-35; T.R. Gurr, "Why Men Rebel", Prince¬
ton, 1970; Denton E. Morrison, "Some Notes Toward
Theory on Relative Deprivation, Social Movements and
Social Change", American Behavioural Scientist, vol.
14, 1971, pp. 675-690; Pinard, op. cit.; wTg.
Runciman, "Relative Deprivation and Social Justice",
London, 1966.
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preceded by a period of improving conditions and rising
expectations, which are then perceived to be blocked for
A*
some reason. ^ Geschwender has modified Davies* theory
to include forms of protest other than revolution. His
basic argument is that the conditions which initiate a
protest movement and a revolution are, in principle, the
same. He then tries to clarify the relationship between
the perception of deprivation and subsequent protest
action. Gesohwender hypothesizes that individuals will
attempt to reduce the strain which is created when their
4.4.
aspirations are seen to be unachievable. ^ Morrison
argues that a reduction in the strain can be accomplished
by the actor changing his perceptions, or by attempting
to change his position in the social structure such that
he will have the opportunity to achieve his aspirations,
or, more radically, by combining with others to reform
4.5
the social structure. Unfortunately, the conditions
favouring any one response are not specified.
A further difficulty in the relative deprivation
approach is that it requires an extensive historical
perspective together with data on the subjective
orientation of the actor. Much of the evidence for the
theory is indirect since long term data on the motiva¬
tion of actors (other than leaders) is not usually
available. In giving examples, most writers have
4.3
^Davies, op. cit.
^Geschwender, op. cit.. p. 128.
4.5
^Morrison, op. cit.
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presented data on socio-economio conditions over an
extended time period, and have inferred from the timing
of protest that relative deprivation does explain the
origin of protest movements. I shall try to show that
this produces poor results for western Canadian history.
On the evidence of dissatisfaction of farmers as
reported in the minutes of the annual meetings of farm
organizations in the prairie provinces it is probable,
or at least plausible, that relative deprivation was
endemic in the west. Farming people continuously
expressed their sentiments of deprivation, produced by
their peroeived subjection to the economic power of the
eastern financial and industrial corporations.^ Such
feelings were probably based on the severe fluctuations
of income which characterized the west in the pre-
industrial period. Political debate in Saskatchewan
and Alberta has consistently centred on questions of the
economy and the conditions of life associated with it.
With relative deprivation being endemic, slumps in
prosperity would serve only to accentuate feelings of
deprivation already in existence. If we look at
economic prosperity in relation to protest politics over
a long time period in the west, then the relationship is
unclear because of this persistence of feelings of
deprivation both in good times and bad. Of the three
^See the files of farm papers such as the Grain Growers*
Guide and the Western Producer; local dailies,
especially letters to the editor; also the minutes of
annual conventions of farm organizations.
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main political protests between 1915 and 1950, only the
first, the Progressive movement, fits the J curve
pattern# The Progressives flourished during the early
1920s when a sharp slump followed the long war time
period of relatively high farm income# Social Credit
became popular in Alberta after five years of depression
conditions. The Saskatchewan CCP came to power in 1944
as conditions were gradually improving. Therefore, as
a theory of the origin of protest movements relative
deprivation seems over-simplified.
Where it is perhaps most useful is in giving
support to the well known hypothesis that severe,
prolonged despair tends to produce a resigned apathy
rather than active protest.^ This phenomenon has
already been noted with regard to the Palliser Triangle.
It was argued that whereas all farmers suffered during
the economic crisis only the wealthier ones had the
financial and mental resources to do anything about it.
Relative deprivation theory adds to this the suggestion
that the status of the wealthier is even more threatened
than that of those who have always been poor.
"The wealthier farmers during the Depression
experienced a rapid and sharp decline in
their economic position in both absolute
terms and relative to the poorer farmers.
This deoline relative to their previous high
^E.g., Daniel Bell, "The End of Ideology", Glencoe,
I960, p. 31? Davies, op. clt.. p. 7? S.M. Lipset,
"Political Man", London, I960, p. 63 and pp. 258 ff.j
Pinard, op. cit.« p. 137? Runciman, op. cit.» pp.
25-6? Maurice Zeitlin, "Revolutionary Politics and
the Cuban Working Class", New York, 1970, pp. 60-65*
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position (which we may assume they preferred)
led to their organization and participation
in the CCF.»48
Earlier I stated that we remain uncertain under
what conditions the perception of relative deprivation
will he resolved hy attempting to reform the social
structure. Morrison has speculated on a number of
enabling conditions, but it is unclear whether he
40
believes all must be present together. ^ They are
worth investigating because they may be important
additions to the list of facilitating factors in the
rise of third parties. Morrison suggests that for
organized protest to develop there should be a large
population experiencing the deprivation, close inter¬
action and proximity among the deprived, high role and
status commonality (i.e., Pinard's structural attach¬
ments), a stratification system with clear strata
boundaries and visible power differences between the
strata, and the presence of much voluntary association
activity.
In Alberta and Saskatchewan several of these
conditions were present. The deprivation experience
was obviously widespread. While interaction was
limited by geographical factors until telephones and
cars became numerous, the farmers' ideas and feelings
were widely distributed by the agrarian journals. Thus
relatively isolated people could be aware of
4.8
Geschwender, op. cit.. p. 130.
40
^Morrison, op. cit.. pp. 684-5.
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dissatisfaction throughout the west.
A low degree of social division among the deprived
would make a united protest organization easier to found
and would increase its power. It has been usual to
consider the rural prairie community as homogeneous in
status,^0 but, although united by virtue of a common
class position, differences of social status have often
divided the people. The farming community has been
internally stratified by the degree of prosperity of
individual farmers, by type of agriculture (especially
ranching versus grain farming^ ), by ethnic origin and
religion. These differences have hindered the develop¬
ment of united agrarian protest.
Morrison*s category of a clearly defined stratifi¬
cation system is difficult to assess. I shall assume
that he refers to the actor's definition of the strati¬
fication of the society in which he lives. Such
perceptions are likely to be very complex because
stratification may be perceived in the distribution of
any number of scarce and valued properties among a
population. It may also have a local and a national
dimension. In the present context we would want to
know under which conditions will farmers tend to ignore
local differences and act unitedly with regard to other
groups at a national level. To the prairie farmers
50
E.g., S.M. Lipset, "Agrarian Socialism", rev. ed.,
New York, 1968, p. 212.
51
See John W. Bennett, "Northern Plainsmen: Adaptive
Society and Agrarian Life", Chicago, 1968.
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the main division at a national, and even international,
level appeared to be between the farmers and the con¬
trollers of finance and monopoly industries. Such
perceptions of stratification provided a focus for
protest.
Frequent activity in voluntary organizations has
been an important characteristic of prairie regions.
They provide the source and training ground for an active
protest leadership. This earlier organizational history
was outlined in considerable detail in the last chapter.
In this chapter I have tried to present the economic
and social impact of the depression as the context in
which the CCF and Social Credit developed. A model for
the development of third parties was presented. The
depression created conditions of structural strain which
generated feelings of deprivation. Existing political
parties were blamed for the catastrophic fall in the
quality of life, and where the hope of the people had not
been destroyed they turned towards Social Credit and the
CCF, each of which promised a new prosperity. The rise
of these parties was facilitated by a number of additional
conditions such as one-party dominance (in Alberta),
corruption in government, close interaction among the
deprived, prior experience of voluntary organisation, and
perception of a common class enemy. The task of the
following chapters is to describe and account for the
development of separate third parties - Social Credit
and the CCF.
Chapter Five
Social Credit in Alberta. 1933-1944
In this chapter I shall describe the Social Credit
economic doctrine and trace the sudden upsurge in Social
Credit popularity, climaxed by victory in the provincial
election of 1935. Then the policies of the government
during the Aberhart administration will be examined.
5.1. Aberhart's Social Credit Economic Doctrine (1955)
Social Credit has its origin in the political and
economic philosophy of Major C.H. Douglas (1872-1952), a
Scottish engineer, who became convinced that he had dis¬
covered a flaw in conventional economics which was easy
to cure. Human misery in the twentieth century would
then disappear. The meaning of Social Credit is best
identified in his theory of the cultural heritage.
Modern technology, he argued, made possible a super¬
abundance of goods and services. The cultural heritage
was the increase in goods and services which new
scientific discoveries made possible, but this was an
unearned increment from the point of view of the whole
society. It was then a social increment, and one which
would grow ever larger as time passed. This unearned
social increment is what Douglas defined as the Social
Credit of the community. But all goods and services
were not being distributed as they should, because the
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existing financial system did not allow financial credit
to keep pace with Social Credit. This problem would
have to be solved by controlling finance and issuing
dividend credits to each member of the community, thus
increasing purchasing power. The history of the Social
Credit movement in England, the detailed economic and
political doctrines, and the critiques, need not concern
us in the present context.1 The Douglas proposals had
relatively little popular impact in Alberta; rather it
was the simplified and distorted programme of William
Aberhart which captured the imagination of the people.
Therefore, this section will present the Aberhart Social
Credit system as he had developed it by 1935•
Before entering politics Aberhart combined the
careers of teacher and preacher. In 1915 he became a
high school principal, strict in discipline and
primitive in teaching method (a supporter of the rote
learning method). By many he was esteemed as a leader,
but was intensely disliked by others. All recognized
his imposing presence and technical skill as a public
speaker. At the same time Aberhart was a fanatical
religious leader. He was constantly active in the
Baptist Church until he founded his own Prophetic Bible
Institute, from which in the middle twenties he used the
new technique of radio broadcasting to reach a large
audience all over the southern part of the province.
"^Por an excellent analysis of all these aspects of
Social Credit see C.B. MacPherson, "Democracy in
Alberta", Toronto, 1953, pp. 93-141 and 179-192.
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Bible study groups were set up and kept in close contact
with the Institute, to which students of Bible prophecy
were attracted. (One of these, Ernest Manning, was to
follow Aberhart as premier of the province.) In short,
Aberhart was the most successful of the many radio
2
evangelists who operated in Alberta at that time.
These personal details have been presented to aid our
understanding of two aspects of his later social
relationships. First, his personal experience as an
authoritarian leader in religious and secular life made
him particularly likely to approve that part of the
Douglas philosophy which left specific policy making to
experts. More important, it suggests how much Aberhart
was already a part of the culture of the ordinary people.
In his religious crusade he already had a message to
which tens of thousands clung. His distinctly personal
contribution to the rise of Social Credit was to link
the economic doctrine with the moral, and to direct the
publicity campaign, which vastly extended his audience.
It is important in reviewing Aberhart*s Social Credit
proposals to remember that they were presented to the
people in the context of severe economic depression and
mixed in with strong doses of fundamentalist religion.
From early in 1933 Aberhart issued a series of
leaflets and pamphlets in which he argued for a new
monetary system based on the Douglas Social Credit
2
John Irving, "The Social Credit Movement in Alberta",
Toronto, 1959» pp. 8-49.
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proposals. These were widely used in the "bible study
groups, which he had already established as a religious
leader. His Social Credit idea provoked muoh excited
3
discussion among those who were reached in this way.
Many others heard Aberhart introduce Social Credit as
part of the religious broadcasts. Without doubt the
most comprehensive statement of his doctrine appears in
4.
the Social Credit manual.
"During the campaign it became a constant
reference for charges and counter-charges in
radio broadcasts, speeches at mass-meetings,
and newspaper comment. There must have been
few adults in Alberta who did not read at
least a part of it at some time or other
during the election campaign. Its doctrines
provided the basis for the speeches of the
Social Credit candidates...."5
Therefore, the manual is the most important documentary
source of Aberhart's Social Credit and forms the basis
for the following description.
In general terms Aberhart proposed that the state
should issue to each person a social credit or dividend
in order to increase the purchasing power of the
consumer. The evils of depression would then disappear.
At no time did Social Credit mean an attack on the
principle of private enterprise or private profit.
Social Credit proposals were directed only towards
reforming the economic system so that the small scale
capitalists of Alberta could prosper. The basic
3Ibid., p. 53.
^"Social Credit Manual, Calgary, 1935.
^Irving, op. cit.. p. 298.
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premise of the system was that?
"It is the duty of the state through its
Government to organize its economic structure
in such a way that no bona fide citizen, man,
woman, or child, shall he allowed to suffer
for lack of the hare necessities of food,
clothing, and shelter, in the midst of plenty
or abundance."6
He argued that Alberta was wealthy enough to provide the
necessities of life for her people and still have an
excess with which to reward individual enterprise*
Readers of the manual are advised that Sooial Credit
does not mean confiscation of property, interference
with inheritance, bank deposits, or insurance policies.
Social Credit supports capitalism but "it prevents wild¬
cat exploitation of the consumer."
The Manual diagnosed the problems of Alberta to be
the result not of over production, but rather the result
of a lack of consumer purchasing power, excess
profiteering, and the high interest rates which retarded
the flow of credit. (Fifty-one per cent of taxes in
Alberta were used to pay interest charges, stated the
manual.) Although it is not explicitly stated in the
manual, the widely discussed A + B theorem provided the
rationale for the diagnosis. In brief, A + B
represented the total costs of production.* A represented
those costs which were paid out to individuals aB wages,
salaries and dividends. B represented those costs of
production which were paid to other organizations in
overheads, taxes and raw materials. It was then argued
^Social Credit Manual, op. cit.. p. 5.
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that the total cost of production of all goods and
services (A + B) must be greater than the total
purchasing power (A) of all individual consumers. It
was, therefore, necessary to restore the B segment to
the consumer in the form of a Social Credit dividend, or
7
to lower prices by giving the dividend to the producer.
Otherwise there would be "Poverty in the Midst of
Plenty", a favourite Social Credit slogan. In its
apparent simplicity the A + B theorem appealed to those
unskilled in economics.
If the cause was accepted, then the solution was
simple. The manual explained how Social Credit would
operate. The people had only to grasp its four basic
terms.
1. Cultural Heritage. This was defined as the people*s
heritage of natural resources from which all citizens
ought to benefit. But the products of the resources
were controlled by a few "Big Shots".
2. Basic Dividends. In order that everyone be assured
of food, clothing, and shelter, their cultural heritage
would be returned to them through the issue of basic
dividends. The figure of $25 per month per adult was
suggested as a suitable sum over and above regular
wages and salaries.
3. Non-negotiable Certificates. This was how the
7
'The economic fallacies of this crude algebra are best
stated in MacPherson, op. cit., pp. 108-112. See also
"The Case of the Economic Safety League", Appendix IV
in Irving, op. cit.
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dividend credit would be used. The certificates were
to be blank forms in which each citizen would fill out
the amount he was spending in a commercial transaction
and have the receiver of the credit sign for it. The
receiver would then have to deposit the credit certifi¬
cate in a bank or credit house. His account would be
credited, the other person*s debited. The receiver
could then meet his own requirements by issuing a
certificate. Aberhart argued that a continuous circu¬
lation of credit, "the life blood of the state", would
be assured because all income would have to be spent by
the end of the year in which it was received.
4. Unearned Increment. If the province were to issue
credit continuously but remain out of debt, said
Aberhart, it would require some means of recovering the
credit which it issued. This was to be achieved by
recovering the unearned increment, which was defined to
mean much the same as excessive price spreads. (This
was a complete misunderstanding of the Douglas concept.)
In the manual, unearned increment refers to that portion
of the selling price of goods which is not earned by the
producer. This would be recovered in taxation.
Aberhart did not present any precise description since
total retail sales in the province amounted in 1933 to
$112 million, and could hardly be said to contain
$120 million in price spreads. (To issue a dividend of
$25 per month to each citizen, the province would
require $120 per annum exclusive of costs of administration.)®
Q
Case of the Economic Safety League, op. cit.
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The other main ingredient in the proposals was
price control, which was defined as the setting of a
just price. Experts would meet to decide a just price
for all goods. It would give a "fair commission" hut
allow no exploitation. Consumption would he made to
balance and control production. Therefore, a compen¬
sating price would he declared periodically and made up
to the retailer or consumer in a way similar to the
issue of basic dividends.
These were the main elements in Aherhart's
inflationary economic programme for Social Credit.
These ideas spread like a prairie fire. Orthodox
Douglas Social Creditors were also active in the
province during the thirties. These people came
together in the New Age Club and worked hard to spread
the Douglas ideas. But their more technical,
impersonal presentations could not compete successfully
for popular favour with the simplified Aberhart mixture
q
of economics and religion.
10
5.2. Ascent to Power
Social Credit was known in Alberta, although not
widely popular, many years before Aberhart became a
q
^Irving, op. cit., pp. 63-67.
10The following description is based primarily on the
extensive account in Irving, op. cit.i but see also
MacPherson, op. cit.. pp. 144-179; C.H. Douglas,
"The Alberta Experiment", London, 1937; Harold J.
Schultz, "Portrait of a Premier: William Aberhart",
Canadian Historical Review, vol. 45, 1964, pp. 185-211.
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convert, William Irvine, an Alberta M.P. at Ottawa,
was responsible for having Douglas appear before the
federal Committee on Banking and Commerce in 1923# But
on that occasion Douglas only impressed Irvine and Henry
Spencer, another prominent member of the United Farmers,
After this many of Douglas' writings were distributed
through the United Farmers information services. Thus
the ideas of Social Credit had already had some airing
by 1932, the year when Aberhart was finally persuaded by
a friend to read some of the English literature.
Apparently Aberhart became convinced overnight that
Social Credit was the solution to the poverty of the
depression.
Therefore, in the autumn of 1932 he began to intro¬
duce Social Credit into his religious broadcasts, and
early in 1933 he began a series of public lectures on
the subject at the Bible Institute, As requests for
lectures increased Aberhart set up study groups to train
speakers in Social Credit, just as he had been doing for
years in his evangelist activities. His printed
expositions were also widely distributed. In the
summer Aberhart and Manning toured all over the southern
part of the province preaching Social Credit to the
small town inhabitants and the farmers*
"It was these very people who had learned to
know and trust him through his religious work
who now threw off their coats to aid in
advancing this new economic movement which he
sponsored,"11
11Irving, op, cit,. p, 60,
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Towards the end of 1935 officials of the governing
United Farmers party began to notice the growing
interest in Social Credit in the rural areas. However,
they attached no political importance to this grass roots
activity until, in January 1934, Aberhart was reported to
have requested Social Creditors to vote only for those
candidates (in a Calgary by-election) who would urge a
government investigation of the Social Credit proposals.
Coupled with pressure from within their own organization,
this forced the United Farmers* leadership to debate the
subject at their convention. Internal conflict within
the United Farmers organization resulted in separate
resolutions calling (1) for the introduction of the co¬
operative commonwealth to Alberta (i.e., the CCF pro¬
gramme), and (2) an investigation by the executive of
the Douglas Social Credit proposals. The government,
hoping the storm would pass, did nothing, but soon the
Liberals, of all people, asked for Douglas to be called
to Alberta to explain his proposals. By March the
government was forced to call hearings on Social Credit
with Aberhart and Douglas as the chief witnesses.
During the early months of 1934 Aberhart came under
severe attack within the Social Credit movement. Con¬
ventional followers of Douglas were very critical of
Aberhart's misinterpretation of Social Credit. The
group at the New Age Club were foremost in the attempt
to discredit him, and towards the end of February they
received support from the Douglas headquarters in London.
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Douglas himself wrote to Aberhart insisting that his
name be withdrawn from the pamphlet titled "The Douglas
System of Economics". The result of these attacks was
that at a mass meeting of his supporters Aberhart
resigned from the leadership of the Social Credit move¬
ment. Members of the Hew Age Club, who were prominent
in the central council, then succeeded in having Gilbert
McGregor elected to the presidency. His reign was to
last only two months, but this interval indicates that
Social Credit could survive by this time without the
magical-religious appeal which Aberhart gave to it.
Irving records that, "Under the new leadership no
diminution of popular interest in Social Credit seems
12
to have occurred."
Despite having resigned, Aberhart was still called
with Douglas to the provincial hearings. The
differences between the two were now highlighted in the
press, but neither was very specific about what should
be done. Hank and file Social Creditors became
convinced that Douglas was being unfair to Aberhart when
he attacked him at the investigation; and they were
more convinced of this when, at a mass meeting in
Calgary, Douglas both ignored Aberhart and appeared to
have little knowledge of the Alberta situation. The
hearings brought Aberhart back into the limelight,and
with the increasing popular pressure for Aberhart to
return to the official movement, McGregor felt obliged
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to resign.
Installed once more in power, Aberhart proceeded to
purge his organization of orthodox Douglasites. The
message was then spread with renewed vigour in the summer
of 1934. Aberhart and seoondary leaders moved out from
the Institute in tours which took them all over the
province, speaking to enthusiastic audiences in the
towns and rural school houses. Everywhere the leaders
established local Social Credit groups (often with the
same personnel as the United Farmers' locals). A
weekly newspaper was started to combat the opposition of
13
the daily press. By the end of the summer Social
Credit had achieved a mass popularity in the small towns
and in the rural areas of the province. In the large
cities there were also active groups.
After the hearings in March the United Farmers
government had done nothing more about Social Credit, in
the hope that its inadequacies had been amply demon-
strated, but the continued upswing of the movement
throughout the summer forced further consideration.
The executive was forced to invite Aberhart to appear
before the United Farmers' annual convention in January,
1935, when he again presented his theory. After long,
heated debate a resolution which called for Social
Credit to be made part of the United Farmers' platform
was overwhelmingly rejected.
13
^The country weeklies were much more in favour of
Aberhart.
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In New Zealand, where Douglas Social Credit had
some support among the farmers and small "business men,
supporters of the new solution had hoped that existing
parties could he persuaded to adopt Social Credit mone¬
tary policy. Apparently the Labour Party had done so
in 1935 but then ignored the policy while in office.
Eventually in 1953 a Social Credit Political League was
14.
formed, which contested elections but never won a seat.
Having been so firmly rejected at the United Farmers1
convention, the founding of the Alberta political
organization was much quicker than the New Zealand
counterpart. Aberhart and his followers immediately
formed the Social Credit League to fight the next
election. The social relations of this organizational
structure will be discussed in detail in chapter 8. It
will suffice to say at this point that the League was
based on the local study groups and under the direct
control of Aberhart - to the extent of his having the
final say in the choice of both policy and candidate.
This power was conferred on Aberhart by delegates at two
regional conventions, one in Edmonton, one in Calgary.
Meanwhile, although the United Farmers had rejected
Aberhart, they still passed a resolution on the next day
which called for Douglas to be invited back to Alberta
as a consultant. Eventually the government followed
the convention's mandate, but this resulted, when made
"^R.S. Milne, "Political Parties in New Zealand",
London, 1966, p. 299.
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public, in a demand from the United Farmers1 own member¬
ship that Aberhart be asked to submit his proposals as
well. Again the government gave way to pressure but
Aberhart declined his invitation. Douglas, on the
other hand, accepted a position as a reconstruction
adviser. The report which he made under contract to
the government did not contain specific proposals by
15
which the government could save itself.
The 1935 election campaign which followed became a
bitter battle between Social Creditors and United
Farmers' leaders, but without doubt William Aberhart was
the dominant figure around which charge and counter-
16
charge were hurled. Aberhart conducted the Social
Credit campaign from the Bible Institute, which became a
rallying centre for groups of supporters from all over
the province. Chief weapon in the Social Credit
attack was the radio facilities of the Bible Institute.
Aberhart's broadcasts now turned more and more towards
exhorting his listeners to vote Social Credit. He and
his lieutenants toured the province speaking to
capacity audiences everywhere, while the opposition
parties could drum up little support, and fewer signs of
hope and enthusiasm. An example of the impact of an
Aberhart campaign meeting is this account of an Edmonton
Social Credit picnic,
15
^The report is published as an appendix in Douglas,
op. cit.
16
For a detailed account of the election campaign see
Irving, op. cit.. pp. 290-333.
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"The programme concluded with one of Aberhart's
greatest oratorical efforts. With tears in
his eyes, he described the pitiable conditions
into which the depression had plunged hundreds
of thousands of people in Alberta. He
promised that a Social Credit government could
end all this by giving every adult in the
province a monthly dividend of $25..•• In
closing, Aberhart graphically described the
struggle of a deep-sea diver with a devil-fish,
and compared this struggle with Alberta's
terrific struggle with the money octopus.
'We still have one hand free,' he roared,
•with which to strike - to mark our ballot on
election day. let us strike then with all
our might at this hideous monster that is
sucking the very life blood from our people!'
"Thunderous and prolonged applause from ten
thousand picnickers assured him that the
people were with him in the fight. Hundreds
in the audience wept as the meeting closed
with '0 God Our Help in Ages Past!'"(the
Social Credit theme song)."17
Aberhart was viciously attacked for mixing politics and
religion, for being a dictator, for appealing to the
emotions while having no sound solution to the problems
of the day. All these assaults from the opposition
parties, the newspapers, and the Economic Safety League
were brushed aside by the Social Credit leadership. If
anything Social Creditors became more determined to vote
for Aberhart because they believed in him. Aberhart
was close to the people; the intellectual leadership of
the other parties had lost touch with the grass roots.
By theoend of the campaign (August 22, 1935) the United
Farmers of Alberta had been destroyed as a political
organization. In the new legislature Social Credit
held an overwhelming 56 seats out of 63, the Liberal
17Ibid., p. 291.
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Party 5, the Conservatives 2# and the United Farmers
none. The voter turnout was up 63 per cent on the 1930
figure, and it seems safe to assume that this was because
Social Credit had attracted many people who had
previously taken no part in politics, Norman James, a
successful Social Credit candidate, describes how many
of the candidates were like himself, newcomers to
politics, who had previously avoided involvement in the
"dirty game" and had little idea of how a government was
18
actually conducted.
There is an unfortunate dearth of evidence on the
social composition of Aberhart's support, but it was not
restricted to a single occupational group such as the
farmers. Social Credit won all the seats in the
province except for some of the Calgary and Edmonton
ones, and followed this up with a repeat performance in
the federal election of 1935* Irving's study brings
out the varied composition of Social Credit support,
which included farmers, small town entrepreneurs, the
poorer white collar workers and manual working class of
the cities.
"An unyielding insistence that the monetary
system was uniquely responsible for the
depression attracted a wide variety of people
to the Social Credit movement. In small
towns and villages teachers, merchants,
ministers, druggists, farmers, railroad
workers, and doctors frequently assembled in
the same study group."19
18
N.B. James, "Autobiography of a Nobody", Toronto, 1947.
1Q
^Irving, op. cit.. p. 234.
157.
Even the coal miners of Drumheller voted for Aberhart.
The only group from which Social Credit seems to have
drawn no support was the urban professional and
managerial class. The greatest support was in the
rural areas and in the villages, where "the movement
offered the people#..a new opportunity of re-entering
the political life of Alberta, from which they had felt
20
themselves excluded ever since 1921."
It is always difficult to find out why people
favour or reject a party in a political campaign
(especially when the event is many years old, with the
result that participants in the campaign are no longer
available for interview). In the fifties John Irving
was able to interview a sample of secondary leaders and
supporters of Social Credit who were active in the move¬
ment by 1935. He claims that the sample was representa¬
tive but does not state how it was drawn, nor does he
consider the problem of how people reinterpret events
which have happened to them years earlier in their
21
lives. However, it is the only information available
on an important problem in Social Credit research. The
extensive quotations from these interviews, which are
available in Irvine's book, suggest that Aberhart and
Social Credit were supported for several closely
connected reasons.
20Ibid., p. 279.
21
Ibid,, pp. 235-6. The interview data on the response
of the people to Aberhart is discussed in chapters 8
and 9 of this book.
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Some became Social Credit supporters because they
accepted the economic diagnosis and they believed that
Aberhart could really make a reformed system work.
These people could respond to the secular aspects of
Social Credit without being convinced of its sacred
connections. Some, less concerned with the general
interpretation of society in Social Credit theory,
supported Aberhart because he promised them $25 per
22
month and a just price for their products. Farmers
were especially susceptible to these promises. Of
foreign born groups such as Scandinavians, Ukranians and
Germans Irving writes, "Many of the older generation of
these and smaller groups could scarcely speak English
and the $25 monthly was probably all that thousands of
2*5
them heard or understood of Social Credit." ^ Of those
who emphasized the secular aspects of Social Credit, few
claimed to understand the technicalities of putting it
into operation. "All such matters, people constantly
insisted, could be left to Aberhart and the experts he
OA
would call in...." In their despair they were
prepared to trust.
To others Social Credit was "applied Christianity".
More than any other reason they followed Aberhart
because he was a "Man of God" who really cared for the
people. The more extreme, often his loudest supporters,
22Ibld.. pp. 250-5.
23Ibid., p. 250.
24Ibid., p. 256.
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saw him as divinely gifted. The fervour which Aberhart
aroused for Social Credit can only be described by the
people themselves. For examples
"We felt he was a born leader, with something
great to do in the world. It seemed to us as
if God had picked Mr. Aberhart and then
prepared an audience for him in Alberta first
as a religious leader and then as a leader of
the Social Credit movement. The life of Mr.
Aberhart in Alberta was a fulfilment of a
Divine Plan."25
"He showed us how Social Credit was a natural
result of the Bible and Christianity. A lot
of us were convinced that this God-inspired
man had a plan which would, without any
possibility of failure, solve the problems of
the common man forever."26
"I was an old U.F.A. man and had worked for
our local for years. But our government in
Edmonton refused to do anything about the
depression.... Then along came Aberhart and
his standing as a religious teacher attracted
me to Social Credit. I felt that Aberhart
was a God-fearing man that we could all trust,
so I left the U.F.A. for good.... If he said
Social Credit would work then I figured it
would work.... One night I went to a Social
Credit meeting in a town near us where Mr.
Aberhart was speaking. A U.F.A. man began to
throw questions at him and made a disturbance.
I got real mad at this U.F.A. man for doing
that, and I couldn't hold myself in. So I
jumped up and led the meeting in prayer. I
said, 'Let us pray for Mr. Aberhart. Let us
pray for his soul.1 As we prayed aloud the
U.F.A. man got frightened and shut up. There
we were, all down on our knees praying for Mr.
Aberhart. We were a bunoh of hard working
slaves - over-worked, over-tired, eyelids half
closed from exhaustion and misery, children
lying all about, under and over benches.
When we finished praying tears were rolling
down practically everybody's cheeks. Later
on I was surprised myself that I had led that
25
Ibid., p. 259; "a lower middle class housewife".
26
Ibid., p. 261; "a small town real estate and
insurance broker".
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meeting in prayer for Mr. Aberhart."
For many people the religious and the economic aspects
of Social Credit were closely interwoven in the image of
Mr. Aberhart. The result was a strong emotional
commitment to Aberhart, a faith that conferred charis¬
matic authority on him. The faith is reflected in the
leaving of a specific programme to experts, and in the
centralization of decision-making in the person of
Aberhart, a demand which he made and was freely conceded
5.3. Social Credit in Office. 1935-1944
A necessary prelude to describing the policy and
action of Social Credit in office is to indicate those
parts of Major Douglas' political philosophy which were
imported to Alberta. The crux of this philosophy is
contained in the following passage:
"A democratic parliament is...from its
inherent nature an assembly of representa¬
tives. not of delegates.
"It is concerned with impressing the will of
the people upon the institutions of industry,
agriculture, and oommerce, and that will can
only be concerned with results. Methods are
for experts, and popular election is an
unsound method by which to appoint an expert.
The people are only to be consulted about broad policy
goals but do have the power to change the executive
elite since "the domain of policy comprises the removal
of executives if the results achieved are unsatisfactory
27
'Ibid., p. 262; "a farmer in the Edmonton area".
28
Douglas, op. cit.. pp. 55-6.
2^C.H. Douglas, "Social Credit", London, 1924» p. 143.
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Aberhart subscribed to the interpretation of
society as having a general will seeking expression
through a leader. The will of the people was defined
as Mthe abolition of poverty in plenty"; the people
should concern themselves only with this objective, not
with methods and techniques. This was to be left to
leaders of the movement who would promise to achieve the
general will of the people. This was summed up in the
Social Credit election slogan of "Vote for Results, not
Schemes". Thus the mass is urged to unite behind the
leader and trust in his ability. In conventional
Douglas theory the legislature and the cabinet were to
represent the general will of the people by choosing
appropriate experts who would advise on specific
policies.. This was formally accepted by Aberhart, but
in practice he was to retain strong personal control over
what policies were implemented.
When Social Credit won with its huge majority in
1935» Aberhart formed a government and was quickly given
a safe seat (he was not a candidate in the election).
However, premier and cabinet did not move to introduce
Social Credit. Confronted with an enormous provincial
debt, Aberhart's first official act was to appeal to the
federal government for financial help. R.J. Magor, an
orthodox eastern financial expert, was appointed to
assist the government. His advice was reflected in the
30
Other less important points of divergence between
Aberhart and Douglas are discussed in MacPherson,
op. cit., pp. 160-62.
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conventional methods of finance and administration which
the Social Credit government followed in its first year
in office.
Meanwhile Douglas was still under contract to the
Alberta government as a reconstruction adviser. He was
the obvious choice for the Social Credit expert who
would bring about the new Utopia. However, Aberhart
refused to rubberstamp the Douglas proposals. Angered
at Aberhart's misunderstanding of Social Credit and at
his compliance with orthodox finance, Douglas insisted
on resigning. His public statement of resignation
charged that interference by other officials made it
impossible to carry out Social Credit policies and
constituted "a danger to the people of Alberta in their
31
aspirations and a breach of contract with myself.M>
Aberhart had, in fact, restored to the cabinet the
responsibilities for government policy which, according
to Social Credit theory, should have been left to experts.
Before the election Aberhart had asked for 18 months
to introduce a full Social Credit programme, during which
time he was to be given trust and loyalty. But as the
18 months drew to a close there was still no sign of the
expected dividends, while the depression in the south
persisted. Late in 1936 John Hargrave, leader of a
Social Credit faction in England, arrived in Alberta and
produced a complex set of proposals, which the Social
Credit leadership then proceeded to ignore. Hargrave
^Regina Leader-Post,' 4-3-36.
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left in disgust in January, 1937.^2 A few days later
the government's debt settlement legislation, which
would have meant a loss for the mortgage companies, was
■2-2
declared ultra vires. ^ In addition, the speech to
4
open the new session of the legislature proposed only
orthodox financial measures; a full Social Credit
34.
programme was to be delayed for another year. ^ This
combination of circumstances was enough to threaten the
legitimacy of Aberhart's personal power. Members of
the legislature, who had accepted that their function
was to represent the people's will, but to leave the
details to experts, now recognized that results were not
forthcoming. They had been asked to demand only
results, and this they were now determined to do. The
insurgents, as the dissident Social Credit Members of
the Legislative Assembly (M.L.A.) were called, provided
the biggest challenge which Aberhart ever had to face in
his government career.
In anticipation of a move to oust him, Aberhart
appealed over the heads of caucus members direct to the
constituency associations, hoping perhaps that a display
of popular support would be enough to hold back any
32Ibid., 27-1-37; Harold J. Sohultz, "The Social Credit
Back-benchers' Revolt", Canadian Historical Review,
vol. 41, I960, p. 4.
"^Regina Leader-Post, 19-2-37. There were now hints
that the government was going to introduce a moratorium
and a law for the reduction of principal on debts.
-^Reglna Leader-Post, 25-2-37; Schultz, I960, op. cit..
p. 5.
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opposition. He admitted temporary failure and asked
for more time.^^ By this time the press was reporting
a strong current of discontent within the Social Credit
Leaguealthough the first public opposition did not
come until the debate on the budget. It was attacked
vigorously by several members of the house, who believed
that the financial measures were contradictory to the
principles of Social Credit. Their strength in the
house was enough to prevent closure of the debate, and
the insurgents were able to force the government to
introduce legislation setting up a Social Credit Board
of experts, in return for which they would vote the
government a temporary supply of money. However, the
termsof the new Social Credit Bill proved unsatisfactory
to the insurgents, whereupon the government introduced a
new Act, which provided for a Social Credit Board of
five M.L.A.s (who were not to be cabinet personnel) to
appoint from three to five experts, who would devise a
complete system of Social Credit. Each expert on the
37
commission would hold office for ten years.Although
they had helped frame the Act, prominent opponents, such
as Dr. H.K. Brown, criticized its final form. They
protested the wide powers granted to the Board, its
permanent appointment and the shifting of responsibility
from the cabinet to the personnel of the house. Brown
33
MacPherson, op. cit.. pp. 169-70,
56Regina Leader-Post, 1-3-37.
^Ibid., 13-4-37} Schultz, I960, op. cit.. pp. 7-14.
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called it unrecognizable as the bill which had been
*2? Q
discussed in committee# Nevertheless, the Act was
passed on April 13th and the house recessed until June.
In effect it was a skilful government device to buy time.
During the recess Aberhart appealed over his radio
station to the grass roots supporters that they should
either support him or ask their constituency M.L.A. to
cross the floor of the house. He would countenance no
opposition from within the party# At meetings in the
constituencies the insurgents hit back in self defence,
but they lacked the advantage of their own radio station.
The hot debate lasted all through May and there was some
uncertainty about what would happen when the legislature
would meet in June# However, although there was still
some evidence of opposition within the League, the
budget was finally approved on the understanding that
another session would be called in August to enact the
Social Credit legislation that a team of experts was
preparing#
Meanwhile the Social Credit Board had tried to get
Douglas to prepare a plan# He did not come himself but
sent two close followers, who, by August, had prepared a
series of Social Credit Acts. These Acts were designed
to force the banks to operate under licence from a Social
Credit commission, and to prevent any opposition in the
-^Hegina Leader-Post, 14-3-37; MacPherson, op. cit..
pp. 173-4. In fact, MacPherson shows that the Act
divided responsibility between the Board, the
appointed commission of experts, and the government.
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courts by the banks or any other party, if such action
questioned the constitutionality of the governments
legislation. Banks were given two weeks to get a
licence, and, if they refused, another Bill preventing
them from taking any civil action in the courts would
come into effect. Taxation in Alberta was to be
abolished, the governments revenue to be supplied in
future by contributions of credit from the banks.
These measures were quickly passed in the legislature
and this marked the end of the insurgents' revolt. The
new legislation clearly involved a severe attack on the
power of chartered banks and as such it provoked inter¬
vention by the federal government. Prime Minister
MacKenzie-King disallowed the legislation on the grounds
that it involved an encroachment on the powers ascribed
by the British North America Act to the federal parlia¬
ment.^
It is evident that this action was anticipated by
Social Credit leaders in Alberta,^"1 and perhaps it was
even a relief for them. In the first place, it
prevented them from having to make Social Credit work in
practice, and secondly, it provided a scapegoat against
which the government could direct the wrath of the
people. "See what we are up against," Aberhart could
■^Regina Leader-Post, 5-8-37.
40Ibid., 18-8-37.
^MaePherson, op. cit.« p. 178.
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say to the people;*2 he could point an accusing finger
at the eastern politicians and business interests in
order to justify his failure. Yet Aberhart could no
longer be assured of the complete allegiance of the
people based on their belief in his inspired ability to
produce results. It was at this time that a petition
began to circulate in Aberhart's own constituency in an
attempt to get enough signatures to have him recalled
from parliament. Social Credit theory allowed that the
mass of the people did have the right to get rid of
their representatives when results were not forthcoming.
For this reason a Recall Bill had been passed in 1936
which allowed for the recall of an M.L.A. when a
petition to this effect had been signed by two-thirds of
the registered voters in his constituency. Now, when
the Bill was a threat to Aberhart's personal position,
it was quickly repealed. The incident is important
because it provides evidence of doubts about Aberhart's
legitimacy, not only within the legislature, but also in
the province at large. His position was further
weakened by the refusal of the Lieutenant-Governor to
sign further Social Credit legislation and a press
4.^5
control bill during the final session of the house.
In December Social Credit even lost a seat in the legis¬
lature when a Unity candidate (Liberal + Conservative)
won the Lethbridge by-election.**
*2Regina Leader-Post, 18-8-37.
4.^5
Canadian Annual Review, 1937-38, pp. 482-3.
**Ibid.. p. 476.
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The next two years "brought an end to any serious
attempt to introduce a Social Credit system, as all
further legislation to this effect was disallowed by the
4.5
federal government. Only the Social Credit Board
survived, but under a new Act which left it only with
the power to undertake an educational programme. By
1938 Aberhart publicly stated that the attack on finance
was over and Social Credit would adjust to the inevitable
and pursue conventional policies.48 The most notable
legislation in the 1938 session was an attempt to change
the method of taxation from one based on property to one
based on production. The Agricultural Land Relief Act
proposed a production tax of seven per cent but was not
to be proclaimed until the courts decided on its
validity.4^ Although defended by the government as a
form of crop insurance, since income would be turned
over to areas in need, the new legislation was bitterly
opposed by farmers in mass meetings from the day of its
announcement until it was declared ultra vires by the
4.8
courts. The tax. was opposed because it more than
doubled the previous tax burden, and would have
centralized municipal funds in Edmonton. The 1939
session contained no further attempt to introduce Social
4.5
^For details see J.R. Mallory, "Social Credit and the
Federal Power", Toronto, pp. 87-90.
48Schultz, 1964, p. 201.
4^Canadian Annual Review, op. cit.. p. 484.
48See Regina Leader-Post, 27-4-38, 21-5-38, 23-5-38,
1-6-38, 3-6-38.
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Credit, this being explained by Manning, the deputy
leader, as the result of the power which "international
money monopolists" oould bring to bear on the federal
government. In the face of such strength Alberta
49
could not act.
With the next provincial election due in the summer
of 1940 at the latest, Social Credit leaders were
seeking a new base of authority by emphasizing a
tradition of sound administration in the everyday
affairs of the province. It was pointed out how the
educational system had been improved by reorganizing
local school units into regional ones and achieving more
efficient use of scarce resources. Advances in social
50
welfare and public health legislation were claimed.
In February, 1940, Aberhart announced the new election
giving the minimum legal time for campaigning - 33 days.
In the campaign speeches the theory of Social Credit was
avoided as much as possible and took a minor place in
the party's official platform.
"The entire program, except for plank twelve
which promised to continue the fight for
monetary reform and increased purchasing
power, was based on the government's five-
year record and the promised extension of
welfare services.... Aberhart emphasized
this record in radio broadcasts to the
province. State medicine, a new school
system, travelling health clinics, road
49
^MacPherson, op. cit., p. 201.
•^Harold J. Schultz, "A Second Terms 1940", Alberta
Historical Review, vol. 10, 1962, p. 18. This
article contains a detailed account of the 1940
election.
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constraction» treasury branches and marketing
boards were the exhibits which the party was
displaying to the voter*"51
Perhaps the most attractive government legislation to
the farmers was the Aberhart record on the private debt
issue* The mortgage companies tried to establish a
compromise debt adjustment agreement in Alberta similar
to the one which had been negotiated in Saskatchewan,
but in 1937 Aberhart introduced aggressive legislation
which required a reduction on principal of 50 per cent*
This was followed in 1938 by a moratorium on debt for
one year, the restriction of oreditor action and the
prohibition of foreclosures on rural homes. The
federal government disallowed some of this legislation,
but left the debt adjustment sections to be tested in
the courts. This turned out to be a slow process and
while the legislation was before the courts oreditor
action was prohibited, Sinoe the Privy Council did not
declare the legislation ultra vires until 1943, farmers
were still being protected by it at the 1940 election,^2
At this time we are told that "farmers fully believed
that the choice was either Aberhart or the sheriff,
Nevertheless, many people were less enthusiastic
Ibid., pp. 19-20. The "state medicine" meant public
care for a few selected diseases. There was no form
of general state health insurance,
**2Mallory, op, cit., chapter 6. Many farmers were
saved by tne long delay in giving a decision because
the time clause in their contraots limited the period
In which the creditor could force foreclosure.
^Sohults, 1962, on, cit.. p. 23,
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than before about Aberhart and Social Credit. He had
not, after all, produced the promised Utopia.
"The premier was still effective on the
hustings and crowds continued to enjoy his
platform mannerisms and homilies, although in
contrast to the 1935 crusade, he was
frequently jeered, booed and heckled at
meetings."54
The Opposition came from a weak CCF and the Independent
Party, which was a coalition of liberals and Conserva¬
tives. Considering that the Independents had no leader
and weak organization (e.g., there was no central head¬
quarters), they did surprisingly well because when the
election results were announced Social Credit had been
returned but with a reduced majority. The Social
Credit share of the popular vote fell to 43 per cent and
63 per cent of the seats (36) were won compared with 89
55
per cent in 1935. Independents took 19 seats and
were joined by one Labour and one independent Liberal
candidate. Aberhart himself topped the polls in
Calgary,
For the new government the war now provided
adequate justification for doing very little to further
Social Credit legislation, since it was now "perfectly
proper for the government to subordinate contentious
measures to a policy of co-operation with the federal
54Ibid.. p. 22.
55
The number of seats in the new legislative was reduced
from 63 to 57» which is why Social Credit losses are
not given in terms of seats. A decrease in voter
turnout probably hit Social Credit harder than the
other parties.
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government in the prosecution of the war." Indeed,
the major event before the election of 1944 was the
death of William Aberhart in May, 1943. Ernest Manning
was chosen by caucus to succeed as leader and he carried
on the Aberhart policy of war-time co-operation with the
federal government# The post-1944 development of
Social Credit under Ernest Manning's leadership will be
considered in chapter seven below.
56
MacPherson, op. cit.. p. 202.
Chapter Six
On Route to Power: the Saskatchewan CCF, 1932-1944
This chapter will deal with the development of the
CCF as it came to power in the province of Saskatchewan.
I shall consider the origin of the party, the transforma¬
tion of its initial socialist policies from the election
of 1934 until power was won in 1944, and the social
composition of CCF support during these elections. In
a largely rural society such as Saskatchewan land policy
is crucial to an understanding of political developments
and, therefore, the chapter concludes with a section
devoted to changes in the CCF land policy up to 1944
6.1. Origin of the Saskatchewan CCF
The Saskatchewan section of the CCF emerged as a
coalition of farmer and labour forces at the beginning
of the depression. It has already been stated in
chapter three that those farmers who were most
interested in reform had established an independent
Farmers' Union in 1921. A major concern of this group
was political education, a task which was continued
within the United Farmers of Canada organization (formed
after the Farmers* Union and the Grain Growers' Associa¬
tion had reconciled their differences).^ By early 1928
"'"Among the farmers who sought to spread socialist ideas
were several Communists who later formed the Farmers'
Unity League, a Communist front organization.
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the left had two important successes. At the annual
convention of the United Farmers of Canada a resolution
was passed which favoured the compulsory marketing of
wheat through the Pool, when and if 75 per cent of
farmers signed contracts with the existing voluntary
Wheat Pool. The few socialists within the organization
had long been campaigning for a compulsory Pool as the
only way for farmers to have any control over price,
since they could then eliminate competition among them¬
selves. In addition, George Williams, the leader of
this group, was elected vice-president of the United
p
Farmers* organization. This victory was consolidated
in the following year when Williams became president and
an unqualified demand for a compulsory or 100 per cent
"5
Pool was passed. The new radicalism of the organiza¬
tion was expressed by the retiring president, J.A.
Stoneman, who said, wWe should stress more and more that
we do support public ownership and control of not only
A
railways but natural resources as well.M^ This was a
very important statement because in asking for the
public ownership of natural resources, he was saying
that farmers should give up personal ownership of land.
The leftward swing was not taken without much debate and
friction, which resulted in the resignation of ten
2UFC (SS) Minutes, 1928, Archives of Saskatchewan.
Ibid., 1929. Supporters saw it as 100 per cent
control, opponents as 100 per cent compulsion.
A
^Ibid_., presidential address.
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directors, who accused Williams of destroying co-opera-
5
tion and drawing the organization into politics.
As the depression took grip in 1930 the pressure
for direct political action increased. In an address
which stirred the United Farmers' convention (also
published in the Western Producer), the honorary
president, E.A. Partridge, demanded a form of Christian
socialism to replace capitalist exploitations
"We must organize along class lines, we must
realize that it is the same class, who
exploits labour, who exploits the farmer,
only in a different way, and that the
propertyless farmer must join hands against
the common enemy.••• True co-operation has
its final goal in socialism, which is the
continual observance of the Golden Rule, the
gospel the man Jesus Christ preached and
practised, two thousand years ago."6
Following this speech the debate on a motion to allow
the United Farmers' organization to undertake direct
political action produced a narrow defeat for the
7
motion. However, it was agreed that farmers should
set up another organization "for the purpose of more
directly selecting and electing representatives to the
legislature and the House of Commons, pledged to support
O
the demands of organized agriculture." As 1930 drew
R
^Canadian Annual Review. 1929-30, p. 480.
6Address of honorary president, UFC (SS) Minutes, 1930,
Archives of Saskatchewan.
7
The minutes show that few of the speakers were against
direot political action because they had faith in
existing remedies or existing parties. Indeed, some
opposed the motion because they wanted an independent
political party which could unite farmers and workers.
®UFC (SS) Minutes, 1930, Archives of Saskatchewan.
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to a close, there was no sign of an end to the depression
and the farmers were growing angrier at the existing
social structure. Many were facing foreclosure after
years of working to build up their farms, and so were in
the best possible mood to agree with Partridge at the
1931 convention when he demanded a transition "from a
system of production for profit to a system of production
for use.This year there was again little opposition
to taking political action, but a heated debate as to
whether the United Farmers should act directly or set up
a new party. In the end Williams persuaded the conven¬
tion to support direct political action as an economic
organization."1"0
The decision for direct political action was taken
in order to implement the economic policy, which had
been established at the same convention. This policy
appears confusing because it combined the long standing
requests for agricultural reform with a long range
socialist objective. The ultimate objective states thati
"In the opinion of the United Farmers of Canada,
the present economic crisis is due to the
inherent unsoundness of the capitalist system
which is based on the private ownership of
resources, and capitalistic control of pro¬
duction and distribution that involves the
payment of rent, interest and profit; we
recognize that social ownership and co¬
operative production, for use, is the only
sound economic system."11
9Ibid., 1931.
10Ibid.
11
Ibid.; and Organized Farmer and Labour Programme
(Sask.) 1931, Farmer-Labour pamphlet, Archives of
Saskatchewan.
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Part of the provincial economic policy demanded 'that
•Use-Leases1 be implemented, and that all land and
resources now privately owned be nationalized, as
12
rapidly as opportunity will permit," This resolution
passed despite opposition from those who wished to
retain title to their land. It marked the biggest
policy victory for the left. However, it should not be
thought that all the farmers in Saskatchewan were
committed socialists. The policy was passed after
heated debate in an organization which represented a
minority of farmers in the province. More than any¬
thing else, this plank in the platform was to cause the
rejection of the CCF during the thirties. All other
parts of the United farmers' platform were directed to
13
patching up the existing system.
By this time George Williams and other socialist
influenced farmers were linking with Saskatchewan's tiny
Independent Labour Party - in fact, they had been doing
so for two years. In 1931 the United Farmers and the
Labour Party presented joint reform proposals to the
province's Conservative-led coalition government, and
"^UFC (SS) Minutes, 1931* Archives of Saskatchewan.
13
^In addition to the "Use-Lease" policy the provincial
government was asked to prevent any more foreclosures,
evictions and seizures; to give the farmer absolute
safety on his homestead quarter section; to improve
debt adjustment legislation; to undertake a plebiscite
on the 100 per cent Wheat Pool; and to see that no
more new farms were set up in the province. It
probably reflects the division within the United
farmers that much of this programme becomes redundant
in view of the policy to nationalize land.
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after all their demands had been rejected a conference
was held at which the two reform groups agreed to work
together to build a co-operative commonwealth. 1932
brought formal recognition to the agrarian-urban
coalition with the founding of the Saskatchewan Farmer-
Labour Party at a joint UFC-ILP convention where the
only surprise was the eleotion of IIP leader M.J.
Caldwell to head the new party. This year also saw the
establishment of the national COP to which the Farmer-
Labour Party affiliated. Although it did not change
its name until 1934, the Farmer-Labour Party was, de
facto, the Saskatchewan CCF.1^ By virtue of its
affiliation the Saskatchewan organization was required
to accept the national CCF policy, and, therefore, it is
worth giving some brief space to the forming of the
national party.
Unlike Social Credit, which was first and foremost
a provincial organization, the CCF was a national party
with provincial sections. It is also misleading to
accept Upset's assertion that the CCF was formed mostly
because of pressure in this direction from agrarian
15
socialists in Saskatchewan. v The origins of the
national CCF are much more varied. The farmer and
labour members of parliament, who formed the ginger
^S.M. Lipset, "Agrarian Socialism", New York, revised
edition, 1968, p. 134, seems to give undue Importance
to the retention of the old name and extends it one
year too long anyway.
15Ibid.. pp. 114-5.
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group, frequently discussed the need for a united party
to build a co-operative commonwealth. Many like James
S. Woodsworth worked strenuously throughout the country
for this goal, and by 1932 their efforts bore fruit.
Up to this time socialism in Canada had been advocated
in some form by a series of small labour parties, which
often became even smaller as factions split off in
16
ideological disputes. But the parties did succeed in
sending a few influential labour leaders to parliament,
where they kept socialist ideas alive. It was the
western conference of labour parties, which, from 1929,
reduced the internal bickering in the labour political
movement and provided a point of contact with the
agrarian organizations by inviting farmer representatives
17
to join them. Preachers of the social gospel, who saw
in socialism the principles of Christian co-operation,
were active both within the labour movement and on the
prairie. The importance of radical theology as an
influence in founding the CCF is suggested by the fact
that major leaders such as Woodsworth, William Irvine
18
and R.C. Henders had once been men of the cloth.
1 6
A comprehensive history of Canadian labour parties
before 1930 is Martin Robin, "Radical Politics and
Canadian labour, 1880-1930", Kingston, Ontario, 1968.
See also Charles lipton, "The Trade Union Movement of
Canada, 1827-1959", Montreal, 1966.
17
Stanley Knowles, "Le Houveau Parti", Montreal, 1961,
P. 43.
18
On the social gospel see Kenneth McNaught, "A Prophet
in Politics", Toronto, 1959, pp. 30-57? and Richard
Allen, "The Social Gospel and the Reform Tradition in
Canada, 1890-1928", Canadian Historical Review, vol.
49, 1968, pp. 381-99T
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Early in 1932 a group of intellectuals from the eastern
universities, who had studied in England and been
influenced by Fabian socialism* set up a League for
Social Reconstruction. This was to be an educational
organization which would work to establish a social
order in which the principle of social relations would
be the common good rather than private profit. Woods-
worth was made honorary head and the League worked
closely with him to establish the new party. It was
this intellectual elite which drafted the party*s
manifesto. On the agrarian front.the 1931 conventions
of both the United Farmers in Saskatchewan and in
Alberta voted in favour of building a national organiza-
19
tion of all those seeking fundamental change.
The product of these forces was the CCF, established
on August 1st, 1932, at Calgary. Here the regular
conference of western labour parties was joined by
representatives from the farm organizations of Alberta,
Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Ontario, the League for
Social Reconstruction (as observers), but only one
representative of the labour unions, who was A.R. Mosher
of the Canadian Brotherhood of Railway Employees.
There was much rhetoric about the compatibility of
farmer and labour interests, but the structure adopted
for the party reflected the problems of unity. It was
to be a federation in which membership could only be
"^The U.F.A., 1-8-32. 1931 was the year Gardiner took
over from H.W. Wood as president of the United Farmers
of Alberta.
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attained through the provincial sections and the
federated organizations were to retain their individual
20
identities. This meant that unions could not
affiliate because they were national bodies; it would
be up to union locals to join if they wished.
In Saskatchewan and elsewhere, enthusiastic
supporters worked hard and with great personal sacrifice
to build up the party's strength before the first
national convention, to be held at Regina in 1933.
Here J.S. Woodsworth was confirmed as the national
leader and a formal constitution was ratified. The
most notable document was the Regina Manifesto, the
party's document of faith. It begins:
"We aim to replace the present capitalist
system, with its inherent injustice and
inhumanity, by a social order from which the
domination and exploitation of one class by
another will be eliminated, in which economic
planning will supersede unregulated private
enterprise and competition, and in which
genuine democratic self-government, based
upon economic equality will be possible.
The present order is marked by glaring in¬
equalities of wealth and opportunity, by
chaotic waste and instability; and in an age
of plenty it condemns the great mass of the
people to poverty and insecurity. Power has
become more and more concentrated into the
hands of a small irresponsible minority of
financiers and industrialists and to their
predatory interests the majority are habitually
sacrificed. When private profit is the main
stimulus to economic effort, our society
oscillates between periods of feverish pros¬
perity in which the main benefits go to
speculators and profiteers, and of catastrophic
depression, in which the common man's normal
state of insecurity and hardship is accentuated.
20
Ibid.; later the party became more centralized after
David lewis was appointed national secretary.
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We believe that these evils can be removed
only in a planned and socialized economy in
which our natural resources and principal
means of production and distribution are
owned, controlled and operated by the people."
The manifesto stated that the CCP would "eradicate
capitalism" when it was elected in place of the
capitalist parties. Proposals to create the "planned
and socialized economy" were sufficiently vague that
none of the affiliated groups could take serious offence
at being ignored. Any group could see in the document
what it wished. How, for example, is one to identify
the "principal means of production"? Ho answer is
given in the manifesto. The provincial sections had
only to subscribe to the vague general principles of the
manifesto, and could construct their own speclficpolicies
in the provincial sphere. Although the national
administration of the party occasionally brought
pressure on the Saskatchewan section to alter policies,
we are justified, overall, in treating the Saskatchewan
section as the unit of analysis in the remainder of this
work.
6.2, The Provincial Election of 1934
The provincial election of 1934 was the first in
Saskatchewan during the depression and the first oppor¬
tunity for the CCP to test its strength. Unfortunately
PI
The Regina Manifesto, 1933. It is reprinted in
several publications including McNaught, op. cit.. and
Walter D. Young, "The Anatomy of a Party: the national
CCP", Toronto, 1969. A comprehensive and penetrating
analysis of the document is found in Young, pp. 39-67.
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for the CCF, this strength did not appear great.
Financially the party began the campaign with funds at
their usual low level. At the 1933 convention the
secretary reported that little work could be done
because there was no money available and voluntary
workers were constantly out of pocket. Office staff
rarely received full pay and several times the central
22
office was on the brink of closing. Contesting the
election at all was a remarkable feat of personal
sacrifice by those who fought for the CCF (or Farmer-
Labour Party, as the old name was retained until after
the election).
The CCF fought the 1934 election on a platform
which had a strong socialist component, which was stated
in the Handbook for Speakers as "the social ownership of
23
all resources and the machinery of wealth production." ^
As might be expected opposition was constant from the
established parties and the provincial newspapers.
Apart from the general assault on socialism as a threat
to individual freedom, the most frequently criticised
policy was the aim to socialize land. The opposition
22
Farmer-Labour Group minutes, convention, 1933#
secretary's report. See also secretary Eliason's
personal hardship and commitment to the movement as
expressed in a letter to Coldwell, 2-6-33. CCF
Papers, file Ho. 20/2, Archives of Saskatchewan.
Much of the party correspondence is devoted
exclusively to matters of finance.
^Handbook for Speakers, 1933, p. 21, CCF papers,
pamphlet collection, Archives of Saskatchewan. The
handbook was compiled from reports of conferences held
in Saskatoon and Regina, 7-1-33 and 11-2-33.
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raised the spectre of Saskatchewan farmers being forced
into state collectives, complained that under the
proposed system the farmers would lose control of their
land, that they would have no choice but to surrender
their title, and that they would lose the value of
24-
improvements which they had made to their holdings. ^
Countering this accusation that the CCF was against the
idea of the family farm became a necessary part of
nearly every speech by CCF candidates in the countryside.
Often the CCF was charged with communism and the
support of violent revolution. For example the Regina
Star reported that the United Farmers* "left wing group
25
objected to co-operation along constitutional lines."
George Williams was particularly subject to attack
because he had visited the Soviet Union and written
about his experiences. The Minister of Justice in
Ottawa even accused him of being a "paid agent of
26
Moscow", which received extensive press coverage.
Religion became a major issue in the campaign.
M.J. Coldwell accused the Liberal Party of spreading
fear among the Roman Catholic population that the CCF
would prevent them from practising their religion.
More important the Catholic Church hierarchy had a letter
2^E.g., Regina Star, editorial, 8-7-33; and Lipset,
op» cit.. p. 136.
2^Regina Star, 6-7-33, Regina Leader-Post, 3-1-34. Such
charges were, of course, denied by the CCF.
26
Regina Leader-Post and Regina Star, 23-2-33, Saskatoon
Star-Phoenix, 24-2-33, etc.
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denouncing socialism read from all pulipts and two
students at Notre Dame College were forced to resign
from the CCP. Later the text of a letter from the
Archbishop of Regina to Coldwell, assuring him of the
political neutrality of the Church, was published in the
Leader-Post, but the damage to the left had already been
done.2^ Even the United Church, strongly anti-capitalist
in 1931, rejected socialization at a conference just before
28
the election. The United Church was the largest in the
west and was composed in part by former Methodists who had
supported the sooial gospel. Many prominent CCP candi¬
dates and supporters were members of the United Church,
and rejeotion of their programme by the church must have
been a severe blow to their hopes of success,
Paced with such odds it is remarkable that the CCP
did as well at the polls as it did, winning nearly 25
per cent of the popular vote and five seats in the
legislature. The Liberals won all the other seats (but
with a minority of the popular vote) and so the Conserva¬
tive administration of Dr. J. Anderson was completely
wiped out, CCP supporters were distressed at the
result, for they had expected to sweep the province.
Coldwell, who had been defeated, described himself as
bitterly disappointed and wrote, WI am feeling today
both tired and sick."2^ This resoundihg defeat in 1934
2^Regina Leader-Post, 26-5-34.
28Ibid., 5-6-34.
2^Coldwell to Eliason, 20-6-34, CCP papers, file No.
20/3, Archives of Saskatchewan.
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marked the end of the sooialist phase for the CCF in
Saskatchewan.
Why did a socialist appeal fail in Saskatchewan?
Unfortunately, we have no record of how the public
perceived the different parties in relation to their
voting decision, not even the ex post facto sample
which Irvine provides for Alberta. Some clues are
provided in Lipset's ecological analysis of support.
The CCF vote was lowest in the small towns and villages,
highest in the rural areas and in the working class
districts of cities. In rural municipalities the CCF
support was lowest among Ukranians, French-Canadians and
30
Germans. Other than Scandinavians these are the
largest ethnic groups in the province. However, since
most of the French and Germans were Roman Catholic, the
ecological analysis does not allow us to argue whether
racial or ethnic prejudices were most influential in
their voting. The CCF candidates were most successful
in*Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian municipalities. Milnor
also points out that not all Catholic areas went against
the CCF; indeed, Ukranian Catholic areas such as Wadena
gave the CCF some of its highest support.^ Table 6.1
30
Lipset, op. cit., pp. 197-220. The Canadian census
gives a breakdown of statistics by rural municipality,
which usually corresponds to the boundaries of poll
districts. The municipalities with a high degree of
ethnic and religious homogeneity were used by Lipset
as the basis for ecological analysis.
31
A.J. Milnor, "Agrarian Protest in Saskatchewan", Ph.D.
thesis, Duke University, 1962, pp. 114-20. This may
be influenced by the rivalry between the Ukranian and
the /
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presents correlations between party vote and census data,
indicating that a high CCP vote?; is most closely
associated with areas of Anglo-Saxon population, United
Church membership and high quality land. But these
characteristics are all highly intercorrelated them¬
selves, with the result that it is impossible to deduce
which factor is the most important. CCP votes are most
negatively correlated with Liberal and Roman Catholic
areas.
Lipset also presents evidence that the CCP vote was
lowest among poor farmers, those who lived in areas
where land tax assessment was low and the incidence of
tenancy highest (see Table 6.1). This is supported by
qualitiative evidence from the observations of several
CCP candidates. Helmer Benson, candidate in Pheasant
Hills, remembered that most of the down-and-out people
"32
voted Liberal - "It was like their religion."^ George
Hindley, who ran in Wilkie, said that "when you get
people down so far they stop thinking. They lose their
initiative, they lose their capacity to fight and they
"3 "3
begin to accept things.This is the complement to
(Footnote 31 contd.)
the Roman Catholic Churches. Ukranian Catholics were
not under the jurisdiction of the Canadian Roman
Catholic Church. More important Wadena was the well
organized constituency of CCP leader, George Williams.
■zo
H.J. Benson, Interview, 14-9-70, in Archives of
Saskatchewan, file No. 15/45.
"3 "3
-^George Hindley, Interview, 21-1-71* in Archives of
Saskatchewan, file No. 15/60.
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Upset* s statement that only after economic conditions
improved did the poor farmers have the personal security
which was necessary for them to engage in politics as
CCF supporters.
The newspaper files suggest that socialism was the
big issue of the 1934 election. It is therefore
important to know how supporters of the different
parties viewed socialism, but there is little evidence
of a systematic nature. A review of speeches at con¬
ventions, public statements and letters in the farming
journals suggests that those who supported the CCF saw
socialism as Christian co-operation which would allow
them to protect their way of life. Those in opposition
tended to define socialism in terms of Soviet totali¬
tarian rule, collective farms, and anti-religious
attitudes - i.e., a threat to the small capitalist
producer and the family farm. Ho party perceived in
such a way, whether times be good or hard, could hope to
win an election in a society whose people were committed
to personal ownership of the land. The history of co¬
operative action does not provide grounds for changing
this assessment of the people of Saskatchewan, since
producers* co-operatives are defence mechanisms best
described as "the joint entrepreneurship of individuals."
The farmers of Saskatchewan only accepted socialism when
it was defined as co-operative organization.
Bennett and C. Krueger, "Agrarian Pragmatism and
Radical Politics", in Lipset, op. cit.. p. 351.
190,
6.3. Pragmatism in Policy and Relations with other
Parties
The Saskatchewan COP was not a doctrinaire 'ideo¬
logical* party, and "being committed to winning power
through the electoral machinery, participation and
defeat in the 1934 election began a process of compromise
in policy and attitude to other reform oriented parties.
This conservative process accelerated after the CCP had
its first encounter with Social Credit in the 1935
federal election, to which we shall now give some
attention.
In the context of continuing depression the Conser¬
vative federal government of R.B. Bennett fought the
35
election as a reform party,but the reforms arrived
too late to save his government. He had come to power
with the promise to end unemployment, yet in the
election month of October 13.3 per cent of the labour
force still had no job. For these hard times Bennett
and the Conservatives were held responsible, and the
reforms were insufficient to restore confidence in the
government. Among political leaders there was a mixed
reaction, many Conservatives being frightened by the
critique of laisser-faire capitalism, which was the
35
•^Earlier in the year Bennett introduced a Canadian new
deal which included Acts to establish a comprehensive
scheme for federal unemployment insurance} labour
legislation to provide for weekly holidays, minimum
wages, and a maximum number of hours per week; an Act
to prevent the eviction of farmers; legal machinery
to set up Dominion Marketing Boards; and several Acts
to control industrial competition.
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backdrop to Bennett's specific proposals, while the
Liberal Party was content to shout that the 'Hew Deal'
legislation was ultra vires because it violated the
British North America Act, which gave jurisdiction to
the provinces on matters of "civil rights and property".
In this way the Liberals were able to oppose Bennett
without appearing to be against the interests of the
poor. CCP leaders had two main complaints about the
reforms: they were stolen from the CCP platform and
they were insufficient. Woodsworth promised support
for specific legislation rather than vague ideas, and
pointed out that the most important part of the 'New
Deal', the unemployment insurance, could not help the
plight of the hundreds of thousands already out of work.
36
What was required, said Woodsworth, was a new system.
For the purposes of this study the most important
event of the federal election was the first appearance
of Social Credit in Saskatchewan. Presh from the
summer's triumph in Alberta, the Social Credit League
sought federal representation by contesting the seats in
Alberta and Saskatchewan. Social Credit associations
were formed throughout Saskatchewan and the League
nominated candidates in all constituencies. Campaigning
with the same anti-socialist, but reform platform, which
had been so successful in Alberta, Social Credit was a
strong competitor for votes among the dissatisfied
36
See reports of speeches by Woodsworth in Regina
Leader-Post, 10-1-35, 11-1-35, 21-1-35 and 4-2-35.
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people of Saskatchewan. Particularly, it could appeal
to all those who wanted reform hut were frightened by
visions of totalitarian socialism under the COP.
The CCF was campaigning on its immediate reform
programme coupled with references to the new order which
would emerge in the future. Those leaders in
Saskatchewan who still believed in socialism feared the
compromise and ambiguity of this position. In January,
George Williams told Coldwell that there was no place
for the CCF as a reformist organization, since there
were already two of these. Insteadt
"We...must convince the general public...that
we are out and out socialists, and they are
capitalist reformers." This might be un¬
popular and prevent a few people from being
elected "but I do sincerely believe that by
being outright Socialists, we will qualify
ourselves for power when the Fascist experi¬
ment has run its course. It may be a long
and weary road. My personal opinion is -
the sooner we reconcile ourselves to out and
out socialism and all the abuse that term
means, the sooner we will be worthy of the
crown of success. In this regard it might
be wise to err on the side of being rather
abrupt rather than err on the side of being
too suave, and I feel that our immediate
programvadopted at our last Convention erred
on the side of being too suave. However,
that is past, and all we can do about it now
is to go ahead and battle as out and outers,
and in my humble opinion, this course will
prove in the end to be the wisest course."37
Others in the party (notably Coldwell, Hugh McLean,
Clarence Fines and Tommy Douglas) were more prepared to
compromise and co-operate with Social Credit in order to
prevent duplication of effort by opposition parties.
-^Williams to Coldwell, 30-1-35, CCF papers, file No.
20/4, Archives of Saskatchewan.
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On the party executive Williams still had sufficient
support to maintain a firm official stand against co¬
operating in any way with Social Credit, but he was
unable to prevent several constituency associations co¬
operating at that level of organization. In Yorkton,
Jacob Benson became a joint candidate (CCP and Social
Credit) and was subsequently repudiated as a CCP candi¬
date. Tommy Douglas, who was endorsed by Social Credit,
had greater personal influence on the CCP executive and
was treated less harshly. After several months of
debate Douglas was retained as a CCP candidate and asked
only to accept a motion of censure from the party. (By
this time Douglas had actually been elected.) less
publicized troubles occurred in other constituencies,
notably Saskatoon and Last Mountain.^8 This pressure
for co-operation at the local level brings out the point
that many people were prepared to co-operate with Social
Credit because they wanted immediate action and tangible
results. Pinard presents a similar general hypothesist
"Given the fact that the masses are, by and
large, neither sensitized nor interested in
most facets of the movement's ideology, we
claim that unincorporated masses, once faced
with a crisis, will choose the movement most
likely to be successful, whether it is con¬
servative or progressive in the eyes of the
70
There is some evidence that Social Creditors were also
seeking co-operation, but the CCP candidate in Prince
Alberta rejected the suggestion first proposed by
Social Credit, that he should stand down in order that
Coldwell would be given no opposition in Rosetown
Biggar. See correspondence in CCP minutes, Executive
meeting, 30-9-35.
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sophisticated observer.
For the same reason the masses may see little reason for
conflict among organizations with reform goals. Hence
the pressure for a reform party to pursue pragmatic
policies, in so far as it needs the support of the people.
This pressure towards pragmatism in politics was
given another boost by the failure of the CCF in the
eleotion. In the country as a whole the Liberals won
an overwhelming victory taking 171 of the 245 seats, but
Lower describes the victory in negative terms:
"The victory was not a tribute to Mr. King, it
was not a proclamation in defence of liberty,
it was not even a pronouncement on the issues
of the day. Liberalism, as it emerged in
Canada after 1935, was the counterpart of
Baldwin Conservatism in Great Britain, of Le
Front Populaire in France, and of Rooseveltian
Democracy: it represented the huddling
together of frightened people uncertain of
their way in a chaotic world."40
On 8.9 per cent of the total vote the CCF elected seven
candidates to the House, but Social Credit on a smaller
popular vote won 17 seats. Winning 15 of Alberta*s
17 constituencies Social Credit eliminated all the
sitting United Farmers* members, which was a severe blow
39
"^Maurice Pinard, "The Rise of a Third Party", Englewood
Cliffs, 1971, p. 95.
^°A.R.M. Lower, "Colony to Ration", Don Mills, 1964,
P. 523.
^Social Credit was able to do this because of the
regional concentration of its support. For an
excellent analysis of how the Canadian electoral
system affects representation see Alan Ci Cairns, "The
Electoral System and the Party System in Canada, 1921-
1965". Canadian Journal of Political Science, vol. 1,
1968, pp. 55-80.
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to the CCP since these people had been the backbone of
the party in Ottawa. In Saskatchewan the Liberals, with
a minority of the popular vote, won 16 of the province's
21 seats. Social Credit took two, the CCP two and the
Conservatives only one. In fact, Social Credit won
20 per cent of the vote, slightly more than the CCP, and
was very strong in the west of the provinoe. Por the
CCP leaders this was the second severe, defeat in little
more than a year and must have been a major cause in the
dilution of socialism in the party programme.
At the provincial convention in 1936 a reform
platform was adopted which made no reference to socialism.
The constitution was also amended to allow for co-opera¬
tion with any organization for the purpose of bettering
A2
the immediate conditions of the common people. Having
removed the socialism there could be little objection on
ideological grounds to co-operating with Social Credit,
a course which George Williams and his supporters now
advocated. The main opposition now came from federal
M.P.s, but they were only successful in having the co¬
operation proposals couched in more general terms. It
was resolved that:
"This convention urge upon the Provincial
Council the advisability of issuing a call to
all progressive organizations, political,
cultural and economic to meet in convention
to seek to discover common ground upon which
we may unite for action and a common goal to
4.2
CCP minutes, first annual convention, 1936, Archives
of Saskatchewan.
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4.3
which we may unitedly move."^v
In using the words "unite for action" and "unitedly
move" the resolution is probably misleading as to the
degree of co-operation which the leaders intended.
Unity implies coming together as one, but nothing more
than coalition was intended (coalitions are temporary
agreements between separate organizations which have
certain common interests). My interpretation is based
on a radio address by George Williams later in the year:
"When the CCP convention voted for cooperation,
they just as emphatically turned down affilia¬
tion and made it quite clear that the CCP did
not intend to sink their identity in a com¬
promise party. They did not intend to give
up any of their principles or platform nor do
they suggest that other groups should do so.
"What we suggest is that the reform groups in
Saskatchewan agree that there is a program on
which all groups can unite, and that with this
program in mind, we refrain from fighting each
other by running five or six candidates in
each constituency."44
Williams then went on to reject Social Credit theory,
but added that Social Creditors should not be obstructed
too much in their attempt to get a new deal. While
assuring listeners that the CCP was not communist, he
was careful to add that "some communists are only
disgusted with the slowness of democratic reform." In
this presentation Williams was trying to strike a
delicate balance between retaining an image of the
43Ibid.
44George Williams, "Cooperation", radio broadcast,
Weyburn, 9-12-36, CCP pamphlets, Archives of
Saskatchewan.
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specific, individual identity of the CCF and paving the
way for a united front of reform parties. The
ambiguity of Williams' attitude to Social Credit and the
Communist Party also suggests that he was ill at ease
with his new role as co-operator. Indeed, in private
he still expressed a desire for socialism, but tempered
by practical considerations, Kis reply to a farmer
from Carrot River, who rejected the reformist tendencies
of the party, is instructive:
"There comes a time...when we acquire a
certain amount of worldly wisdom and a time
when we find if we want to get a certain
place and are continually shot down in
frontal attack, you are wise to attack on the
flank.,.. You fill your place by keeping
socialism ever before the eyes of the people
while some of the rest of us fill our places
by getting the power to bring about Socialism,
In the summer of 1937 Williams reported to the
party on his attempt to get that power. He emphasised
that the resolution of the previous convention to call a
meeting of progressive forces was exploratory and did
not involve affiliation. A CCF committee had devised
an immediate programme for agricultural relief and
approached the United Farmers* organization (which had
withdrawn its affiliation with the CCF) in the hope of
presenting a united front to the government. However,
the United Farmers decided to make their own representa¬
tions to the Liberals and, only if these failed, would
they co-operate with the CCF. Eventually the United
45M.O. Vineyard to Williams, 3CK3-37, and Williams to
Vineyard, 5-4-37, CCF papers, file No. 43, Archives
of Saskatchewan.
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Farmers* Board pronounced satisfaction with the govern¬
ment's attitude but not with existing conditions.
Therefore, they resolved to call a conference of all
economic, commercial and educational bodies for the
purpose of developing an agricultural policy. Failing
immediate satisfaction from the government the policy
was to be submitted to the CCF. Williams argued that
the minutes of this meeting showed the futility of
conferences between diverse groups. Consequently, if
the CCF wished to call a conference it would be best to
invite only those organizations with the "same ideology"
as the CCF.46
Also, in the spirit of the 1936 resolution, Williams
and A.J. Macauley had visited William Aberhart. "Bo
commitments were made, but the door was left open for
further conversations and possible future co-operation."47
Williams had tried to prepare the ground for this
meeting by encouraging the leader of the CCF in Alberta
to stop attacking Social Credit and even to begin a
reconciliation process. It was clear to Williams that
continued clashee in Alberta would make co-operation in
Saskatchewan all the more difficult. However, William
Irvine, leader of the Alberta CCF, was not prepared to
compromise because he saw an early end to the Social
Credit experiment and did not want to have the CCF
46Williams* Report on Cooperation, CCF minutes,
Provincial Council, 5/6-6-37.
47Ibid•
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4.8
defined guilty by association.
In September, 1937, the Saskatchewan CCP executive
decided to approach the Social Credit league at its
autumn convention in Saskatoon with the following messages
"Through the medium of this message of greeting,
the Saskatchewan CCP desires to extend to your
organization an invitation to meet a committee
from the Saskatchewan CCP to canvass the
possibility of cooperation, in order to
prevent the forces of reaction again sweeping
Saskatchewan by splitting the reform vote."49
At the Social Credit convention a motion to receive the
CCP message was passed, but then Ernest Manning, visiting
from Alberta, produced what seems to have been an instant
rule that such a motion had to be unanimous. This
determined opposition by Manning may be explained partly
by his anger at the persistent attacks of CCPers in
50
Alberta, but it is also reasonable to suppose that
Social Creditors retained hopes of a sweeping victory in
Saskatchewan after their relative success in 1935, a
success achieved with little time for organization.
Therefore, the Alberta leaders may have felt that they
had little to gain from any form of alliance with the CCP.
While these negotiations with Social Credit were
going on, there is evidence that the CCP was itself being
approached by both the Communist and Conservative Parties
^^illiams to Irvine, 15-12-36 and 23-12-36, and Irvine
to Williams, 19-12-36, CCP papers, file No. 43, op. cit.
^CCP minutes, Executive meeting, 11/12-9-37.
50
Lipset, op. cit.. p. 144, gives this interpration, but
fails to point out that a majority of Saskatchewan
delegates wanted to hear the offer.
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«5i
to establish some form of alliance. Most surprising
was the new position of the Conservative Party, now led
by John Diefenbaker. The Conservatives produced a
reform platform that was little different from the CCP
immediate programme, including as it did measures such
as state medicine, unemployment and crop insurance, and
52
increased social service benefits. Nevertheless, a
definite alliance with the Conservatives was rejected by
the CCP provincial convention.
Following its rejection of CCP overtures in the
fall of 1937, the Social Credit League of Saskatchewan
announced that the aim of the League was to have a
candidate in every constituency for the election
expected in 1938.^ Despite this announcement many in
the CCP continued to work for some form of alliance.
Responding to pressure in the constituencies for joint
candidates, the CCP executive issued a press statement
in which it was recognized that there was a popular
demand for co-operation. The statement added that the
CCP, as the strongest and best organized group, was the
logical centre for this. Therefore, where the CCP was
strongest it should not be opposed by others, but where
it had little hope of winning it was only reasonable for
"'^Williams* press statement, Saskatoon Star-Phoenix,
17-7-37. Apparently the approaches were restricted
to the constituency level of organization. J.G.
Diefenbaker to the author,12-8-71.
5?
Regina Leader-Post, 8-11-37.
^Moose Jaw Times-Herald, 6-1-38.
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CCP people to find a candidate from another progressive
group whom they could support without compromising their
principles. The decision whether to nominate or not
was to be made in a properly called CCP convention.
There was to be no compromise, no fusion party and no
fusion candidates. In addition the aim of the CCP was
still to elect enough candidates to form a straight CCP
54
government.
This proposal for limited "saw-off" arrangements
could hardly satisfy Social Creditors, ambitious as they
were for victory. Still the CCP tried to stem the
invasion. In a letter to Aberhart, A.J. Macauley, a
CCP executive member, promised that if the CCP won the
election they would undertake some form of united
provincial action,55 and following this he went to meet
the lion in his den. Aberhart apparently thought the
request for co-operation was absurd and presumptious,
insisting that he would never co-operate with the CCP
and, indeed, he would vote Liberal before he would vote
56
CCP. Even after this rebuff some members of the CCP
did not give up:
"It may help you in your nevotiations with
Social Credit to know that even after
receiving Mr. Macauleyfs report on Mr.
Aberhart's blast, I personally went to
Rosthern and kept our fellows out of the
5^CCP minutes, Executive meeting, 19/20-3-38.
55CCP minutes, Provincial Council, 16/17-4-38.
Macauley's report,
56ibia.
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field, pointing out to them that they should
"back Social Credit. It is my opinion that
actions speak louder than words."57
Shortly after his meeting with Macauley Aberhart
announced that he was only waiting for an invitation
before sending his forces into Saskatchewan. A prelude
to intervention by the Alberta government was the forma¬
tion of a national Social Credit organization. This
would provide a mechanism for Aberhart to control the
Saskatchewan members and would be some proteotion
against charges of interference in the affairs of
another province. To this end a conference of western
58
Social Credit leaders was called by Aberhart. A few
days later it was announced in Regina that the Western
Canadian Social Credit Association would control
election activities in all western provinces and that
Ernest Manning would organize in Saskatchewan. The
association would approve all nominations in Saskatchewan
5q
before they were made official.
Ever since co-operation had been rejected in the
previous year, the Social Credit forces in Saskatchewan
had been split. Early in May Manning arrived to heal
wounds and direct the campaign, but his medioine was
weak because it was reported that "from 32 constituencies
has come strong disapproval of Mr. Manning's methods of
57
Williams to S. McArton, 27-4-38, CCP papers, file No.
43, op. cit.
"^Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, 29-4-38.
"^Moose Jaw Times-Herald, 3-5-38; Regina Star, 3-5-38.
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organizing constituencies and nominating candidates. In
every case complaints state that the local Social Credit
organization in Saskatchewan is being strangled and that
an unscrupulous dictatorship has been set up."60 Despite
this internal conflict Social Credit candidates were
selected in 41 of the 52 constituencies. Now Aberhart,
Manning and several other cabinet ministers toured
Saskatchewan propounding the famiTar Social Credit
doctrine. A federal government controlled by financial
interests was blamed for the failure to introduce Social
Credit in Alberta. Social Credit would fight on and
purchasing power would be restored to the people, who
could safely leave the details to experts. Social
Credit was attractively defined as "the ability to buy
61
goods and services without paying for them at the time,"
and Manning promised "when we get control of the money
we will pay out dividends so fast it will make your head
swim."62
It was widely recognized that the Saskatchewan
election of 1938 was the crucial test of whether Soolal
Credit could expand into a national force. Therefore,
it came in for even more abuse in the Liberal press than
did the CCF. Long letters were published which warned
the people of Saskatchewan against repeating the "chaos"
go
Statement by Saskatchewan member of Western Canada
Social Credit Board, quoted in Regina Star, 20-5-38.
61
Aberhart, quoted In Moose Jaw Times Herald, 25-5-38.
g p
Regina Leader^Bost, 28-5-38.
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in Alberta and leading articles warned against the
appearance of a new Hitler. In the western border
riding of Kindersley-Kerrobert there was the remarkable
spectacle of Liberals, Conservatives and CCPers
combining to form a League for the Defence of Democracy
63
as a response to Aberhart*s intervention in Saskatchewan.
1957 has been the worst crop failure year in the
history of the province and now in the following summer
all the parties were claiming to be parties of reform
which could handle the effects of the crop disaster.
The CCF abandoned any reference to socialism and concen¬
trated on social planning and the protection of the
family farm by better debt adjustment legislation, crop
insurance, etc. Only the Liberals nominated a full
slate of 52 candidates; the Conservatives put up 25»
the CCF 30 and Social Credit 41• There were also
several unity candidates. The result of the election
is shown In Table 6.2, which shows that the Liberal
Party was returned to power with a large majority in the
legislature. Although the other parties did not contest
all the ridings, there was enough duplication of opposi¬
tion to allow the Liberals to carry 17 constituencies,
which otherwise would have fallen to the reform forces.
Thus the overwhelming dominance of the Liberal Party in
the new legislature should not lead the reader to believe
that the Liberals were wholeheartedly supported in the
province.
^Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, 25-6-38.
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Table 6.2. Number of Seats Contested. Number of Seats
Won, and Percentage of Popular Vote for
each Party, Saskatchewan, 1958.
~d_„j_,_ Ho. of Seats No, of Seats Percentage1olitical larty contested Won of Vote
liberal 52 38 45
Conservative 25 0 12
CCP 30 10 19
Social Credit 41 2 16
Other 6 2 8
Source: David E. Smith, "A Comparison of Prairie
Political Developments in Saskatchewan and
Alberta", Journal of Canadian Studies, vol, 4»
1969i p. 2Fj Saskatchewan Archives Board,
"Elections 1905-1953", Regina and Saskatoon,
1954.
The CCP leaders were only moderately satisfied with
their performance. Compared with 1934 the decrease in
popular vote was the result of placing fewer candidates
in the field and of the intervention of Social Credit as
a competitor for reform votes. CCP representation in
64.
the legislature was increased from five to ten, ^ most
of which came from east-central Saskatchewan where
recent crops had been better than in other parts of the
province. Indeed, neither the CCP nor Social Credit
was strongest in the poorest areas; Milnor has
64.
This was quickly increased to 11 when Joe Burton won
the Humboldt by-election, an important victory for the
CCP in that with a Catholic candidate it showed the
CCP could win votes in German Catholio areas such as
Humboldt,
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calculated that only one of the ten constituencies with
the highest proportion of protest votes was in the area
of greatest crop failure (the Palliser Triangle).^
The CCF did make major advances in the small urban
districts, more than doubling its support, but it
appears that this increase did not reflect support from
small business men and professionals; rather it came
from workers and farmers living in town. Business men
and professionals either retained their old party
66
identification or were converted to Social Credit.
With regard to support Lipset concludes:
"The principal change in CCP support in the
1938 election from that of 1934 was that it
tended to receive the support of many poorer
Anglo-Saxon Protestants who had previously
voted Conservative.... As in 1934, the CCP
was opposed by the poorer non-Anglo-Saxon
and Catholic areas. Catholic farmers either
continued to vote for the Liberal Party or
backed the Social Credit movement, which had
more appeal to dissatisfied Catholics than
did the socialist CCF."®?
For Social Credit the election was a disaster, only
two of its 41 candidates being successful. There were
encouraging results only in the constituencies close to
Alberta, especially in the north and central region .
where Cut Knife was won from the sitting CCP member.
Given that the Roman Catholic Church had remained
neutral towards Social Credit, it is not surprising to
find that Social Credit was stronger than the CCP in
65
-^Milnor, op. cit.. p. 151.
66 '
Lipset, op. cit.. pp. 198-9.
67Ibid.. p. 203.
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Catholic areas, particularly those with French or German
68
concentration. However, we should note these
relationships are very weak, certainly not strong enough
to swing the constituencies away from the Liberals.
Overall the poor showing of the Sooial Credit candidates
must have been a severe blow to William Aberhart,
because it suggested that national power, which was
necessary to introduce Social Credit, was unattainable.
Why did Social Credit fall in conditions so similar
to Alberta of 1935? Lacking data on voters* perceptions
of Social Credit, any answer must be speculative.
Several factors seem worthy of consideration. The
Social Credit League was an imported organization, which
had to build up from scratch in areas where the CCF had
been organizing for years. Also, the authoritarian
method of having candidates selected by an outsider was
distasteful to the people of Saskatchewan, who had not
experienced the failure of the United Farmers of Alberta
experiment in constituency autonomy. Only those who
lived close to the border with Alberta had been exposed
over a long period to Aberhart*s religious broadcasts
and to the evangelists who poured over the countryside
from the Bible Institute. Perhaps most important of
all, there was no evidence after three years in power
that Aberhart was bringing the promised Utopia to
68
Milnor, op. cit.. p. 150. Humboldt is an important
exception^ Kc>te that the conclusion is based on
quartile analysis because the relationships are too
weak to show up in ecological correlations.
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Alberta. Why should people then believe that he would
succeed in Saskatchewan? It is also true that Aberhart
and Social Credit received a very bad press and were the
primary targets for liberal propaganda, but this had not
prevented Social Credit winning in Alberta and was
probably a minor factor.
While Social Credit received a mauling, the CCP
emerged from the electoral conflict of 1938 as the
undisputed challenger to Liberalism in Saskatchewan.
The earlier rejection by Social Credit of CCP approaches
and the party*s increased strength relative to Social
Credit encouraged a new anti-coalition attitude on the
part of the pragmatic CCP leaders. It was now
recognized that there was no need to combine with Social
Credit in order to win, and so the CCP took a hard line
towards future unity proposals. Meeting a few weeks
after the election the annual convention of the CCP
passed a new statement on co-operation, resolving that
the CCP should run a candidate in each seat in any forth¬
coming election, but also agreeing that, because of the
damage done by vote splitting, all constituency organi¬
zations should "seek the cooperation of all former
gq
supporters of other progressive groups," J If these
were former supporters they would not be involved in
vote splitting and hence there would be no need to seek
their co-operation to avoid duplication of effort.
6Q
JCCP minutes, 3rd annual convention, 1938, Archives of
Saskatchewan.
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The confusing resolution passed in 1938 was to cause the
leadership many headaches in the next few years.
People interpreted the word "cooperation" according to
their own desires. To some it meant combining in a
united front, to others no more than an electoral saw-
off, while others thought that even the latter had now
been rejected. George Williams and most of the party
council took the latter position, and so rejected a
strong pressure in several constituencies to sanction a
united front approach under such labels as United Beform,
70
United Progressive, and New Democracy.
It is important to realize that this rejection of
co-operation with other reform groups did not mean the
adoption of a more socialist position by the OOP. The
party continued to emphasize social planning and social
security? social ownership was to be restricted to the
financial institutions, and some natural resources and
public utilities (all of which was consistent with the
agrarian populist tradition of North America). The few
leaders who were still prepared to diBCuss socialism
were careful to define it pragmatically - for example,
George Williams in a pamphlet published in 1939 writes:
"This is not a treatise in Socialism according
to Marx, Lenin, Stalin, Henderson, Bellamy or
Engels. The writer does not pretend to be
70
Saskatchewan's small Communist Party was influential
in several of these attempts to set up a united front.
See especially correspondence in the Meadow Lake
constituency files. Such approaches were now
rejected by the CCP leadership as an attempt to
destroy the party from within.
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outlining a theoretical socialism.... The
people of Canada are not interested in ascer¬
taining whether a proposed economic system
agrees with Marxism, or any other •ism";
they want to he reasonably sure it will work.
In its next test of popular strength, the federal
election of April 1940, the CCP exhibited its growing
popularity by winning 5 of Saskatchewan*s 21 seats,
28.6 per cent of the vote, and only trailing the
Liberals by 101,450 to 104,441 votes in the 15 seats
72
which were predominantly rural. Such support was
heartening for the CCP members because the party had
been weakened by conflicting attitudes to the Canadian
participation in the war.
"During the campaign, some members of the CCP
ran on an antiwar platform, some on an all-
out support of the war, and still others on
the party program of economic but not
military aid to the Allies."73
Probably of greater importance to the farmers was that
war had brought only a small increase in the price of
wheat, although the crops were now much bigger. In
1941 the CCP continued to support the farmers in their
demands for higher wheat prices. That year-the Liberal
federal government would only guarantee a price of 70
cents per bushel, while the farmers were demanding $1,
which they backed up by collecting 185»000 signatures on
a petition and $40,000 to send a delegation to Ottawa.
71
George Williams, "Social Democracy in Canada", 1939t
CCP papers, pamphlet collection, Archives of
Saskatchewan,
72
Lipset, op. cit., p. 149*
73Ibid., p. 148.
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This pressure was enough to force the government
guarantee up to 90 cents (still well below pre-depression
n A
prices). As the only party to give complete support
to the farmers in this struggle, the CCP benefited by
having its membership more than doubled during 1941-42,
The other major event of 1941 was that Tommy
Douglas was elected president of the Saskatchewan CCF in
preference to a candidate supported by George Williams
7S
(who had now joined the army and was overseas). ^
Apparently some party members felt that Williams had
held too much personal influence in the party, but the
real significance of this event was that it consolidated
the reformist, pragmatic direction of the party, and
showed the influence of the urban middle class in the
farmers' party (Dduglas was a Baptist minister and early
member of the Independent labour Party).
In 1942 a record crop helped to fill the party
treasury, which allowed more intensive organizational
publicity. The CCP would probably have won any
provincial election called at this time, but had to wait
until June, 1944, because the Liberal government, fearing
defeat, passed a special bill extending the life of the
legislature. This probably added to the liabilities of
the Liberals, of which: ^
"Undoubtedly the most serious was the identi¬
fication with the big business, anti-farmer
74Ibid.t p. 149.
75
CC? minutes, annual convention, 1941, Archives of
Saskatchewan,
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interests that was seen by the farmers as
connected with the national party....
Liberalism became a symbol of the depression
and all that it connoted in relief checks,
poverty and suffering."76
Emphasizing policies of social welfare the CCF now took
53 per cent of the vote and all but five seats in the
legislature. As economic conditions improved the CCF
was now better able to mobilize support in areas such as
the Palliser Triangle to the extent that a block of
constituencies in the centre of this region were now in
the top tuartile of CCF support. Similarly the poorest
areas of the two cities were now among the strongest
77
areas of CCF support. Table 6.3 shows that the
Table 6.3. Ecological Variables and CCF Voting. 1934
and 1944.
CCF Votes
1934 1944
Assessment of land .25 I . oCD
United Church membership .40 .10
Roman Catholic -.29 0H.1
Anglo-Saxon .44 .04
Sources S.M. Lipset, "Agrarian Socialism", New
York, revised edition, 1968, p. 204.
76
Sanford Silverstein, "The Rise, Ascendancy and Decline
of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation Party of
Saskatchewan Canada", Ph.D. thesis, Washington Univer¬
sity, 1968, pp. 77-8. It is true that this liability
had always operated against the Liberals to some
degree, but the educational work of the CCF and the
party's support for higher wheat prices in 1942
combined to increase agrarian distrust of the Liberal
Party.
^Lipset, op. cit.. p. 206, Table 18.
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spread of CCF support had the effect of cancelling out
the major ecological-political correlations of 1934.
The apparent reduction of Roman Catholic opposition may
be connected to the fact that in 1943 the church became
officially neutral towards the CCF by announcing that it
was no longer unacceptable for Catholics to support it.
However, Roman Catholic areas did remain the main source
of liberal votes.
6.4. The Land Policy and its Implications
It has been suggested in the chapter that the CCF
had only a brief courtship with socialist ideology and
that this period ended with the electoral defeat of 1934.
Also, in that year the national party adopted an
"immediate programme" of reforms as the base for the
1935 federal election campaign. In Saskatchewan the
editor of the Melville Canadian perceptively described
this change:
"The C.C.F. program of action calls for
nothing else but repairs to capitalism.,..
It is pointless to answer that there is a
difference between the C.C.F.fs immediate
action and ultimate goal. Its proposed
repairs to capitalism are not steps to
socialism if that's what it wants. They
are steps in the opposite direction, steps
towards making capitalism more efficient
and more satisfactory to the public."78
In this section I shall examine the move away from
socialism with specific reference to land policy. The
long struggle against the mortgage companies indicates
^8Melville Canadian, editorial, 8-8-34.
214.
that Saskatchewan people have a strong attachment to the
idea of personal ownership of land (i.e., the institu¬
tions of private property). Therefore, if the
Saskatchewan CCF has been a pragmatic agrarian dominated
party, committed to electoral institutions, we would
expect to see land policy moving towards consistency
79
with local cultural attitudes.'^ In this crucial area
we find conservative modifications being made even
before the 1934 election.
I have recorded that the socialists in the United
Farmers* organization were able to persuade the member¬
ship to adopt a programme which included the nationaliza¬
tion of land. Farming would be carried on under a
"Use-Lease", which would allow the individual farmer to
operate as before, except that he would now lease the
land from the state. The plan was devised to ensure
security of tenure, since the individual farmer would no
longer be subject to evictions caused by default on
mortgage payments. Opponents were assured that there
was no intention of introducing collective farms as in
the Soviet Union. "Use-Lease" was adopted as the
policy of the new Farmer-Labour Party (CCF) in 1932.
The policy generated great opposition in the rural areas
among those farmers who rejected state ownership because
they wanted to hold personal title to the land. This
attitude prevailed among not only Liberal supporters but
79^For an excellent review of how other aspects of CCF
policy changed see Lipset, op. cit.. pp. 160-196.
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even the active Progressives. For example, S.N. Horner,
who had been elected to the legislature in 1929 as a
Progressive, states that he did not go directly to the
Farmer-Labour Party, because "each should own his own
home and the farmer^ home is on his land. Therefore,
if this land is leased, his home is leased."8®
As early as 1932 opposition to land nationalization
produced a change of wording. The policy became known
as "Use-Hold" to emphasize the security of tenure aspect
rather than the state ownership content. In July, 1933,
a motion was tabled by the political directive board
that the land policy should be amended "so that occupants
be granted the privilege of exchanging their "Use-lease"
for clear title any time after their indebtedness had
been paid in full."8"1" A pamphlet from this period
states that the policy aims to preserve "freedom,
individual rights, and dignity of race." The policy is
described in detail. All lands being opened for settle¬
ment would be held by the state and "Use-Hold" titles
would be issued. Lands which had reverted to the
municipalities because of failure to pay taxes would be
returned to the original occupant tinder a "Use-Hold"
title after the government had settled with the
municipality. Lands on which the occupant could not
meet his debts would be made secure for the farmer on
80
S.N. Horner, Interview, 2-1-71, in Archives of
Saskatchewan, file No. 15/55.
81
CCF minutes, political directive board, 8-7-33»
Archives of Saskatchewan.
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voluntary application for "Use-Hold" title. This would
/
occur after debt adjustment and revaluation of the land
by an Arbitration Board. Bonds would be issued on the
equities agreed. Those who held a clear Torrens title
(a deed of ownership) and were not embarrassed by
creditors could carry on as they were or apply for
"Use-Hold" title if they so wished.82 Another pamphlet
issued in 1933 stated that "despite criticism from the
old parties it is not a system of government farming or
collectivization.♦.use hold title gives every power of
the Torrens except that of mortgage."8^ It could be
willed and participation was voluntary. The alternative
was perceived to be corporation farming by the finance
companies. Thus we can see that the earlier programme
to nationalize all natural resources had been modified.
By 1934 the official CCF declaration of policy was
advocating security of tenure but gave no details of the
land policy| rather it contained an extended statement
on CCP support for religious freedom and a quote from
the Archbishop of Westminster to the effect that
Catholics could vote for non-violent social democratic
parties«8* The policy for the nationalization of land
C5p
"Agricultural Land Policy", Saskatchewan Parmer-Labour
Group, Saskatoon, approx, 1932, CCP papers, pamphlet
collection, Archives of Saskatchewan.
83"ls Your Home Safe?" CCP papers, pamphlet collection,
Archives of Saskatchewan.
^Official Manifesto of the Saskatchewan Farmer-Labour
Group, 1934, CCP papers, pamphlet collection, Archives
of Saskatchewan.
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was officially dropped in 1936. In the budget debate
of 1937 Williams did not mention "Use-Hold" but
advocated protection of the Torrens title by limiting
the power of the mortgage companies. For example, he
suggested that no payments should be made in poor crop
years and that the government should proolaim a
85
moratorium on debt when necessary. Thus the CCF
position in Saskatchewan had become similar to what the
Social Credit government was actually doing in Alberta.
Prom the middle thirties until the victory of 1944
CCF land policy changed very little. In its land
policy the CCF promised to:
*1. Protect the farmer from unjust foreclosure
and eviction.
2. Protect from seizure that part of a
farmer's crop that is needed to provide
for his family.
3. Use, if necessary, the power of moratorium
to compel reduction of debts to a figure
at which they can reasonably be paid with
prevailing prices of farm products.
4. Prevent the growth of debt by placing a
crop failure clause in all mortgages and
agreements of sale."86
Another pamphlet stated that "the CCP believes in the
family farm as the basis of rural life" and that it
would protect the family farm by increasing farm income
through guaranteed minimum prices, encouraging the
development of co-operatives, crop insurance, and
pressing for the abolition of the Winnipeg Grain
85
Williams, Budget Debate, 24-3-37, CCP papers, pamphlet
collection, Archives of Saskatchewan.
88"CCF Land Policy", 1944, CCP papers, pamphlet
collection, Archives of Saskatchewan.
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Exchange.
This process of conservative development provides
another example of a familiar dilemma for parties which
propose social revolution but are also committed to
gaining power by popular elections should ideology be
compromised for immediate reformist gains or should the
original goal be explicitly retained and energy be
88
diverted into educating the electorate? If such a
party fails to provide what the people will accept, it
must become reconciled either to taking power by force
or remaining a powerless educational organization; to
win power quickly by election it must compromise and
adopt a reformist rather than a revolutionary programme.
In the latter case revolutionary rhetoric will be
abandoned. Thus, urging the Social Democratic Party of
Imperial Germany to adopt a programme of immediate reforms
"Bernstein promised Social Democracy the
support of a large sector of the bourgeoisie
- but to win that support the party 'must
find the courage to emancipate itself from a
revolutionary phraseology which is in fact
out of date, and be willing to appear as what
it really is: a democratic-socialist party
of reform.1"89
The pressures towards revisionism seem to be especially
87„jhe Parmer and the COP", COP papers, 1944, pamphlet
collection, Archives of Saskatchewan.
88
See especially the great debate between supporters of
Bernstein's revisionism and revolutionary socialism in
the German SPD. E.g., Peter Gay, "The Dilemma of
Democratic Socialism: Eduard Bernstein's Challenge to
Marx", New York, 1952.
«q
^Carl E. Schorske, "German Social Democracy",
Cambridge, Mass., 1955, p. 19*
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great in rural dominated areas such as Saskatchewan,
where people tend to he strongly committed to existing
property institutions. Again the German Social Demo¬
cratic Party provides an interesting comparison. While
the party as a whole was officially committed to a
policy of total opposition to capitalism (the 1891
Erfurt programme), unindustrialized southern Germany
became a centre of revisionism, as the party tried to
win support among the peasantry and artisans,
"The southern Social Democratic leaders were
inclined from the outset to tone down the
revolutionary aspects of the party's ideology.
The efforts of party agitators to work among
the peasants led to the first attempt to
revise the Erfurt program's Marxian thesis
that the independent peasantry was doomed to
be crushed by large-scale agriculture. To
tell a prosperous peasant that he was fated
to lose his holding was no way to convert him
to Social Democracy, Bavarian party leaders
raised the demand for a policy designed to
protect and defend the interest of the
peasant, while southern theorists developed
an analysis showing that small holdings, far
from being doomed, were more efficient than
large ones for certain types of agriculture."9°
The land issue in Saskatchewan never did involve such an
extreme process of compromise within the CCF because
almost nobody in the party adopted a doctrinaire
position which would have required abandoning the ideal
of the family farm as the basis of rural life. In
Saskatchewan the adjustment of the party to a pragmatic
reformist position was relatively painless because the
party leadership had strong agrarian roots. An early
commitment to winning elections also meant an early
9QIbid., pp. 8-9? also pp. 192-30.
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adjustment of the culture of the party to that of the
society (or more accurately to what the leadership
perceived that culture to he).
In concluding this chapter, it is worth noting that
the development of a large, careerist, party bureaucracy
(another well known source of conservatism in party
development^1) had practically no bearing on the
conservative trends in the CCP, because such changes
were well under way when the party had only the most
meagre permanent staff - one full time secretary in
1934* However, the leadership, once in power, did
develop characteristics of oligarchy - self-perpetuation
and a decline in contact with the rank and file members
- which contributed to the party's defeat in 1964* I
shall want to consider this question in parts of the
next two chapters.
Michels' classic study is still of major importance
R. Michels, "Political Parties", English edition,
Glencoe, Illinois, 1947.
Chapter Seven
Industrialization and the Transformation
of the Agrarian Parties 1944-1971
In this chapter it is proposed to indicate how the
process of economic change affected the policies and
sources of support of Social Credit and the CCF. The
chapter is important to the thesis in that it suggests
the conditions which lead to the decline of populist
politics, and thus it complements the main emphasis of
the research on populism and the conditions which
produce and sustain it. First, a brief overview of the
economic changes since 1945 will be presented; then the
history of each party in power will be reviewed up to 1971.
7.1. The Urban. Industrial Transformation1
Since the Second World War the impersonal force of
economic development has gradually eroded the numerical
predominance of the petit bourgeois class in Alberta and
Saskatchewan. As rural and small town areas suffer a
relative decline in population, the parties, which seek
power and have depended on support from people in these
areas, have been forced to adjust to changed circum¬
stances. The new developments of industrialization and
urbanization have brought a new way of life to much of
1
Except where otherwise noted, this summary is based on
statistical material presented in Appendix A.
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the west. As rural electrification programmes advanced,
the mass media, now dominated by television, invaded the
countryside and spread the urban culture of mass con-
2
sumption living. New desires were manufactured and
new deprivations experienced. But most important to
political life, a diversified economy brought a rise in
the proportion of the population in the labouring
classes and in white collar occupations. Wage labour
replaced farm ownership as the main source of personal
income.
As long as the economy continued to expand in the
fifties and sixties, increases in real income allowed
many people to satisfy their growing desire for material
products. Even the farming population profited from
higher prices and increases in scale of operation,
although annual income remained unstable. However, the
small farmers, those with insufficient capital to expand
and profit from large scale production, experienced a
relative decline in their standard of living. Many of
these contributed to the flow of people from country to
city. Worst hit of all were the native people who had
not yet learned to cope with the white man's culture;
they festered on the reservations where the federal
agents made all important decisions and the men lost
2
An excellent report on the impact of electrification
on rural life is the Report of the Royal Commission on
Agriculture and Rural Life, vol. 11, "Rural Electrifi¬
cation", Regina, 1956.
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their dignity. Yet the plight of the poor white
farmers and the Indians has only recently been forced to
the attention of political leaders. Only when they
disturb the peaceful lives of the more affluent, can the
poor hope to escape the conditions to which even their
unborn children are condemned. This statement of the
existence of severe deprivation among certain minorities
has been made to emphasize that the overall increases in
prosperity, which are referred to in this chapter, have
not been equally distributed. When we discuss such
prosperity we are excluding small scale farmers, most of
the Indians, and sections of the urban labouring class.
Nevertheless, a majority of people experienced an
increase in their material standard of living and that
majority dominated thinking in the legislatures of the
provinces. New prosperity, while it made many innova¬
tions financially possible, discouraged change because
it made change seem unnecessary, and change has never
been valued for its own sake in the Canadian west.^"
Both the Albertan and Saskatchewan governments
recognized that this new found prosperity of their
provinces could not be assured as long as they were
3
See the poignant descriptions of poverty in Canada in
the present day in Ian Adams, "The Poverty Wall",
Toronto, 1970. Using conservative figures approxi¬
mately 20 per cent of Canadians are classed as poor.
^"See John Bennett on the conservative effects of farm
prosperity in "Social Adaptation in a Northern Plains
Region: a Saskatchewan Study", in C.C. Zimmerman and
S. Russell, "Symposium on the Great Plains", Pargo,
N.D., 1968.
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subject to the market circumstances of a single product.
Thus diversified economic development was encouraged.
This included both diversification within agriculture
(away from wheat to other grain crops and livestock) and
a decline in the importance of agriculture relative to
other sectors of the economy. With the built-in
advantage of Alberta's geography, the Social Credit
government has been consistently more successful in
achieving these aims. Agriculture has regularly
accounted for less of the total provincial product than
it has in Saskatchewan, and Alberta has developed more
industries that are not based indirectly on agriculture.
Yet, even in Saskatchewan, the changes in the structure
of the economy have been startling. For example, in the
ten years, 1948-58, agriculture as a source of wealth
declined from 71 per cent of the total value of
5
production to 37.4 per cent. Mining, construction and
manufacturing industries have shown the greatest growth.
Alberta's expansion took off from the development
in 1947 of a large oilfield south of Edmonton:
"The oil and gas industry provided the major
impetus to the economic development that has
taken place since 1947. The increase in
population has stimulated the construction
industry, made viable many manufacturing
industries which are related to servicing the
needs of the consumers not connected with the
5
Stanford Research Institute, "A Study of Resources and
Industrial Opportunities for the Province of Saskat¬
chewan", Menlo Park, California, 1959. Figures such
as these must be treated with caution because the value
of agricultural production shows large yearly
variations (Appendix A, Table 9).
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oil industry, and generated the needs for
service industries."6
The search for oil was also indirectly responsible for
the development of Saskatchewan's glamour industry -
potash - which has lost much of its sparkle in the
current world recession in potash prices.
"Exploration for oil led to the discovery of
potash, and the initiation of new major
industry. Other important developments took
place in sodium sulphate, natural gas, and
clays. The net value of mineral output in
1958 was $164 million, 19*4$ of the
provincial total. These resource based
industries, in turn, provided a market for
products that could not have been manufactured
profitably in Saskatchewan in the past."7
New industries in Saskatchewan and in Alberta
further promoted the dramatic growth of urban population
in both absolute and relative terms (i.e., relative to
the proportion in rural areas). This growth created
sufficient consumer concentration to allow the setting
up of manufacturing enterprises, which are oriented to
the local market. The development of urban amenities
acts to attract further population, which leads to the
economies of large units and brings about greater con-
Q
centration of employment opportunities.
In agriculture the trend towards larger farms and a
decrease in the numbers employed in agriculture have
^Alberta Bureau of Statistics, "Alberta. Industry and
Resources", Edmonton, 1964, p. 81.
7
Stanford Research Institute, op. cit., p. 10.
O
John Richards, "The Decline and Pall of Agrarian
Socialism", in S.M. Lipset, "Agrarian Socialism",
revised ed., New York, 1968, p. 366.
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accelerated. Because of technological innovations in
agricultural production, the larger farm units do not
require increases in the labour force proportionate to
the increase in farm size. The labour force has
declined despite an increase in the total area of land
in productive use. Farm income continues to fluctuate
and is usually below the national average for per capita
personal income. Although the economy is changing
rapidly, the latest census figures still show that
agriculture provides the largest single source of
employment in both provinces.
The lower density of rural population, in con¬
junction with improved transportation, has accelerated
the decline of small distributing centres. Today the
prairie countryside is dotted with small towns (defined
as those with less than two thousand people), where a
large proportion of the small businesses have been
abandoned and where the homes that remain often have a
q
run-down appearance. Young people, in particular, have
flocked to the cities in a migration which repeats the
pattern so familiar to students of industrialization.
Saskatchewan remains well behind Alberta in the propor¬
tion of her people living in urban areas, but the cities
of Saskatoon and Regina have been among the fastest
q^These comments are based on press reports reinforoed by
my travels in Saskatchewan. E.g., the road from
Saskatoon to North Battleford passes by numerous small
declining villages, which are spaced out at 7 to 12
mile intervals. The researcher is both rewarded and
saddened by making the small detours which are
necessary to visit them.
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growing in Canada during the last decade. Saskatchewan
also lags behind in the rate of population growth, and
there is some evidence that out-migration has reached
such proportions that the population is now declining
slightly.10 An upswing in economic activity will
probably change this as it has in the past.
Perhaps the most important consequence of the urban,
industrial transformation in Saskatchewan and Alberta is
that the mass apathy of a mass consumption society seems
to have descended on the population. Except for small
groups of student and union activists the urban people
seem content to demand only that what they have should
be preserved. In rural areas the co-operative organiza¬
tions have become conservative parts of the establishment.
"...the major, once pro-CCF, non-capitalist
economic institutions (Wheat Pool, consumer
co-ops, etc.) followed the conservative path
that Lipset suggests is common for all purely
economic reform organizations during good
times.... The depoliticalization of co¬
operative Saskatchewan may have sharply
weakened the CCP organizationally, since this
process implies a decline in the overlap of
leadership between the party and other
organizations••••1,11
If these speculative comments are accurate then we
should expect an increase in political conservatism,
whatever the actual party labels might be, because the
apathy in the west today is not the product of
10
This out-migration is probably the main reason why
Saskatchewan had the lowest unemployment rate in
Canada during 1970-71.
11Richards, op. cit., pp. 371-372. He also reports
that the editor of the main farm paper, the "Western
Producer", was a conservative.
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destitution; rather it is a product of satisfaction
with what exists. Since what is defined as good there
is no need to work to change politics. Those who
promise to conserve the good life are entrusted with
public office.
Against this background of a rapidly changing
society we will consider the recent political history of
Alberta and Saskatchewan. How did Social Credit and
the CCP adjust to the processes which they helped to
bring about? How do populist reform parties respond
to success?
7.2. The Saskatchewan CCP in an Age of Prosperity
The CCP came to power in 1944 and survived as a
government for twenty years. Its history since 1944 to
the present may be divided into five main periods - a
period of innovation, 1944-48, which set the tone of the
administration; consolidation and expansion, 1948-60;
the medicare election and its aftermath, 1960-63; the
Liberal interlude, 1964-71; and the revival of the
NDP12 in 1971.
7.21 Innovation. When the new CCP government
entered office in 1944 it was committed to a programme
of widespread innovation in the areas of agriculture,
12
The CCP allied with the Canadian Labour Congress in
1961 to form the New Democratic Party. See Walter
D. Young, "The Anatomy of a Party: the National CCP",
Toronto, 1969; and Gad Horowitz, "Canadian Labour in
Politics", Toronto, 1968.
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public ownership, labour legislation, health and welfare,
and education. Tommy Douglas did not greet his victory
with revolutionary fervour, commenting, "We must go
13
forward cautiously but resolutely." Yet, in compari¬
son with any other administration the province had
experienced, the first two years of the first term were
ones of intense innovation.
An agricultural policy intended to provide security
of tenure and stability of income was pursued. The
Farm Exemptions Act gave the farmer the right to retain
enough of the proceeds from his crop to keep his family,
cover operating expenditure, and have sufficient seed
for the next planting before paying out to the finance
corporations. The Farm Securities Act banned evictions
from the quarter section where the farm house was
situated. Most important the farmer was also allowed
to postpone interest payments and have the principal
reduced by the equivalent of one year*s interest during
14.
crop failure years, ^ This was bitterly opposed by the
finance companies, which had defeated the attempts by
Social Credit to introduce similar legislation in the
thirties. Again the financial interests won, because
the Supreme Court declared that the offending clauses on
reduction of interest and principal were ultra vires.
In other respects the CCF promoted stability by
13
^Quoted in A.W. Johnson, "Biography of a Government:
Policy Formulation in Saskatchewan, 1944-1961", Ph.D.
thesis, Harvard University, 1963, p. 179.
"^Statutes of Saskatchewan, 1944.
230.
establishing seed and fodder banks as an insurance
against poor years, pressed for a continuation of the
wartime Wheat Pool agreements, and increased the agri-
15
cultural extension services.
There was no attempt to socialize agriculture,
although the left wing did encourage the setting up of
collective farms. Enabling legislation was passed in
1945, but only 29 farms were subsequently established
(excluding the Hutterite religious communities). In
these farms the land is owned or leased by the group as
a whole, work is planned at regular meetings, and the
men draw equal monthly wages regardless of the specific
jobs they do. Family units live in separate houses
which are owned collectively. After investigating
these collective farms, Cooperstock concluded that most
of them have suffered because the members are unable to
adjust to the principle of property sharing. They are
unable to do so because they have been socialized in a
society where the individually owned and operated farm
is the ideal. Membership in co-operative associations
does not alter this because so few members are actively
involved. "...much of the loyalty to the co-operative
movement may be based on rational calculation of the
15
^Sanford Silverstein, "The Rise, Ascendency and
Decline of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation
Party of Saskatchewan, Canada", Ph.D. thesis,
Washington University, 1968.
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16
economic gains to be derived from membership." Most
of the surviving farms are, in fact, large scale family
enterprises. "Except for one or two of the earliest
farms, there is no indication of any important ideo¬
logical motivation in their organization."17 Collective
agriculture is outwith the dominant prairie farming
culture.
Except for the gesture towards collective farming,
Lipset's assessment is correct that the CCF was conser¬
vative in its rural policy. It did "nothing to change
the comparative position of tenant farmers or to
equalize the economic status of the poorer and smaller
1 ft
farmers," Any attempt to limit the size of
individually owned farms has been resisted by the CCP
leadership. It also seems that the expansion of co¬
operatives under the CCP has benefited the larger
farmers disproportionately, because the poor cannot
afford to wait until dividend time for cash income.
They must often accept the prices offered by the private
elevator companies, which are higher on the date of
19
delivery to the elevator.
1^Henry Cooperstock, "Prior Socialization and Co-opera¬
tive Farming", in B, Blishen etal., eds., "Canadian
Society", Toronto, 1968, p. 359. Cooperstock notes
that, unlike the sooially isolated Hutterites, the
absence of barriers betweenico-operative farmers and
the local communities reinforces the individualist
values of those on the farms,
17
J. Bennett and C. Krueger, "Agrarian Pragmatism and
Radical Politics", in Lipset, op. clt., p. 355.
1SLipset, op. cit.. p. 274.
19Ibid., p. 276.
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When challenged on the lack of socialism in their
government, CCF supporters are proud to point out the
state owned industries set up by the CCP. In 1945 a
Crown Corporation Act reached the statutes. This Act
permitted the government to purchase existing businesses,
to establish new ones and to borrow in order to finance
them. In short time the government was operating an
Electric Power Commission (later the Saskatchewan Power
Corporation), a province wide telephone system, a bus
company to replace Greyhound services, an airline to
serve the north, an Insurance office to provide all
kinds of service (but especially the cheap and compulsory
auto insurance), fur and fish marketing services, two
fish filletting plants, a lumber marketing board, a seed
cleaning plant, liquor stores, a printing plant, woollen
mill, shoe factory, tannery, sodium sulphate plant, a
brick yard, and finally the Prince Albert box factory.
The box company was taken over after a protracted labour
dispute. Lipset stated that the overriding Justifica¬
tion for these government enterprises was a concern to
use them as a source of income in order to extend social
services, but Johnson points out that this end could be
achieved by increasing corporation taxes and controls.
He agrees that a few ministers were motivated by revenue
considerations, but claims that the most important
reason for the government's action was that leading CCP
members did recognize the need for economic diversifica¬
tion in the province, and were afraid that it would not
233.
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be carried out at all unless by the government. This
opinion is mirrored by a report from the Stanford
Research Institute. Apart from the control of public
utilities and transportation services (long a part of
<r
populist platforms), it concludes that:
n...the primary direction of the extension of
public ownership has been toward the utiliza¬
tion of resources and elimination of gaps
left by private enterprise. The government
has undertaken such enterprises only when
private sources of investment have felt that
the particular enterprises were too risky.
In certain cases this has proved true, as
demonstrated by the failure of three Crown
Corporations in the late 1940s. However, it
is worthy of note that, as a whole, Crown pi
Corporations have been profitable ventures."
The CCF was generally cautious and pragmatic. It
did not reject private enterprise. The provincial
budgets under the direction of Clarence Fines were
orthodox, balanced ones, which was partly a result of
the province*s need to improve its poor credit standing
22
on the financial markets. Oil, the most promising
area for future development, was left to private
industry. Although speakers at OCF conventions
regularly favoured public ownership of the oil industry,
the Douglas policy of development by private industry
prevailed. A system of land rental and royalty
payments was established as in Alberta, and so the CCF
20Johnson, op. cit., p. 141.
21
Stanford Research Institute, op. cit., p. 68.
Silverstein's conclusion that almost all government
enterprises failed to survive market conditions is
false, op. oit.. p. 132.
22
Johnson, op. cit.. p. 289.
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lost its only chance of fulfilling, in Saskatchewan, the
goal of socializing monopoly industries. Reviewing his
time in power Douglas said that he would have preferred
government ownership of oil, but the investment require¬
ment was out of the range of a provincial government.
He was forced to compromises
MWhen the companies came in to explore for oil,
the agreement was that when we declared an
area to be what we called a proven area, it
was checkerboarded. That meant that the
black squares belonged to them. They could
take the oil out of the black squares and pay
the royalty and pay the ground rent. But the
white squares belonged to the Crown. We
didn't do what Alberta had done, we didn't
turn the white squares over to the companies
by putting them up for bid. We took the
squares that were left. We turned over to
the co-operatives a lot of these areas on a
farm out basis, in which we shared the cost
and we shared the return."23
As the early enthusiasm among the government ministers
for public ownership waned in 1947, an industrial
development fund was established to assist private
industry by granting loans. Planning rather than
public ownership was emphasized as more conservative
OA
forces prevailed in government councils. Thus, apart
from developing small scale industries based on local
products, the CCF did not depart to any significant
degree from the policies on public ownership, which were
already operating in Canada. Part of the power
industry, part of the telephone system, and the liquor
23
T.C. Douglas, Interview in Canadian Dimension, vol. 7,
April, 1971, p. 34.
2^Johnson, op. cit.. p. 295.
235.
stores had, in fact, "been inherited from the Liberals.
The CCP differed only in the speed and scope of its
action.
"Public ownership of corporations is not new
in Canada. Certain fields are viewed by
Canadians as natural ones for public owner¬
ship. The dominion government has long
owned one of the railroads and the largest
domestic air transportation system in Canada.
Several provinces own their own telephone
systems# Electric power generation and dis¬
tribution have also been placed under
provincial ownership in other provinces.
Thus public ownership in itself does not
constitute a radical innovation in the
Canadian organization of industry."25
Nevertheless, for Saskatchewan the CCP took important
new steps towards a more prosperous future.
Somewhat surprising in a rural province was the
legislation sympathetic to labour which the CCP passed.
But this is explained by the pressures on the CCP to
make a good impression on labour organizations at a
national level, and by the unionist/I.L.P. origins of
several of the provincial leaders. Anyway, the Trade
Union Act encouraged union organization by establishing
collective bargaining as a worker's right, by making
such bargaining compulsory for employers, and by
granting the closed shop to unions which were supported
by the majority of workers in government supervised
elections. Anti-union practices were outlawed and
provision was made for the expropriation of factories
if employers persisted in disobeying the terms of the
25•^Stanford Research Institute, op. cit.« p. 66. My
emphasis.
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Act. This wa8 how the government came to control the
box factory. New wage laws gave Saskatchewan workers
one of the highest minimum wages in Canada in 1947
($18.50 per week), two weeks paid vacation each year,
workmen's compensation at 75 per cent of previous income
27
(the best on the continent); and a 44-hour work week.
To appease the farmers, farm employees were exempt from
the legislation.
It is important to record that encouraging good
labour legislation did not mean that the CCP accepted
anything that smacked of workers' control. Those
workers who expected at least to be consulted in the
running of the government enterprises, found themselves
out in the cold. All demands for participation in
decision making were resisted. The managers, most of
whom had been running private industry before, adopted a
paternalistic approach, which estranged those of the
workers who had expected changes in the social relations
28
of industry and an increase in personal dignity.
Managers were concerned only with making the government
enterprises operate at a profit. There developed a
social vacuum between workers and management, and workers
tended to translate all grievances into overt conflict.
26
Lipset, op. cit.. p. 279; Silverstein, op. clt.« pp. 122-3.
27
Lipset, op. cit., p. 279.
OQ
Silverstein, op. cit.. pp. 124-5* Lipset, op. cit.. pp.
281-6; esp. p. 283. "Though most of them (the managers)
think of themselves as being friendly to labor, they
cannot conceive of sharing authority with the worker.
The worker is someone to be helped rather than consulted."
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After visiting one Crown Corporation, lipset concludeds
"This executive was unaware of any desire on
the part of his workers for participation in
management. It is interesting to note that
the employees in this plant complained that
the management did not consider their feelings,
but interpreted their grievances purely on an
economic dollars-and-cents level. The same
pattern recurred in other government
factories."29
In education, Woodrow Lloyd, a former head of the
Saskatchewan Teachers Federation, introduced the
policies of the organized teachers. The most important
changes were a consolidation of school distriots in
order to reduce costs, and, by spreading the burden more
widely, to increase standards in the poor areas; the
provision of free textbooks; and an increase of $500 in
the minimum salary of teachers bringing it up to $1200.
In the thirties the CCF had strongly advocated teaching
socialism in the classrooms, but curriculum revisions
30
directed to this end were kept to a minimum.^
The greatest innovations were in the areas of
health and welfare. Tommy Douglas considered these
were his greatest achievements. No sooner had the
government taken office than the first steps were taken
to bring in the plans to which the party was committed.
Within months free access to the complete range of
medical services (including dentistry) was available to
all old age pensioners, those receiving mothers'
allowances, and the blind. At the same time those
2^Lipset, op. cit.. p. 283.
30
Silverstein, op. cit.. pp. 148-154.
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suffering from tuberculosis, cancer, venereal disease,
or mental illness were provided with free care.
Saskatchewan was also the first province to provide a
supplement ($5 per month) to the federal old age pension.
Legislation was passed in 1946 to bring into being
Canada's first provincial medical insurance scheme,
which provided for free hospitalization at a premium of
$10 per person per year. The original CCP scheme
involved a change in the class position of doctors from
independent practitioners to salaried employees of the
state. This was bitterly opposed by the organized
medical profession, despite the fact that fully one
third of rural municipalities, 60 villages and 11 towns
were already employing doctors on this basis, and had
31
done so for decades. The Saskatchewan College of
Physicians and Surgeons, while unopposed to health
insurance in principle, rejected the CCP programme
because health would be under the direct control of the
government and doctors would be paid by salary. The
government's advisors felt that, if the doctors were
conceded their demands, the ills of private medicine
would be continued. Health insurance, they argued,
would be inadequate as long as it was accompanied by
fee-for-service payment. Such a system would
perpetuate the concentration on curing illnesses rather
32
than emphasize prevention of disease. However, the
31
Lipset, op* cit.. p. 288.
32Ibid., p. 293.
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pressure of the medical interest group was so great that
the government backed away from its original plan* The
government's greatest fear was that the doctor-patient
ratio, already poor compared with other provinces, would
get worse if the plan was pressed and the doctors carried
out their threat to abandon the province. In the com¬
promise settlement, insurance was limited to hospitaliza¬
tion and control was to be exercized by an independent
planning board, but one on which the doctors expected to
dominate. The fee-for-service form of payment was
adopted,
The province was also divided into health regions,
into which the CCP intended to introduce fully
socialized medicine. As a beginning complete medical
and hospital services were provided free to residents in
the health region which centred on Swift Current, in the
south-west. This was considered an experiment, which
would be evaluated and extended if it worked. Even
here the CCP compromised with the doctors, since they
would be paid on a fee basis. The doctors won most of
the concessions they wanted, but so did the public.
People did not understand the basis of the quarrel
behind fee or salary payment? they wanted a relief from
the financial burden of being ill, and that they got.
It was perhaps the greatest single reason for the CCP
staying in power.
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7.22 Consolidation, 1948-1960. The first term
was the period of most innovation, and the next twelve
years found the CCF, buttressed by prosperity, able to
consolidate the advances that had been made in reforming
the social structure. In 1948 the COP party was
returned with an easy majority but somewhat chastened by
a loss of 16 seats and a decline in the popular vote.
(Perhaps the changes introduced were more extensive than
some 1944 supporters wished.) This result probably
decreased the pace of innovation, because the party was
oriented to staying in power and many members thought
the election was a warning not to go too far, too fast
in public ownership or other unpopular policies such as
33
school unit reorganization. ^ It was quickly evident
that the second term of office was going to bring no
further experiments in state owned industries* Some of
the ones already started were in financial trouble and
ridiculed by the opposition. In the social services
Douglas announced, "We have now gone as far as we can go
in terms of social security until we put a better
economic base under (it)."*^ The focus was now on
building a diversified economy with the help of private
enterprise. To this end an Industrial Development
Office was established in 1950, which provided a "focus
of energy and a symbol of policy which previously had
•2*
•^Johnson, op. cit.. pp. 359-360.
34
-^Ibid., p. 365. Douglas was speaking in the legisla¬
ture, 1949.
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been lacking."33 By 1951 oil development had begun in
earnest with 136,000 square miles being explored at a
cost of $25 million a year.
Increasing prosperity in agriculture and other
industries, together with the CCF's efficient election
organization, produced a record vote for the government
in 1952. The population decline had been reversed, but
there was now evidence that country people were becoming
urbanized in the sense that they wanted the physical
■57
amenities of urban life. The CCF then concentrated
on bringing these to rural areas. The government
promised to bring electricity to 40,000 additional farms,
to engage in a huge market road improvement programme,
and to co-operate with the federal government in
building the South Saskatchewan dam. All these tasks
were undertaken and achieved, although the great dam had
to await the election of John Diefenbaker's Conservative
administration. Targets for rural electrification were
easily achieved. Road building and natural gas distri-
38
bution expanded rapidly.
The era of "continue and extend" was not without
problems for the CCF in the areas of public ownership,
35Ibid., p. 368.
3^Ibid.. p. 370. Mineral production worth $51 million
in 1951, rose to $123 million in 1956, and $212
million in I960.
37^ Royal Commission on Agriculture and Rural Life, vol. 7,
"Movement of Farm People", Regina, 1956, pp. 82-114.
"58J Johnson, op. cit.. pp. 481-484.
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local government organization, and the continued
fluctuations in farm income. The shoe factory and
tannery were closed in 1949» to he followed hy the
woollen mill in 1953 (Saskatchewan sheep produced low
quality wool). Finally the ill-fated box factory was
closed in 1957. These failings tended to obscure the
overall success of the public corporations in terms of
profit making, but public ownership had not expanded
since the first term of office. "A decade after
assuming power, the business done by the eighteen
government-owned enterprises constituted less than four
39
per cent of the total business within the province." ^
In local government the CCF wanted to reorganize
the municipalities into larger cost saving counties, but
met with such opposition from incumbent councillors that
it was agreed to set up an investigation commission.
Not until 1962 was the problem resolved, when the
government agreed that it would only reorganize on the
basis of a popular vote in each area designated for
40
reconstruction.
The abnormally high farm prices of the early
fifties did not last, and the 1956 election was fought
during a temporary decline in personal income of farmers
and other indicators of economic well being. Johnson
suggests that the CCF had become "less sensitive to the
39
^Evelyn L. Eager, "The Government of Saskatchewan",
Ph.D. thesis, University of Toronto, 1957.
^Johnson, op. cit.« p. 591.
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people's perspective."^"1 The CCF was also under attack
for alleged associations with the Communist party, for
encouraging "creeping bureaucracy" and the consolidation
of school units.
"Many rural areas were notorious for the low
salaries paid to teachers and refusal to pass
increases in local taxes designed to support
education. These areas were most inclined
to oppose the loss of local educational
control and to object to the consequences of
education centralization in terms of high
costs."42
All of these factors may have contributed to the decline
in popular support for the CCP in 1956, a decline in
which the CCF share of the rural vote fell from 52 to 42
per cent of all rural votes. It had only fallen
another two per cent by 1964 when the liberals took over.
It was the resurgence of Social Credit which was
most responsible for keeping the CCP in power in 1956
and I960 on a minority vote. The opposition was so
divided in those years that the CCP remained the
dominant party in the legislature. Social Credit re¬
appeared in strength in 1956, not as a radical
inflationist party, but as a replica of the Alberta
party's new style conservatism. In theory under local
control, the Saskatchewan Social Credit League was, in
practice, manipulated by two professional organizers
imported from British Columbia and Alberta. In the
41Ibid., p. 518.
^2Silverstein, op. cit.. p. 182.
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absence of a party leader tbey directed the campaign.^
Like the Manning government, the Social Credit League
appealed equally to city, small town, and rural people
in Saskatchewan. In 1956 Social Credit speakers
promised to bring to Saskatchewan the good times they
had brought to Alberta and British Columbia. Although
attacking "welfare giveaways", they also offered a
hospitalization plan with no premiums but charges of SI
44
per day to a maximum of S20 per person. Social
Credit won over 20 per cent of the vote but only three
seats in Regina's Assembly building. The broad based
appeal of Social Credit took away votes from each of the
other parties. A 9 per cent decline for the CCF was
accompanied by a similar fall for the Liberal Party and
the virtual disappearance of provincial Conservatives.
7.23 Medicare and the Doctors' Strike.^ In
December, 1959» Premier Douglas announced plans for an
extension of the province's medical scheme. He proposed
^Eager, op. cit.. pp. 410-411.
^Silverstein, op. cit., pp. 177-189.
45
Medicare is the popular name for the Medical Care
Insurance Act. In this section I have drawn on the
numerous accounts of the medicare crisis which are now
available: R.F. Badgely and S. Wolfe, "Medical Care and
Conflict in Saskatchewan", Millbank Memorial Fund
Quarterly, vol. 43, 1965; J. Gouldner, "The Doctors'
Strike: Change and Resistance to Change in Saskatchewan",
in Lipset, op. cit., pp. 393-404? Johnson, op. cit.,
pp. 599-687? C.""krueger, "Prairie Protest: the Medicare
Conflict in Saskatchewan", in Lipset, op. cit., pp. 405-
434? F.B. Roth, "Medical Care in Saskatchewan", in
Canadian Annual Review, 1962, pp. 312-318? Silverstein,
op. cit.. pp. 190-202; and E.A. Tollefson, "Bitter
Medicine: the Saskatchewan Medicare Feud", Saskatoon,
1963.
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a compulsory, comprehensive, state insurance scheme to
provide a high quality service administered by an organi¬
zation responsible to the legislature, A committee was
set up to investigate the detailed problems of intro¬
ducing such a plan. As the reader might expect, the
College of Physicians and Surgeons led the conservative
reaction to the government's policy, and they were
quickly followed by the liberal Party, The election of
I960 was fought exclusively around this issue. Again
the CCF was victorious, increasing its majority by two
seats, although the CCP share of the popular vote fell
to 41 per cent. Nevertheless, the leaders decided that
they had a mandate to go ahead with the plan.
In September, 1961, the government's investigating
committee produced a majority report which favoured a
medical programme providing for universal and compre¬
hensive coverage, financed mostly through tax increases,
with payment on a fee-for-service basis, and the whole to
be administered by a commission responsible to the
Department of Public Health. No person was to be
excluded on grounds of his inability to pay the small
premium which would be asked. The Saskatchewan
Assembly quickly passed the Medical Care Insurance Act
to bring the proposals into effect.^ Now the fervour
of the opposition increased. The doctors threatened
that they would refuse to co-operate with the scheme,
and were supported by several vociferous protest groups,
^Statutes of Saskatchewan, 1961.
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the most prominent being the Keep Our Doctors Committee.
The CCP government, now led by Woodrow Lloyd on Douglas'
departure to lead the national NDP, would not give in.
Some concessions were offered and the date of intro¬
duction was set back some four months in the hope of
reaching agreement with the doctors. When the legisla¬
tion came into effect on 1 July, 1962, the doctors
carried out their threat to go on strike. Although, at
first, some panic was reported among the people, the
strike did not prove an effective weapon. It was
ineffective because the doctors themselves agreed to
provide emergency services (otherwise they would lose
popular support); they were never completely united in
48
their opposition; the government imported doctors on
a temporary basis from Britain and other parts of North
America, which meant that assistance was available to
any community in the province which requested it; and
the Keep Our Doctors campaign withered away within a few
days. The upshot was that the doctors agreed to
negotiate with the government. On July 23rd, the
strike ended with only minor concessions to the doctors,
47
See Krueger, op. cit. The KODC was started by four
Regina housewives but later taken over by professional
leaders. A petition started by KODC got 46,000
signatures; full page advertisements appeared in the
press; and demonstrations were organised. But all
in vain.
48
Specialists had most to preserve in the old system and
were most against medicare. Rural doctors were less
enthusiastic about the strike and some were financially
embarrassed by it. A minority actually approved of
the new scheme and worked as usual.
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who were now given options on how they could practise.
If they did not accept the plan to hill the Medical
Insurance Commission directly, the doctors could receive
payment indirectly hy first hilling patients who would
he covered hy the province, or they could practise out¬
side the Act, or participate in several approved private
assurance plans. However, the main features of the Act
remained unchanged, and all hut the last concession had
heen offered before the strike hegan anyway. To their
surprise the doctors found that their earnings and con¬
ditions improved rather than deteriorated, with the
consequence that several years after the crisis those
who responded to a questionnaire survey were mostly in
49
favour of continuing the Act.
The CCP had heen in office 16 years when it intro¬
duced the plan for medicare, and 18 when it came into
effect. Why this "highly controversial medicare
program" should have heen introduced hy a government so
long in office was defined hy lipset as "perhaps the
most intriguing question...in the history of the
50
Saskatchewan CCP as a government." He is not alone
in suggesting that medicare was partly an attempt to
recover popular support which had heen lost in 1956.
It is also a challenge to the theory that parties become
^Reported in Gouldner, op. cit., p. 403. Pears that
doctors would leave the province proved unfounded,
in the first ten months of 1963 the number of
practising doctors rose from 765 to 821. Canadian
Annual Review, 1963.
50
Lipset, op. cit.. p. lxxi.
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conservative in office. Yet if medicare legislation
was the outstanding event of the latter day history of
the CCF, it was, for all that, a part of the "continue
and expand" policy of the second period. It was in no
sense revolutionary. In fact, medicare was the
extension of a policy already carried out in the Swift
Current health region. The main novelty of medicare
was its universal, compulsory coverage. Furthermore,
the fee-for-service system of payment was less radical
than the 1945 proposals for salaried doctors. State
medicine has always been a safe issue for any innovator
in Saskatchewan. Even the Liberal Party advocated a
complete system in the thirties and introduced a mild
health insurance act two months before being turned out
of office. Medicare was a programme to which Douglas
and the CCF had been constantly committed, and in I960
it was felt by the government that the province was
51
financially able to expand the existing services.
Also, medicare was no longer a policy which set
Saskatchewan apart in ideology from the rest of Canada.
The federal Liberal Party, for example, had become
interested in a national insurance plan. These words
are not intended to detract from the achievement of the
CCF in being the first government in North America to
defeat the medical profession's lobby, but only to
emphasize that it was not the revolutionary event that
some commentators would have us believe. In the words
51
Douglas, op. cit.
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of T.C. Douglas himself, "This was the culmination of
our medical program. It didn't come all at once. We
built up to it gradually."*'2
7.24 The Liberal Interlude. 1964-71* Given what
I have said about the long history of support for state
medicine in Saskatchewan, it is highly unlikely that
Krueger is correct in assigning the basic reason for the
fall of the CCP government in 1964 to the medicare
51
dispute. By that time state medicine was sweet
tasting to most people. Organizations such as the Keep
Our Doctors Committee had floundered, and the Liberal
Party did not propose to set the clock back. I960 had
been the medicare election and the COP showed a decline
of only 0.5 per cent from its popular vote of that year.
The 1964 election was fought on other issues, although
how far these entered into the deliberation of the
electors we cannot be certain. The primary reason for
the defeat of the government must have been the collapse
of the Social Credit League, from whose former support
the Liberals gained enough to take over in a photo
finish decision. (This assumed that other voters
remained consistent in their party choice between I960
and 1964.)
The CCP failed to regain the popularity of the early
fifties. Why? The answer should include the issue of
52Ibid.
«5^
"Xrueger, op. cit.. p. 431.
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the development of the economy, the deterioration of the
CCF party organization, and the formation of the NDP.
The Liberals under Eoss Thatcher attacked slow population
growth, t he relative lack of industrialization and high
taxes. Although Saskatchewan was experiencing an
unprecedented economic boom, and although steps had been
taken to diversify the economy (most notably in potash
mining), the province still lagged behind Alberta's hot
pace. Liberal speakers were constantly quoting
statistics to show how Saskatchewan lagged behind other
provinces, while the CCF candidates chose to emphasize
CC
improvements compared with the past. The Liberals
complained that the "socialist" policies of the CCF were
driving the corporations away from the province. A
Liberal government, it was argued, would be better able
to attract corporate investment and prosperity for all
would follow. If the Liberal campaign had an impact,
it was less because people paid much attention to the
jungle of economic statistics, but more because the
standard of living which the people experienced was
below what they saw on trips to other provinces, below
what migrant friends reported, and below what the mass
media implied they should have.
Perhaps more important than any one political issue
54.
^"Uorman Ward, in Canadian Annual Review, 1964, p. 160.
"^Silverstein surveyed the election speeches of 30
persons, members of all parties, and found that all
spoke about industrialization, even in the remotest
areas, op. cit., p. 217.
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was the combination of a strong liberal door to door
campaign and a decline in the activism of CCP organiza¬
tion members (although there were more members than ever
before). The annual convention is the heart of the CCP
and its state is summed up by Richards:
"The influence of the convention waned because
nobody in the CCF, from top to bottom, knew
what to do with a rich Saskatchewan, or how
to make explicit what was valuable in their
party processes, so that it could be defended
from apathy and professionalism."56
In addition, it is possible that many rural people
thought that the party had deserted them, when in 1961
the NDP was formed. The decision of the national COP
and the Canadian Labour Congress to unite in support of
a new party had been manipulated by the leadership of
both groups, and was imposed on the membership. The
CCP had become a moderate, labour party dominated by
eastern Canadians. When Douglas left Saskatchewan to
lead the NDP his vacant seat in Weyburn was won by the
Liberals, and he failed to be elected from Regina in the
1962 federal election. Some regarded this as a
repudiation of the NDP in western Canada rather than a
57
vote against medicare. Economic development, party
organization, and resentment at the formation of the NDP
may have had some impact but the basic damage to the CC?
power position had been done in 1956 and the impact of
these factors was mostly to keep former Social Credit
56
Richards, op. cit., p. 581.
57
E.g., Canadian Annual Review, 1961, p. 65.
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supporters away from the CCP rather than to cause the
CCP to lose its existing support.
7.25 NDP Revival. The NDP (the old name had now
been dropped) did not remain very long on the opposition
benches. Thatcher survived his first general election
in 1967, but with a reduced majority. The CCP won back
some of the support which had been lost to the Conserva¬
tives, who had staged a brief revival in I960 and 1964.
The Liberals and the CCP gained fairly equally from
Conservative defections, leaving the balance much as
before. Unfortunately for Thatcher, his government was
met in 1970-71 by the effects of a nation wide recession.
He had also made his party unpopular by attacking
important occupational groups. The Liberals took a
hard line on teachers' pay and reduced the number of
teachers in the schools (to improve standards!). Heavy-
handed control of the provincial university led to a
crisis centring on the concept of "academic freedom".
Much publicity was given to the setting up of labour
courts, which would take away from labour many of the
rights won from the CCP in 1945. As pollution became a
big issue, the Liberals were accused of presiding over
the destruction of the environment by private enterprise
in the north. They also increased medicare premiums
and introduced "deterrent" fees. Most important the
farmers suffered a loss of approximately 50 per cent of
their income in 1970-71» for which the provincial
Liberal Party took the blame, although it did not decide
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federal policies which caused the slump. Agrarian
populist government may he disappearing under the
concrete blocks of urban Canada, but it is still not
possible to win Saskatchewan without rural support.
In 1971 the "vote liberal to save private enterprise"
approach no longer worked and the NDP won 45 of 60 seats
59
with 55 per cent of the popular vote. ^
The NDP that was returned to power in June 1971 was
not the populist government of old; rather it was a
60
party led by lawyers and intellectuals, oriented to
labour, moderate in its policies, and making concessions
to agriculture in a province with many rural seats.
The Saskatchewan NDP still showed signs of its populist
heritage in the party*s democratic organizational
structure, and in leader Allan Blakeney*s comment that
"we will put the province once again in the hands of the
61
people." The NDP also promised to preserve the
family farm by setting up a land bank commission, which
would enable retiring farmers to pass on their farms to
young people rather than sell out to the corporations.
(Many of the farmers* children had no wish to stay on
the land.) Deterrent fees would be removed from the
•^Saskatoon Star Phoenix, 30-6-71.
59Ibid., 24-6-71.
60
The leader and deputy leader selected in convention in
1970 are both lawyers. Such a possibility would have
been abhorred by the party members in the thirties and
forties.
61
Saskatoon Star Phoenix, 24-6-71. Note also the
campaign slogan, "New Deal for People".
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health service and contracts for the exploitation of
resources would have to be renegotiated. Perhaps the
election was best summed up by the editor of the
Winnipeg Tribune, who stated that the "election results
underline once again Prairie disenchantment with the
centralist policies of the federal government and
Ottawa's inadequate consideration for the western agri-
62
cultural community."
7.3. From Social Credit to Social Conservative:
Alberta
The Manning era began when the Alberta Social
Credit caucus elected him to lead the party on the death
of Aberhart in 1943. Ernest Manning had always been
the heir apparent. He dominated the party until his
retiral in 1968. It was an era of entrenchment in
power and a growing conservatism of philosophy.
The continued economic difficulties, which nearly
caused the Social Credit government to be uprooted in
1940, were reversed by an expanding war economyt
"The fundamental conflict between debtor and
creditor in a contracting economy, which the
Social Credit party had exploited as a means
of gaining and retaining power was exorcized
by the wartime recovery of the western
economy. "63
Verbal assaults on financial corporations and anti-
finance legislation were markedly reduced by the
CO
Quoted in Saskatoon Star Phoenix, 30-6-71.
^J.R. Mallory, "Social Credit and the Federal Power",
Toronto, 1954, p. 154.
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government, although the Social Credit Board, shorn of
its power, took up a right wing extremist position.
Socialism and international finance were seen as one and
the same thing, both combining to bring about a
ftA
centralized "world slave state". The association of
the Jewish race with international finance was so
compelling to the Social Credit Board members that they
reproduced the late Douglas policy of anti-semitism.
The combination of anti-semitism and isolationism was so
embarrassing to the Social Credit government that the
Board was dissolved in 1948. The government, now
presiding over an expanding economy, did not want to be
associated with such sentiments. In fact, by 1945, with
private debt well under control, the government had
concluded a settlement of the public debt. The Alberta
Bondholders Committee agreed to the following;
"...the holders of matured securities.•.were
offered the principal amount in cash, together
with a cash adjustment in respect of interest
unpaid in the nine years from June 1, 1936.
Holders of unmatured securities were offered
in exchange new serial per cent securities
and an equal principal amount, dated June 1,
1945, and maturing from 1961 to 1980, together
* with an adjustment in respect of the higher
contract interest rates to the original
maturity or call dates."65
By this time socialism was perceived as the chief
enemy by Social Creditors. Their landslide victory in
the 1944 provincial election is widely regarded as a
^Report of the Alberta Social Credit Board, 1944,
Edmonton.
65
Mailory, op, cit., p. 162.
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vote to defeat the CCF. Paradoxically this was also
the election when the COP won 25 per cent of the vote,
a figure it has not since approached. But coming, as
it did, only two months after the great victory in
Saskatchewan, this is not surprising. There may have
been some transference of popularity as the CCF victory
was widely reported in Alberta. In 1944 Saskatchewan
politicians began what became a tradition of campaigning
in Albertan elections, but just as Aberhart failed in
Saskatchewan in 1938, Tommy Douglas could not produce
success for the CCF in Alberta. The Alberta CCF was at
this time more radical in its policies than the
Saskatchewan section of the party, and the CCF was too
closely associated with the failings of the United
Farmers government.
In 1944 both the CCF and Social Credit produced
some anti-monopoly and anti-finance propaganda. For
example, Manning promised he would "continue to fight
against finance until the battle is won", and a CCF
advertisement read, "Smash the Oil Monopoly", because
the oil monopolists are the "Big Shots" who really
66
control the banking system. For the most part Social
Credit ignored the old foes and concentrated on
presenting the CCF as a socialist organization which
would destroy private enterprise and individual freedom.
S.D. Clark suggested that Social Credit was now getting
finance from big business:
^Calgary Herald, 2-8-44.
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"In the election of 1944 many prominent
Alberta business men - and, there is reason
to believe, a number of large business firms
outside - lent their active support to the
party which nine years earlier had advocated
a radical programme of monetary reform."67
The assertion is undocumented, but the attitude of
Social Credit official, Solon Low, suggests it may have
been true:
"...If Alberta could demonstrate to the world
it could set the socialist movement 'back on
its heels', support would come from quarters
which had opposed it in the past, such as the
heads of important businesses in eastern
Canada, who would make their contributions to
Social Credit with 'no strings attached'."68
It is difficult to understand why the attack on the
socialism of the CCF should have had any more effect on
voters than had the Liberal attacks in Saskatchewan.
The Social Credit government could combine these attacks
with an appeal to the success of their administration of
the province. Among other things, they had supported
the war effort, fought against monopolies, reduced the
provincial debt, reorganized the educational system,
provided free treatment for tuberculosis, cancer and
polio victims, and free hospitalization for maternity
cases. On a smaller scale some of the welfare reform
programme of the CCF had been Introduced
The campaign established the pattern for the post
S.D. Clark, "The Religious Sect in Canadian Politics",
in "The Developing Canadian Community", Toronto, 1962,
p. 140.
^Edmonton Bulletin, 2-8-44.
^Calgary Herald, 5-8-44.
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war years. It was so dull that it seldom made the
front pages of the newspapers. It was waged, to the
extent that it was fought at all, on the issues of
opposition to socialism and the government's record.
Mallory states that the conciliatory attitude of
Social Credit leaders towards finance was connected to
the need for capital to develop the resources of the
province, especially oil. (The same constraint
influenced the budgeting policy of the CCF government of
Saskatchewan.) Manning tried to create a suitable
climate for investment by setting up Social Credit as
the business man's best friend; he would be protected
from socialism. The disbanding of the extremist Social
Credit Board was consistent with this policy. At this
time Social Credit leaders still had to be careful to
maintain their populist appeal through support for co¬
operatives, credit unions and anti-finance rhetoric.
Part of Manning's 1945 budget speech could well have
been delivered by a CGFer in the Segina legislature, not
perhaps this early sentence - "I regard every citizen of
this province as a shareholder in Alberta as a corporate
state" - but the following:
"The Alberta government has always fostered
and encouraged the formation and development
of Co-operative Associations.... We have
felt that such organizations can do much to
ameliorate some of the undesirable effects of
the present financial system as it applies to
our prairie economy. We also believe that
co-operatives have a very important function
to fulfill in the control of combines,
cartels and monopolies." He supports credit
unions but warns that, "the most they can do
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is to provide limited means for co-operative
self-help within the narrow and restricted
confines of the monetary system under which
we are compelled to operate in Canada today."
Part II of the Alberta Bill of Rights Act (1946)provided
for the licensing and control of banks and credit, but
it was not to be put in the Statutes until the courts
had ruled on its validity. Thus it was nothing more
than a political move to raise interest among the people
because organization members were becoming apathetic.
The government obviously expected the law to be declared
ultra vires, which it duly was by the Supreme Court.
Part I cf the Bill offered Social Credit dividends to
the people, but this now meant nothing more than social
security benefits, based on a means test, and calculated
to bring incomes up to a subsistence level. There were
71
no promises of a universal dividend.
Even as late as the early fifties, the leadership
of Social Credit still talked in terms that smacked
strongly of populism. During the 1951 budget Premier
Manning said:
"...defects in our internal economy which
curtail production, inflate and deflate
prices and necessitate oppressive taxation
stem primarily from private monopoly control
over the money and credit of the nation and
cannot be corrected merely by the imposition
of government regulations and controls in the
field of industry and labour,
"The solution lies rather in the intelligent
70
E.C. Manning^ Budget Speech, 1944, Edmonton, pp. 4-9.
71
C.B. MacPherson, "Democracy in Alberta", Toronto,
1953, pp. 208-9.
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reform of our national monetary system to the
end that money and credit will be made the
servants rather than the masters of our
economy. It requires further the progressive
removal of all hindrances to maximum
production and to the equitable distribution
of the entire output of which Canadian
industry is capable."72
But this populist attack on finance and inequality was
always tied to a financial practice that was completely
orthodox. Just as in Saskatchewan, the government
followed a pay-as-you-go policy and set about retiring
the provincial debt. This was called making the best
of the existing system. Capitalist business men were
not put off by the Juxtaposition of conservative
financial action and occasional radical statements.
Already by the middle forties the business community had
stopped fearing Manning's pronouncements and investment
in the industrial potential of the province poured in.
The preference of Social Creditors for private
capitalist development was clearly expressed in the 1948
election. The government proposed no policy changes
and the only issue of note was only indirectly a part of
the election. As well as electing MLAs, the public was
being asked to vote on whether rural electrification
should be carried out by private or public enterprise.
At first Manning expressed no preference but soon came
out in favour of private enterprise, because private
corporations "seem to be doing a more efficient Job"
than publicly owned utilities in generating and
72
E.C. Manning, Budget Speech, 1951, Edmonton, p. 23.
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distributing electricity. He also emphasized the high
73
cost to the province of going into the business. The
CCP wanted only rural voters to decide the issue, but
this was rejected by Manning on the grounds that all the
electorate should decide on the expenditure of public
rj a
money. He probably knew that urban votes would be
necessary to defeat the rural support for public owner¬
ship. In the end, that is what happened because the
urban majority (who already had electricity) in favour
of private development was enough to defeat a rural vote
in favour of public ownership. Under private enterprise
in Alberta the proportion of farms hooked up was similar
to Saskatchewan under government control (19!$5), and the
rates charged were similar, but in Saskatchewan "farmers
bear about one-half the initial cost of power lines while,
in Alberta, farmers pay the full cost of power lines."
To do this farmers adopted their traditional procedure
75
of forming co-operatives. The campaign itself was of
such little interest to the public that, "the hustings
were poor crowd raisers throughout the month-long
campaign. One Edmonton meeting was cancelled because
76
no one turned up except the speakers." Everyone
expected Social Credit to win as it did, indeed, turn out.
"^Calgary Herald, 11-8-48.
^Calgary Herald, 4-8-48.
75
'^Royal Commission on Agriculture and Rural life, vol. 11,
"Farm Electrification", Regina, 1957, p. 84.
^Calgary Herald, 18-8-48.
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As the oil industry expanded, promoted secondary
development in manufacturing and service industries, and
filled the coffers of the provincial treasury, so the
policies of Social Credit became more and more focussed
on preserving the good life by making reforms such as
extending educational facilities and improving standards,
reducing municipal debt {which remained among the highest
in Canada), building better roads, and encouraging the
further economic development of the province. Even the
press grew kind to the Manning government. The fiery
protest which was nourished on the hungry bellies of the
thirties was gone, and in its place a localist smugness.
Albertans sailed along in the fifties and sixties on the
crest of growth which was transforming their society
into an urbanized, industrial state. Elections were
almost non events as the opposition parties conceded
defeat by arguing that what Alberta needed was a strong
opposition. Most who went to the polls signed up for
77
another four years of Manning medicine.
Social Credit's popularity was dented only in 1955.
An election was called following allegations that
government members were profiting by having privileged
access to the loaning facilities of the government
treasury branches. Although there was no evidence of
illegal activity, the Social Credit League lost 15 seats.
According to the Edmonton Journal "public confidence"
77
''For documentation of urbanization and industrializa¬
tion see Appendix A.
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had been "shaken by irregularities in finance."
The trend towards conservatism in Alberta did not
miss out the CCF, which was constrained by having to
appeal to an electorate with a rapidly rising standard
of living. The once radical Alberta CCF was stating by
1959 that it had a "radical plan of reform and would
install competitive free enterprise. The gas, oil and
79
eleotric monopoly in the province must be broken."
The CCF was offering to "increase royalties on our
80
natural resources." Gone were the days of nationali¬
zation. The opposition parties, including the CCF,
were offering no more than what the Social Credit league
was visibly providing - orthodox administration of an
expanding economy with a little social welfare thrown in
to help keep the poor quiet. Manning was able to avoid
confronting issues which other parties tried to build up.
He would simply say that Alberta owed her prosperity to
the Social Credit policies of industrial development in
the interests of the people. So stick with tradition.
"Good government is never out of date. Albertans are
81
accustomed to the best. Why change it?"
It is noteworthy that, although farm income
continued to be unstable and the costs of production
were rising steadily, the structure of the province had
^8Edmonton Journal, 30-6-55.
79-'Edmonton Journal, 2-6-55. My emphasis.
80
Edmonton Journal, 12-6-59.
81
E.C. Manning, quoted in Edmonton Journal, 13-6-59.
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so changed that the conditions of farm life never became
a major election issue in the fifties or sixties. This
prompted seven Social Creditors to run as independents
in 1963 because they felt that the government was not
paying enough attention to farm problems. Two others
ran as independents because the Social Credit government
82
was Social Credit in name only. The party had grown
so conservative that the annual convention in 1961
condemned fair employment legislation as opening the
door to Communist infiltration. At the same meeting
the minister of education was forced to deny that the
Qnc
theory of evolution was being taught in the schools.
In this we see the persistence of fundamentalist beliefs
among Social Creditors. Ernest Manning, while premier
of the province, continued to broadcast sermons every
Sunday afternoon.
By the sixties everyone recognized that the Social
Credit label was meaningless. Even the old Douglas
maverick, Earl Ansley, had disappeared from the legis¬
lature. Social Credit had adjusted its ideology and
tactics by transforming itself into a conservative party
supporting the free enterprise version of individual
freedom and development. In 1967 the process of ideo¬
logical transformation culminated in the publication by
Ernest Manning of a new philosophy for the right in
82
Edmonton Journal, 3-6-63. Only one of the
independents was successful.
^Canadian Annual Review, 1961, p. 66.
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Canada. These ideas continued proposals which he and
Robert Thompson, the federal leader, had been putting
forth in 1964, when it was rumoured that secret amalgama¬
tion talks were in progress between Social Credit and the
Conservatives.8^" Although Manning's statement is a
proposal to reform the federal party system, it contains
the principles which guided his Social Credit government
until he retired in 1968, to be succeeded by Harry Strom.
The basic problem to Manning is the public disen¬
chantment with political parties, which do not offer a
clear choice to the electorate. He regrets the dis¬
appearance of prinoiple from politics and argues the
necessity of philosophical guidelines for increased
political stability. Policies and institutions change
85
but basic, fundamental values whould be conserved. •
In a "rationalized two party federal political system"
Manning advocates the Social Conservative position, to
which he hopes to draw all those on the right. The new
ideology was to combine the goals of humanitarian
86
socialism with liberal-conservative economic doctrine.
This was summarized in an Alberta white paper (17-3-67)
which committed the government tos
"...do everything within its power to facili¬
tate the harnessing of an economy based on
^Canadian Annual Review, 1964, pp. 88-90. Several
Social Credit MPs did join the Conservative Party.
85
Ernest Manning, "Political Realignment", Toronto and
Montreal, 1967, pp. 25-26.
86Ibid., pp. 56-61.
265.
the principles of freedom of economic
activity and private enterprise to the task
of achieving objectives stemming from
humanitarian values and a social concern based
on the concept that the individual human being
is a supremely important unit of consideration."
In his rather vague expansion of the Social Conservative
position, perhaps the most important section, and
certainly consistent with the recent history of the
Alberta Social Credit government, is the one which deals
with his attitude to the state. The state is to be
relegated to a supporting function in the development of
society:
"The primary rights and responsibilities for
the development of the human resources of a
nation should reside with the individual
citizens and associations with responsible 88
government performing a supporting function."
The development of natural resources was to follow the
same pattern.
Manning was looking for a vehicle which could win
in Ottawa with this philosophy. He rejected his own
Social Credit league because it was too weak at a
80
national level. ^ Having rejected the liberal Party
because of its welfare state policies, this left the
Conservative Party as the best available organization
for gathering the forces of Social Conservatism.^8
87Ibid.. pp. 62-63.
88Ibid., p. 67.
80^Social Credit had been split because the Quebec section
followed the Douglas teachings and formed the Ralliement
des Creditistes led by Real Caouette, whereas the
western section advocated conservative policies.
00J Manning, op. cit., p. 72.
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As yet nothing has developed from this initiative. In
Saskatchewan a merger of the Social Credit and Conserva¬
tive Parties, projected for February 1971, fell through,
but some Social Creditors did defect to the Conservatives.
In 1971, one of the most surprising political events
in Canada was the fall of the Alberta Social Credit
government in August. The government had looked
impregnable (holding 55 of 65 seats in the legislature)
but fell to a revitalized Conservative Party, led by
91
Peter lougheed, a Calgary lawyer. What is most
perp/exing is why, during the worst recession since the
thirties, the Alberta voters did not switch to the NDP
in the wake of Manitoba and Saskatchewan. Many who
voted Social Credit in provincial elections had been
supporting the Conservatives in federal elections.
There may have been some tendency for people to conclude
that it would be advantageous to have a provincial party
which was also strong federally. However, in Saskatchewan,
where the federal Conservative Party was strong, the
provincial Conservatives won 2 per cent of the vote in
June. It is, at least plausible that the electorate
91
In the election, the Conservatives won 49 seats to 25
for Social Credit and 1 for the NDP. Social Credit
support held firmest in the areas of original strength
around Calgary; it was weakest in the cities and
north of Edmonton. Only 4 of the 29 seats in Calgary
and Edmonton went to Social Creditors, and only 2 of
12 seats north of Edmonton. Conservatives were
strong where Social Credit was weak. The only area
of significant NDP strength was in the north-west -
the Peace River region. Liberals contested only 20
seats. "Returns; Alberta Provincial Election held
on August 30, 1971", Edmonton, 1971.
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had grown too conservative to support the NDP, rejected
the Liberals because of their federal policies, and
turned to the Conservative Party, which may still be
identified on the prairies with the mild anti-establish¬
ment policies of John Diefenbaker. The federal Liberal
Party under both Pearson and Trudeau has alienated the
West. Peter Newman writes:
"What the Ottawa Liberals never seemed to
realize was that the Western Economy had
become broadly based, with petroleum, potash,
pulp, and power rapidly displacing agriculture
as the main source of income. Even in
Saskatchewan by the mid Sixties farming was
providing less than 50 per cent of the gross
provincial product.
"Wheat sales didn't have that much to do with
the West's alienation. The citizens of the
Western provinces had a gut feeling that the
Liberals just didn't care about their
particular problems, and they were right."92
The Conservative Party, which was once the main enemy of
agrarian interests, became identified under John Diefen-
baker with opposition to domination by the "big
interests". Diefenbaker had divided the party and was
hated by the leaders of business and finance in the east,
but he was popular with the rural and small town folk in
the west. Newman captures hie appeal in the 1965
federal campaigns
"It was the presence of John Diefenbaker more
than his words that excited the people.
Here was a communion of instinct that no
other politician could fully understand, much
less duplicate. John Diefenbaker was the
q?
Peter C. Newman, "The Distemper of Our Times: Canadian
Politics in Transition: 1963-68", Toronto and Montreal,
1968, p. 80.
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political poet who in his very being could
evoke the pioneer virtues and the glories of
a simpler past....
"Out of his passion for the homely, awkward
and shattering small truth came Diefenbaker*s
rapport with the people of these small, flat
prairie towns, slanting across time. Here
he could feel again the only role he had ever
played well: the champion of society*s down¬
trodden, assaulting the proud fortresses of
the nationfe various Establishments, He
soaked up the mood of rural Canada and gave
it off, like a hot swift fire that burns away
the scrub of a hidebound life."93
The remnants of the Diefenbaker appeal may have helped
Social Credit, when, in 1971, the people of Alberta
finally became disillusioned with Social Credit govern¬
ment. It cannot explain support for Conservatism in
the expanding cities of the province.
Alberta is rapidly completing its transformation
into an urban, industrial, capitalist society in which
the importance of agrarian populist politics will
continue to decline. Saskatchewan lags behind in this
process. Its resources are such that it will probably
remain one of Canada's most rural provinces. In the
foreseeable future, any party of the left in Saskatchewan
will have to delicately balance its appeal between the
rural populists and the urban working class. The NDP
in Alberta has never been established in rural areas.
Its hope for the future must lie in harnessing the
growing disenchantment of the young and the urban
labour force.
93Ibid., p. 350.
Chapter Eight
Leadership, Charisma and Party Organization
In this chapter we turn from focussing analysis
primarily on Social Credit and the CCF as parties in
relation to their social environment to a study of the
internal relations of the parties, primarily the legiti¬
mation of leadership and its influence on the patterns
of social control in the parties.
8.1. Leadership and the Problem of Charisma
It is no doubt a platitude to say that an under¬
standing of the relationship of leaders to followers is
a necessary part of the observer's interpretation of any
social group, but what are we to mean by leader and
follower? Can we have a concept of one that does not
imply the other? Sociologically speaking, I want to
argue that we should discuss leaders and leadership as
a social relationship in which the exercise of power in
a group is given legitimacy by the members. I am
saying, then, that a leader is any member of a group who
has authority; leadership is not based on coercion, it
requires a voluntary submission on the part of the led.
French and Snyder give a formal definition which is
consistent with this interpretation, except that they do
not distinguish between power and authority:
"Leadership is the potential social influence
of one part of the group over another. If
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one member has power over another, then he
has some degree of leadership.... Those who
are popularly called 'followers' are members
with less leadership.... In a formal
organization, the influence of the followers
and of the leaders is partly determined by
the legitimate authority of the positions
they occupy.... In this case the study of
leadership involves the study of role
relationships...."1
After about 1945 the new approach to leadership as a
social relationship developed out of the failure of
earlier studies to establish the determinants of leader¬
ship by trying to demonstrate that leaders have
particular physical and personality traits which
distinguish them from followers. If we see leadership
as a social relationship in which some people have
authority over others, then the basis of the legitima¬
tion of the power becomes an important question, both to
understand the persistence of the relationship and
because different modes of legitimation are associated
with different group processes. This I shall try to
show with regard to our political organizations. We
will have to recognize that elements of different
grounds for legitimacy may appear in a single relation¬
ship.
Closely related to the problem of understanding
leadership as a social relationship is the further
difficulty of how charisma has been used to explain the
domination of leaders and even as an explanation of the
"^J.R.P. French and R. Snyder, "Leadership and Inter¬
personal Power", in C.W. Backman and P.F. Secord (eds.),
"Problems in Social Psychology", New York, p. 248.
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rise of social movements. Recent years have seen a
growing revival of the concept of charisma both in the
popular press and in the academic world of sociology and
political science. There has been an unfortunate
tendency to equate the charismatic with any leader who
seems especially dramatic, emotional or popular. If
not completely tautological, this approach is at least
misleading. In the first place the 'popular1 usage of
charisma completely ignores its original religious
connotation as a divine 'gift of grace'; but even among
those who are familiar with the source of the concept in
Weber's writing, charisma has been used uncritically and
ambiguously, (Recent work by Friedland and Worsley
provide the most notable exceptions. ) The ambiguity
derives from a tendency to use charisma to refer both to
attributes of the leader's personality and to the legiti¬
macy of the leader's commands in the eyes of his
followers. We have noted that leadership itself has a
history of similar conceptual ambiguity. To provide an
example of inconsistency relevant to the present investi¬
gation we need only to refer to John Irving's interpreta¬
tion of the development of Social Credit and William
Aberhart's contribution to it:
"Aberhart's imposing physical presence, his
performance as orator and organizer, his
resolute and inflexible will, his infinite
2
William H. Priedland, "For a Sociological Concept of
Charisma", Social Forces, vol. 43* 1964, pp. 18-26;
Peter Worsley, "The Trumpet Shall Sound", London, 1968,
2nd ed.
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resourcefulness, his ability to hypnotize
people by his voice, his contagious belief in
himself - all these characteristics combined
to produce in many people the attitude that
•Here is the LEADER*.... Charismatic
leadership gave singular unity and additional
drive and momentum to a movement that already
maintained, on the philosophical side, the
inevitability of the realization of Social
Credit in the world,"3
He goes so far as to state that "...it is doubtful if the
movement would have won political power in Alberta without
his leadership," yet,in the same paragraph, we are told
that Aberhart was the product of the society:
"He was the product of the life of his people,
and his power lay in his offer to lead in a
direction in which those people wished to go,
to resolve a difficulty for which no other
man had so good a solution."4
Thus Aberhart's charismatic qualities (as defined by
Irving) make him and only him a leader, yet it is also
recognized that he cannot lead except where the people
want to go. Probably Irving'a use of the term
'charismatic1 was an afterthought because it is not
explicitly analysed or emphasized; but its appearance
highlights an ambiguity in Irving's analysis, an
ambiguity that is present in Weber's original use of
charisma.
In Weber's classic definition charisma refers to:
"a certain quality of an individual personality
by virtue of which he is considered extra¬
ordinary and treated as endowed with super¬
natural, superhuman, or at least specifically
•*
^John A. Irving, "The Social Credit Movement in
Alberta", Toronto, 1959, p. 340.
4Ibid., p. 337
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exceptional powers or qualities, These are
such as are not accessible to the ordinary
person, but are regarded as of divine origin
or as exemplary, and on the basis of them the ^
individual concerned is treated as a 'leader*."
However, Weber also writes that it is the recognition
from those subject to authority which is vital to the
g
validity of charisma. There is, therefore, confusion
as to whether charisma is to refer to personal qualities
of an individual or whether it is a quality conferred on
an individual by others when they accept the claims of
that individual or when they define his acts as based on
superhuman, mystical powers. Mommsen's brilliant
analysis of Weber's political sociology suggests the
former position because charisma, as a creative,
revolutionary and individual force, was Weber's way of
7
accounting for fundamental change of social structures.'
The individual and his ideas make history, but individual
ideas only bring about change indirectly:
"Interests (material and ideal), and not ideas,
directly govern the acts of men. Nevertheless,
'views of life' created by ideas, have
frequently as pointsmen, indicated the lines
along which the dynamic power of interests
propels action. The 'view of life' will
determine from what and for what one wants to
be or - be it said - can be 'saved•..•."8
5
Max Weber, "Economy and Society", edited by G. Roth and
C. Wittich, New York, 1968, p. 241.
6Ibid.. p. 242.
7
'Wolfgang Mommsen, "Max Weber's Political Sociaology and
His Philosophy of World History", International Social
Science Journal, 17, 1965, pp. 23-45.
Q
Max Weber, quoted in Mommsen, ibid.., p. 30.
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There remains ambiguity as to how much charismatic,
individual, revolutionary qualities do bring about social
change independently of particular social contexts.
However, when Weber treats charisma as a base of
authority, he recognized that legitimacy depends on the
belief of others that the Individual is inspired
(although he still places emphasis on the qualities of
the individual). This provides the basis for the
retention of a distinctly sociological concept of
charisma, which can have empirical referents. Charis¬
matic authority defines a social relationship wherein
subordinates accept the personal rule of an individual
as legitimate because they believe his claim to possess
supernatural or extraordinary powers. The ontological
status of the powers, sociologically speaking, is
irrelevant, since what is important is how the individual
is defined by significant others. The prophet's power
depends on his being accepted by others, after which he
has wide powers of decision making provided he can show
evidence (signs) of success, or at least rationalize
failure in some way which is acceptable to the followers.
Again it must be stressed that as an individual the
leader's physical and personality characteristics are
unimportant.
Since charisma has such an ambiguous conceptual
history and places such great emphasis on individual
qualities, it might well be argued that it should be
abandoned as a concept in sociology; but charismatic
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authority, which is a more limited concept, defining a
social relation, would seem to me to be of value in
Q
political sociology. Yet even this limited usage in
empirical research requires great care. For example,
in a critical article Ake rejects Runciman's analysis of
Nkrumah's charismatic legitimacy because "the qualities
on which he capitalizes are peripheral, not crucial for
distinguishing charismatic leaders... What alone gives
validity to charisma is that followers perceive their
leader as possessing it."1^ In fact, the evidence that
such a relationship existed was tenuous at best; this
being emphasized by the lack of sorrow when Nkrumah was
deposed (although this does not prove that he did not
once possess charismatic legitimacy).
If the conception of charismatic authority as a
social relation is accepted, then attention should be
focussed less on the individual who claims authority and
more on his message. It is common knowledge that there
are many prophets with little or no following.
Q
■'E.g., see the use of the concept by Claude Ake,
"Charismatic Legitimation and Political Integration",
Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 9,
1966, pp. 1-13; Richard R, Fagen, "Charismatic
Authority and the Leadership of Fidel Castro", Western
Political Quarterly, vol. 18, 1965, pp. 275-84; and
R.S. Perinbanayagam, "The Dialectics of Charisma",
Sociaological Quarterly, vol. 12, 1971, pp. 387-402.
All these writers recognize the need to have evidence
of how the leader is perceived.
10Ake, opJLcit., p. 10. The Runciman paper is "Charis¬
maticXegitTmacy and One-Party Rule in Ghana",
European Journal of Sociology, 4, 1963, pp. 148-65.
See also Worsley, op. cit.. p. liii.
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Therefore, we should give particular attention to the
social conditions which encourage the development of
particular kinds of message and create receptivity by
the people to such messages. This suggested emphasis
for sociological research on the conditions conducive to
the acceptance or rejection of a claim for charismatic
authority, serves to highlight a deficiency in Weber's
analysis - the origins of charismatic authority are not
11
grounded in historical analysis. This, of course, is
a result of Weber's emphasis on the qualities of the
individual. Dow falls into the same problem area when,
in his defence of Weber, he argues that the social
context in which charisma develops is relatively
unimportant, the exceptional individual and his ideas
being relatively independent of the social context.
"...one cannot view history as a parade of
equally qualified charismatic pretenders, one
of whom is validated eventually because the
time is 'right'. A better representation
would be that of an individual who can
inspire belief in his message not because of
particularly facilitating conditions, but in
spite of tremendous odds,"12
It seems that Dow is asking us to accept something very
close to a great man theory of history. For Dow the
only way to explain the failure of a claim for charis¬
matic authority would be that the individual had
"^On this point see Worsley, op. cit.. Friedland, op.
cit., and Peter Blau, "Critical Remarks on Weber^s
Theory of Authority", Americal Political Science
Review, vol. 57, 1965, pp. 305-16.
12
Thomas E. Dow, "The Theory of Charisma", Sociological
Quarterly, vol. 10, 1969» p. 315.
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insufficient exceptional powers, since the relation of
the message to the social context (which includes the
characteristics of the audience) is unimportant in his
theory.
The import of this discussion for an understanding
of Social Credit in Alberta is that it is futile to
'explain* its rapid growth by referring to the personal
qualities of Aberhart and other secondary leaders. This
is the failing of Schultz's paper and a partial failing
13
of Irving's otherwise excellent study. Aberhart's
personality was only important in so far as he influenced
the content of the Social Credit doctrine and how it was
communicated to the people. That he claimed to have a
divine plan for salvation and the inspiration to carry it
through, is no explanation of the growth of Social Credit
Alberta, since it was first settled, has had a history of
frequent sectarian activity. Many preachers with
engaging and 'powerful' personalities have claimed that
they held the key to salvation for the people of Alberta,
but only Aberhart, by combining relevant religious and
economic messages, could establish his claim to charis¬
matic legitimation of authority. In chapter five I
analysed the content of the doctrine and how it was
"^Harold J. Schultz, "Portrait of a Premiers William
Aberhart", Canadian Historical Review, vol. 45, 1964#
pp. 185-211; Irving# op. cit.. See also Denis Smith,
"Prairie Revolt, Federalism and the Party System", in
H. Thorburn, (ed.), "Party Politics in Canada",
Scarborough, Ont., 1967.
"^W.E. Mann, "Sect, Cult, and Church in Alberta",
Toronto, 1955.
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perceived by the people as broadcast by Aberhart, while
the social conditions which favoured the granting of
charismatic legitimation were considered in chapter four.
The quotations (in chapter five) from supporters of
Aberhart emphasize their belief and trust in Aberhart'a
divine ability to solve the depression. Although this
data is unsystematic, it does provide reasonable grounds
for claiming that the authority relationship between
leader and followers in Social Credit was charismatic.
In the next section I shall try to show the influence of
this form of legitimation on the structure of the Social
Credit League.
In contrast to Social Credit, there is no evidence
to justify an interpretation of the CCP, which would
describe the main quality of the relationship between
leaders and followers as charismatic legitimation. I
would hold that neither the influece of social gospel
theology nor the oratorical skills of Tommy Douglas is
sufficient to change this assessment. No Saskatchewan
CCP leader to the present day (Coldwell, Williams,
Douglas, Lloyd and Blakeney) has tried to legitimate
himself by the claim to mystical or superhuman powers?
on the contrary the CCP leaders presented a secular,
'rational' interpretation of the world. Thus I cannot
agree with explanations of the power of the CCP, which
15
rely on a vague use of charisma. J Even Young's more
careful assessment of the national leader, J.S. Woods-
15
•'See in particular Denis Smith, op. cit.
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worth, as a charismatic leader must be questioned.
Although Woodsworth, the 'prophet in polities', came
closer than any other in the CCF to establishing charis¬
matic authority, yet, whereas Woodsworth was honoured
and respected, Aberhart was worshipped. In limiting the
label of charismatic legitimation to the relationship
between Aberhart and his followers there is support from
Roger Graham's recent essay, in which he concluded that
Aberhart was the only charismatic figure in Canadian
17
history. legitimation in the CCF was primarily legal
in the sense that it was conferred on office holders in
so far as they appeared to conform to the CCF norms of
office holding, i.e., in so far as the leaders performed
as executives acting for and subject to the control of
the membership.
8.2. Organizational Structure? Decision-Making
and Control
legitimation is closely related to the control
structure of Social Credit and the CCF, which will be
examined in this section, bringing out the authoritarian
structure of the Social Credit league, in contrast to
the ideal of decentralized, grass roots control in the
CCF. I shall concentrate on the party organization up
"^Falter 1. Young, "The Anatomy of a Party: the
National CCF", Toronto, 1969, pp. 157-62.
■^Roger Graham, "Charisma and Canadian Politics", in
J.S. Moir (ed.), "Character and Circumstance",
Toronto, 1970.
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to 1944.
Given the charismatic authority which Aberhart had
developed in relation to his following prior to the
formation of the Social Credit League, the authoritarian
qualities of the organization were predictable. Clark
claims that:
"The religious evangelist escaped the checks
upon leadership secured through an elaborate
denominational organization and an accepted
ritual. His relationship to the convert was
a purely personal one? it was he rather than
any church that offered the means of salva¬
tion. The result was that the religious
evangelist came to assume a very considerable
dominance over those whom he converted,"18
Charismatic legitimation confers personal power on an
individual and those who act in his name. It makes
intelligible the acceptance by Aberhart's supporters of
the authoritarian organizational structure of the League,
a remarkable contradiction to the practice of grass roots
democracy attempted by these same people in their co¬
operative organizations and in the early years of the
United Farmers' government. In spite of Weber's
description of the typical charismatic organization as an
19
irrational, non-bureaucratic community of disciples, *
there seems to be no reason why administration which is
based on charismatic legitimation of power cannot take a
highly structured, centralized form, while remaining non-
bureaucratic in the sense that whatever rules exist are
1 R
S.D. Clark, "The Religious Sect in Canadian Politics",
in "The Developing Canadian Community," Toronto, 1968,
pp. 143-4.
"^Weber, op. cit»« pp. 243-5 and p. 1119.
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subject to arbitrary change. What does seem certain is
that the structure will be authoritarian, those subject
to the rules having little to say in their construction.
During 1934 Aberhart and his chief disciples had
been successful in getting local Social Credit study
groups set up all over the province. In rural
districts these groups were often the United Farmers'
locals under a change of name. All study groups were
kept in close contact with the Bible Institute and formed
the base for Social Credit constituency associations when
the movement established a formal political organization
in 1935. By April of that year constituency associa¬
tions had been formed for every seat in the province.
From the Bible Institute each one was sent a circular
containing a draft platform, the procedure to be followed
in local conventions, and an announcement of two forth¬
coming central conventions. Each study group of 20 or
more could send three certified delegates to the
constituency convention. A polling division in which
there was no study group could send one delegate who had
to be accredited by another official delegate# At the
first constituency conventions local officials were
elected, the draft platform discussed, and seven
constituency delegates to the central convention were
selected. At the request of Aberhart no candidates
were nominated, A general convention for the south of
the province met on April fourth and fifth amid great
enthusiasm. Here the draft platform was duly approved,
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and Aberhart was requested to lead the movement but not
to contest a seat at the general election. In the
event of a Social Credit victory, however, he would be
expected to lead the government. The reasons for this
unusual arrangement were that Aberhart would not have to
risk the loss of prestige which would follow if he were
personally defeated, that Aberhart would be free to
campaign anywhere in the province, and that he could now
back up his claim to having no personal interest in
political action. It was also agreed that constituency
associations would not select their own candidates, but,
at a second convention, would compile a list of three or
four from which Aberhart and an advisory committee would
make a final selection. The main justification for this
procedure was that Social Creditors feared infiltration
by opponents and opportunists. However, this was the
one issue that was warmly debated at the convention and
the only motion to which Aberhart spoke - he threatened
to resign unless he had his say in the composition of
his support in the legislature. In a closing address
Aberhart asked for "perfect discipline" from his
supporters and demanded their "absolute confidence in
their leader's judgement". Shortly afterwards the
northern convention in Edmonton passed the same
resolutions.20
Shortly after these general conventions the
constituency associations selected their list of
20Irving, op. cit.. pp. 125-34.
283.
candidates. A further task at the constituency conven¬
tions was to "build intermediate zone organizations in
order to co-ordinate the election activities of the many
study groups in a constituency. However, the main task
was the selection of a list of preferred candidates,
after which Aberhart received a report on the qualities
and past political activities of each nominee. This was
followed by an interview of all nominees in a constituency.
In most cases Aberhart chose the person who was favoured
at the constituency convention, but occasionally he sub¬
stituted others. In Calgary he even included three
persons who had not been proposed at the constituency
21
convention. Exactly the same procedure was followed
at the 1940 election. It is interesting to note that
the British Labour Party, so similar to the CCF in much
of its structure, is closer to Social Credit in the
crucial area of candidate choice. Selection of a
parliamentary candidate is not by open constituency
convention but by the constituency's general management
committee in consultation with and subject to the
approval of the National Executive Committee. Although
the NEC rarely reject a constituency nomination, the
Labour Party, like Social Credit, does have this major
mechanism of centralized control built into its formal
22
structure.
21Ibid., pp. 137-43.
22
R.T. McKenzie, "British Political Parties", London,
1963» rev. ed., pp. 549-57.
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This brief account of the establishment of the
Social Credit political organization brings out the fact
that the direction of effective control was from
Aberhart downwards through the hierarchy. In its
centralized structure the Social Credit League was
radically different from the constituency autonomy ideal
of the United Farmers of Alberta, but:
"The assumption of a general will required, as
it generally has done, the assumption of an
inspired and omnicompetent leader, with a
corresponding reduction in the importance of
the intermediate delegate bodies."23
The reverse of authoritarian control is authoritarian
submission - a "submissive, uncritical attitude toward
idealized moral authorities of the in-group." Irving
presents many statements by Social Credit followers
which illustrate that Aberhart's powers were freely and
submissively conferred on him. For example, with regard
to his choice of three unnominated men to run in Calgary:
"Mr. Aberhart picked these three men as candi¬
dates because he needed them. If he gave
them his stamp of approval, that was good
enough for me. If they were satisfactory to
him, it was sufficient for us working men in
Calgary to stand firmly behind the candidates
he had chosen."25
The quotation above.-suggests what was the main basis
for the maintenance of centralized control. Probably
the most effective way of exercising power is for the
23
C.B. MacPherson, "Democracy in Alberta," Toronto, 1953,
p. 162.
OA
T. Adorno et al.# "The Authoritarian Personality," New
York, 1950, p. 228.
25
A Calgary worker quoted in Irving, op. cit.. p. 144.
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"controller" to persuade others of his right to decide
and lead# If power is the capacity to achieve ends
despite resistance from others, then power is most
easily attained by removing sources of resistance# In
social relations the most efficient way to do this is to
establish a claim to legitimacy such as Aberhart was
able to do. The major mechanism for the maintenance of
this control within the Social Credit League was the
socialization of the membership. Unfortunately, there
is very little information on the recruitment and
training of Social Creditorsj what information is
available is of a qualitative, unsystematic nature. We
know that recruitment to Social Credit was the result of
the joint impact of Aberhart*s radio broadcasts and the
speaking tours, in which lieutenants from the Calgary
Bible Institute addressed mass meetings and picnics all
over the province# Such meetings always ended with a
call to establish Social Credit study groups, a
suggestion which was nearly always taken up Immediately#
Each new group was advised to listen to the Sunday radio
show and to write to the Institute for literature,
26
speakers and help. There is no information on the
socio-demographic characteristics of the Social Credit
members recruited in this way, other than the general
knowledge that the study groups were composed mainly of
farmers, small business men and teachers. In the
absence of any data to the contrary it would seem
26Ibid#. p. 71.
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reasonable to assume that Social Credit members in the
rural areas would be less likely to hold positions in
the co-operative organizations than would members of the
United Farmers of Alberta, which was closely linked with
the co-operatives. If this was true it would help
explain the acquiescence of the Social Creditors to
authoritarian control.
The recruitment process was itself part of the
socialization which continued in subsequent training.
As I have noted new study groups were kept in close
contact with headquarters via the radio broadcasts from
the Institute. Of these perhaps the most famous and
\
most successful were the mid-week "Man from Mars" plays,
in which an observer from Mars saw the ills of the world
and constantly advocated Social Credit as the only
27
solution. Another important component in the
socialization process was the distribution of hundreds
of thousands of study pamphlets, such as the Social
Credit Manual, and from the summer of 1934 the Alberta
Social Credit Chronicle became a highly successful
weekly, the major organ of publicity apart from the
radio. After one year a readership of 60,000 was
po
claimed. All this exposure to public speakers,
literature and radio broadcasts did not mean that the
people understood what Social Credit was in technical
terms (James tells us that even the elected MLAs were
27Ibid., pp. 110-1
28Ibid.. p. 102.
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unsure2^); but it did serve to reinforce the charismatic
legitimacy of Aberhart*s personal power. Indeed, the
mystery of the doctrine contributed to the mystique of
the prophet.
The Social Credit League, openly against the idea
of party, still acted like a political party by trying
to form a government by winning an electoral majority.
Therefore, central control of the parliamentary party
was an important issue for Aberhart. This he attempted
to achieve by controlling the nomination process as I
have outlined already.
In keeping with the theme of centralized control,
we find that throughout the Aberhart period there was
strong pressure to restrict the powers of constituency
associations and the annual convention. The domination
of Aberhart and his lieutenants quickly reduoed any
tendency for the League organization to become anything
more than an election winning machine. Having won the
election there was nothing more for the study groups to
do.
"Although attempts were made from time to time
to revive group discussion of social credit
economic theory, which had been dropped
during the 1935 election campaign, the locals
could not live by stale *A + B* in its simple
form, and the complexities of the general
theory were generally beyond their grasp."'0
Constituency associations, by accepting the theory of
29
N.B. James, "Autobiography of a Nobody", Toronto,
1947.
•50
MacPherson, op. cit., pp. 194-5.
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government by experts, were placed in the same position.
There was nothing to do except nominate a panel of
candidates before every election and make sure that
Aberhart*s final choice won. Similarly, the annual
conventions were diverted by Manning from debating
speoific policies. Instead, delegates were instructed
to listen to what the experts had to say and then to
distribute this knowledge among the faithful.
Informational and inspirational speeches came to occupy
two-thirds of the convention^ time. Thus the Social
Credit convention was a passive institution, "a secular
revival meeting, with carefully provided adult education
admixed. "3*
The only concession towards an institutional
control of the leadership was the Recall Bill of 1936
(see chapter five), but this was not like the recall
provisions of the United Farmers and the CCF, in that it
did not provide for recall by the constituency associa¬
tions. Instead, a sitting member of parliament could
be recalled on receipt of a petition signed by two-thirds
of all voters in his constituency. As MacPherson points
out this was quite in keeping with the political theory
of Social Credit, in that Social Credit represented the
general will of the community as a whole. Of course,
the law was repealed when it became a threat to Aberhart
himself.
31Ibid., p. 198.
32Ibid., p. 161.
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Whereas Social Credit exhibited a form of
centralized, authoritarian control, the CCF was oriented
to delegate democracy or mass membership control of the
party institutions. Where the Social Credit leaders
have been free from institutional constraints on their
autonomy, the CCF leaders have been surrounded by such
controls. The ideological commitment of the CCF to
popular control of decision-making is another way of
expressing the populist ideal that political organization
must be consistent with the general will of the common
people. (At its peak in 1945 CCF membership was 31,858,
about 8 per cent of the electorate.) Reference here
will be to the Saskatchewan provincial structure only,
although it should be remembered that the autonomy of
provincial sections has tended to decrease over time.
The decision-making structure of the CCF was a
conscious attempt to guard against an uncontrollable
oligarchy, an attempt to avoid the elitist structure of
the Conservative and liberal parties. M.J. Coldwell
stated the CCF concept of democracy in the introduction
to a CCF handbooks
"It is my profound conviction that a political
party which is itself undemocratic - whether
its policy is formulated by the large corpora¬
tions as in the Liberal or Conservative
parties, or is controlled by a small clique
at the top as in the Communist Party - can
never build a really democratic society. In
the one case we have political rights without
economic justice, and in the other ostensibly
economic justice, certainly without politioal
rights. Real democracy is a balanced
combination of both these rights; either
without the other is a negation of democracy.
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This is, I believe, a fundamental principle
of the CCF. We apply this principle by
safeguarding jealously the democratic
processes within our own movement."33
There is some variation among provinces in the details
of trying to apply the above principles. In Saskatchewan
despite changes of detail over time, the supreme body in
the CCF organization has been the annual convention,
whereas in the Social Credit league the supreme authority
has been the party leader. The CCF convention was
composed of up to 10 delegates elected from each
provincial constituency, all MPs, all MLAs, and all
members of the Provincial Council.^ Each year the
convention elected the party leader and three members to
the new Provincial Council, Policy resolutions might
originate at any level of the organization, but were not
considered binding until judged by the annual convention.
Proposals from the 1936 executive to restrict the powers
of the convention by removing its right to elect the
leader annually were opposed and defeated by Tommy Douglas
Below the annual convention was the constituency
association, which was further subdivided into polling
divisions. Each poll organization could send three
delegates to the annual constituency convention. There
^M.J. Coldwell, in D. Lewis and F.R. Scott, "Make This
Your Canada", Toronto, 1943» pp. vi-vii.
-^This description of the CCF provincial organization for
Saskatchewan is based on the 194-4 constitution in CCF
papers, Archives of Saskatchewan.
35Douglas to Williams, 20-5-36, CCF Papers, file No. 103,
Archives of Saskatchewan.
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an executive was elected to run the everyday affairs of
the constituency, such as fund raising, campaigning,
organizing membership drives, sending resolutions to the
annual provincial convention, and selling the
"Saskatchewan Commonwealth". The constituency
convention was also responsible for selecting its own
candidate for the legislature, one delegate to sit on
the provincial council, and ten delegates to represent
the constituency at the provincial convention. This
number has been sufficient to ensure a majority of
elected constituency representatives over ex officio
delegates at all annual conventions.
The Provincial Council was intended as an executive
to carry out the party policy as determined by the
convention. In 1944 it was composed of one delegate
from each constituency, three elected by the provincial
convention, the president, vice-president and political
leader, two MLAs and one MP elected by their respective
caucus. Meetings were held at l^east twice annually.
The Council elected an executive each year to run the
affairs of the CCP between meetings of the Council.
These have been the main features of the formal
institutional structure of the CCP, an attempt to ensure
in practice the CCP ideal of membership control as
compared with oligarchy in the Liberal and Conservative
parties. The most important aspects of the constitution
in this respect were the provision for the annual
election of all officers (except the small salaried
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bureaucracy) and the formal commitment of these officers
to accept the policy decisions of the annual convention.
Although it was never used, all CCP members of the
legislature had to sign an agreement to resign their
seats if asked to do so by a properly called CCP
constituency convention.
As with Social Credit, there is no systematic data
on the socialization process or the social composition
of the CCP mass membership. Socialization was no doubt
a product of being recruited by the enthusiastic CCP
campaigners during membership drives and the subsequent
participation in the activities of the organization.
Of major importance in perpetuating the belief in
membership control was the involvement of so many CCP
people in other voluntary organizations or municipal
offices, in which office holding was subject to popular
election. If, on occasion, leaders lost contact with
the wishes of the people on crucial issued, then they
were swept aside by grass roots action, Por example,
conservative Wheat Pool leaders were unable to prevent a
"march on Ottawa" by dissatisfied farmers in 1941*
"Political participation by the ordinary
citizen in Saskatchewan is not restricted to
the intermittently recurring elections.
Politics is organized to be a daily concern
and responsibility of the common citizen.
The relatively large number of farmers*
organizations, cooperatives and other civic-
interest organizations encourages common
citizens to share in the government of their
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communities as a normal routine of life."
Analysing the 1946 convention, lipset found that three-
quarters of the rural delegates held at least some
position in a co-operative, 79 per cent were members of
a farmers* educational organization, and 70 per cent had
been involved in such organizations before the CCP was
founded. Nearly as many also held some kind of public
office, ' He was able also to show that most directors
of the co-operatives were CCP members or supporters,
(We should note, however, that such data tells us only
about the community involvement of the leadership of the
party, not the mass membership.)
Ever since Michel's "iron law of oligarchy" was
proposed, it has been a foolish student who would ignore
the possibility that even those organizations committed
to membership control would come under the domination of
an internally generated elite. The Saskatchewan CCP
had some initial protection in that it never developed a
large bureaucracy to run the routine affairs of the
party. Both Lipset and Engelmann have reported a strong
tendency for the party members, especially in rural
areas, actually to make use of the party forums to
discuss policy and occasionally to criticize the leader-
7Q
ship. However, the longer the CCP remained in power,
36
Lipset, op. cit.. p. 265. The same could be said of
Alberta but we have seen that this could not prevent the
widespread support for the centralized Social Credit League.
37J 'Lipset, op, cit.. pp, 222-4.
^8P.C. Engelmann, "Membership Participation in the C.C.P.",
Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, vol.
22, 1956, pp, 164-6; Lipset, op. cit.. pp, 254-60.
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the more cabinet members dominated the proceedings of
the annual convention, although, even in the sixties,
ministers were occasionally under strong attack. (I
shall look in more detail at the party in power in the
next section.) Even before the CCP formed the govern¬
ment, party leaders could exert strong Influence by
controlling the final form and number of resolutions,
which appeared before convention, and most of all,
because they were concerned with the day to day running
of the organization. This involved deciding how to
respond to issues requiring immediate action, thus
committing the party as a whole to a position. Yet the
leaders derived their legitimacy from annual election by
the convention, and could be voted out of power by dis¬
satisfied delegates. This did not oocur but the possi¬
bility kept the leaders (who were committed to party
democracy anyway) receptive to the opinions of the
membership. Certainly it seems safe to conclude that
the degree of oligarchy was much less in the Saskatchewan
CCP than in the Social Credit League} conversely member¬
ship participation was greater in the CCP.
8.3. Party. Cabinet and Legislature
The nature of legitimation in both Social Credit
and the CCP has for different reasons generated problems
in the relationships between leader and cabinet, legis¬
lature, and party. In both Alberta and Saskatchewan
the people's party has been considered the true source
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of decision-making rather than the legislature. Aber¬
hart, the autonomous, charismatically legitimated leader
tended to pass over the legislature and speak directly
to the people; only twice in his first five year term
did he contribute to parliamentary debate, and then only
because his legitimacy was under challenge. What
debate there was took place in the Social Credit caucus:
"Long and frequent caucuses produced virtually
unanimous agreement.... This was to be
expected in view of the members' indoctrina¬
tion.... Also, they were dependent to an
unusual extent on the person of Aberhart.
They were mindful of the fact that he had
chosen each of them as the social credit
candidate. And if some of the social credit
members of the legislature did not regard him
as their inspired leader, at least they were
aware that his prestige was an essential
asset of the party, while many, perhaps most,
of the members had submerged their wills in
his and needed to keep up their faith in his
leadership."39
After going through caucus, Social Credit legislation
was assured of safe passage when introduced to an
assembly completely dominated by Social Creditors.
The legislature's loss of function was not as great
as would be expected from conventional Douglas theory of
government by experts:
"...a government was not to have the responsi¬
bility of deciding on legislative and
executive policies in the ordinary sense, but
would confine itself to hiring, exhorting,
and firing experts who would have the
responsibility and the power of deciding all
particular legislation and executive policies
In practice, Aberhart quickly reduced the appointed
7q
^MacPherson, op. cit., p. 165.
40Ibid., p. 161.
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expert to the status of an adviser, rather than a con¬
troller of policy, and did so on the grounds of the
premier's responsibility to the people for any mistakes
- a negation of Douglas Social Credit theory.^"1 Yet
there always remained a tension in relations between a
Social Credit government and the legislature, because to
Aberhart and Manning the legislature was a necessary
evil which delayed action; the will of the people was
realized in Social Credit (especially in the person of
its leader) and not in the legislature. No doubt this
attitude seemed realistic to Aberhart because of the
overwhelming majority of Social Credit MLAs; a stronger
opposition would have forced him to give more attention
to the legislature.
Except during the insurgents' revolt, Aberhart and
Manning were able to dominate and largely ignore the
irritation of parliamentary institutions. They were
also in the position of not being answerable to their
party organizations for the specific policies which they
adopted. In the CCP there was a grudging recognition
of responsibility via the legislature to the people as a
whole, but this was complicated for the leaders by the
additional responsibility of the cabinet to follow the
policy directions of the CCP party convention (Pigure 1).
This tension derived from the fact that the CCP leader¬
ship was only legitimate to the extent that it acted as
the executive for CCP policy. This creates a situation
of role strain for the premier and cabinet members if
41Ibid.. p. 165.
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Figure 1• Responsibilities of CCF Leader and Cabinet.
Arrows represent direction of responsibility.
and when the demands of party conflict with their
personal opinion on policy. A CCF government was
obliged by the party constitution to seek the guidance
of a committee of the Provincial Council on matters of
policy and the appointment of ministers:
MAn Advisory Committee composed of three
members appointed by and from the Provincial
Council, shall from time to time advise the
members of the Legislature concerning the
implementation of the program of the
Association.
"Whenever appointments to a Cabinet are being
made, the Political Leader shall submit the
names of his proposed Cabinet Ministers to
this Committee, which shall act in an
advisory capacity, realizing that final
responsibility for Ministerial appointments
must rest with the Premier."4-2
The final clause leaves ultimate responsibility with the
premier. The government has also been obliged to
defend its policies before the full annual convention.
Fortunately for CCF governments, there have seldom been
great issues to divide cabinet and party, at least in
part because Tommy Douglas was a master at consultation
^CCF Constitution, CCF Papers, Archives of
Saskatchewan.
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and conciliation. On two major occasions the govern¬
ment did reject convention demands, one for the public
ownership of the oil industry, the other for the CCP to
clean out the civil service and replace dismissed
officials with committed CCP supporters. On the other
hand, the government occasionally reversed a policy
commitment on the advice of convention,^ but this was a
rare occurrence because the initiation of policy quickly
became the prerogative of the cabinet, which used the
parliamentary caucus as a sounding board for the popular
reaction to policies.^ The party convention gradually
became a place where government policy was explained,
analysed, publicly criticized, but eventually supported
- except in the rare cases I have mentioned. Cabinet
members were now legitimated not only by virtue of their
election to office in the CCP but also on account of
their claim to special knowledge as members of the
government. Over time the influence of the convention
waned, although it could never be ignored, nor did the
cabinet members wish to ignore it. The cabinet was
always open to advice and influence but never to the
45
erosion of its policy making and implementing powers.
43
lipset, op. cit.. p. 258.
^Albsrt W. Johnson, "Biography of a Government", Ph.D.
thesis, Harvard University, 1963, pp« 247-8.
45
Ibid., ohapter 15; also Richards, op. pit., and EvelynISager, "The Paradox of Power in the Saskatchewan CCP,
1944-1961", in J.H, Aitchison (ed.), "The Political
Process in Canada", Toronto, 1963, pp. 118-35, in which
how the CCP resolved the dilemma of party democracy and
parliamentary government is reviewed.
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Nevertheless, to the extent that the CCP cabinet worked
in the conventional way, the direct democracy ideal of
the CCP was rejected, and to this extent the history of
the Douglas administration is the history of the decline
of Saskatchewan populism.
8.4. Types of Factionalism
It would be misleading to close this chapter on
party organization leaving the reader with the impression
that both the CCP and Social Credit League were inter¬
nally homogeneous at nearly all times. In both parties
there have been periods of factional conflict, although
taking somewhat different form in each. Social Credit,
we know, was controlled by a powerful authoritarian
leader. Now one of the chief characteristics of
authoritarianism is an intolerance of opposition both
inside and outside the political organization. Thus I
would expeot that factions in the Social Credit League
would be minor and undercover, particularly during the
period when Aberhart's power was at its height;
furthermore, remembering his call for "perfect
discipline", I would expect the exposure of opposition
to lead to expulsion of the offender(s). However, the
history of disputes in the League gives only partial
support to this proposition.^
A(\
Elsewhere Joseph Njromarkay points out that Hitler was
a charismatically legitimated leader and that
factionalism was of minor importance in the Nazi Party
compared with socialist and communist movements. He
records /
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During the first two years of the League there
seems to have been almost no opposition to Aberhart and
Manning from within the party, but the case of A.P. Keys,
president of the Drumheller Social Credit Association,
is important. In 1935 he publicly accused Aberhart of
"dictatorship", which prompted the leader to appeal for
unity and loyalty. Subsequently Social Credit groups
in the Drumheller valley held a convention in which
resolution after resolution deplored Keys' action, after
which he was expelled. "Proclaiming the infallibility
of the prophet," Social Creditors in Drumheller accepted
all further rules from Calgary without question.^
There is no further evidence of opposition within
the League until the insurgents' revolt of 1937 (see
chapter five). This opposition was the product of a
crisis in legitimacy. Since charismatic legitimation
is derived from the acceptance by the mass of the
leader's claims, it follows that the leader will lose
power if his claim becomes defined as invalid. (On
occasion power may be retained by coercion.) The
leader is, therefore, under pressure to demonstrate his
Footnote 46 contd,
records that Hitler only tried to prevent the develop¬
ment of factions if they began to threaten his personal
position, and, having destroyed the faction, he then
tried to be reconciled with the members; "Charisma and
Factionalism in the Nazi Party", Minneapolis, 1967.
Possibly this "permissive" attitude stems from the
necessity for a German mass movement to appeal to a
wider range of social interest groups than was the case
of Social Credit in Alberta.
* ''irving, op, cit.. pp. 139-40.
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success. Failure to do so may lead to a loss of legiti¬
macy and a reaction against authoritarian control. Thus
we may interpret the revolt of Social Credit backbenchers
in 1937 as a response to Aberhart's failure to show signs
of success. The backbenchers were responding to the
conventional Douglas doctrine that their function was to
demand results. By attempting to introduce Social
Credit legislation, Aberhart was able to silence his
opposition. Yet there was no attempt to expel the
insurgents from the party, or even to hinder their re¬
election in 1940s
"Ho noticeable retaliations against the 1937
party insurgents were to be found in the
selection of candidates. At least fourteen
known insurgents were again approved by
Aberhart.*•."48
At face value this provides good evidence that the
Social Credit League was less authoritarian than I have
suggested, but possibly Aberhart did not feel secure
enough to get rid of them at this time.
The insurgent affair was the beginning of a split
between a minority group, which followed Douglas Social
Credit philosophy, and the majority, who were content
with the Aberhart-Manning version. The former group
was conoentrated in the Social Credit Board, established
during the 1937 revolt, but this group was quickly
isolated by the leadership. First the Board's power
was reduced to that of a publicity organ. Finally,
48Harold J. Schultz, "A Second Term* 1940", Alberta
Historical Review, vol. 10, 1962, p. 22.
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when the Board adopted the post-war Douglas position of
interpreting the war as a great Jewish conspiracy,
rejecting the idea of majority rule, and denouncing the
49
secret ballot, Manning disbanded it completely in 1948.
Similarly control of the Canadian Social Creditor was
wrested from the Douglasites, and one cabinet minister,
50
who supported them, was fired.
Thus up to 1948 there were at least two occasions
when the powerful leaders of Social Credit were able to
expel public opposition from within the movement. While
the defeat of the Social Credit Board meets my approval
on personal, moral grounds, it brings out the dangers of
intolerance of opposition within a party, when that party
dominates the legislature of the society for many years.
Democracy requires the representation of minorities as
well as majorities, and this is possible within a single
party, provided that opposition is legitimate. Pactions
51
may then act as pressure groups within the party, but
apparently this was not possible in the Social Credit
organization, as long as the leader*s overall power was
not in doubt.
In contrast to Social Credit, the ideology of the
Saskatchewan CCP actually encourages open discussion and
4.Q
^MacPherson, op. clt.. pp. 179-92.
5°Ibid., pp. 211-2.
51
Por a theoretical review of this issue with particular
reference to Communist parties see J.J. Wiatr and Adam
Przeworski, "Control Without Opposition", in Government
and Opposition, vol. 1, 1966, pp, 227-39.
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dissent* and frequent conventions provide a forum for
such debate. Particularly during the early years of
the party, there were such open discussions on major
questions of ideology and tactics, but much of the con¬
flict was conducted off stage. Because opposition is
legitimate in the CCP, we would expect factionalism to
produce power struggles and compromises, rather than the
expulsion of opposition. This has generally been the
case, exoept that known Communists have not been
tolerated, because they were thought to be trying to
destroy the movement. Opposition is tolerated, but
only in so far as it does not threaten the organizational
structure itself.
The best example of factionalism in the CCF was the
battle between the small group of farmer socialists (led
by George Williams) and the urban reformers from the old
Independent Labour Party (led by M.J. Coldwell). At
the founding of the Parmer-Labour Party (Saskatchewan
CCP) in 1932, Williams was advised not to stand for
leader because his recent visit to Russia would make him
unpopular in the country. Coldwell (from the urban,
labour group) was then elected to the leadership, but
failed to win his seat at the 1934 election. This
brought a personal and ideological conflict to a head.
While Coldwell was on a recuperation holiday, Williams
arranged a meeting of elected members at which he was
selected leader in the House. Coldwell had not been
invited, or even informed, although he had already
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stated that he was prepared to contest any seat that was
52
made vacant for him. Thus the first round went to
Williams and his small group of socialists.
The dispute continued into 1935* when T.C. Douglas,
of the Coldwell group, was threatened with expulsion for
co-operating with Social Credit (see chapter six). The
executive meeting at which Douglas presented his defence
proved to be a battle royal between the factions. Old
radicals from the Farmers' Union now struggled with the
oity men. Andy Macauley and Tom Johnson, who could not
be present, had letters of protest read into the minutes.
Johnson rejected any candidate, who departed from
principle, because!
"Compromise will mean ultimate defeat. We
have told the people that socialism is the
only way out. Any departure from that
principle will brand us as a party that wants
to get to office and will grasp at any straw
to do so."53
In the investigation, Douglas stated that socialism and
Social Credit were compatible. This statement is
important when we consider that it was Douglas who was
later to lead what Upset calls a "mass socialist move¬
ment". Williams argued that while endorsement was
permissible, alliance was another matter, and that
Douglas had entered into an alliance by agreeing to
support Social Credit legislation. Dr. Hugh McLean
52
Farmer-Labour Group minutes, 1934, CCF Papers,
Archives of Saskatchewan.
"^CCF minutes, Executive meeting, 9-10-35, Archives of
Saskatchewan.
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defended Douglas by saying that he would have done the
54
same, as at least four other candidates. A few days
earlier McLean had talked in the central office of
fusion with Social Credit and had been warned by one of
the staff, who confided to Williams that:
"He couldn't see it that way at all and his
whole ambition is to get elected by hook or
by crook. There is no doubt about it he and
Pines were seriously considering the move and
thought Benson did the right thing to get
elected to Ottawa. Neither one of them have
any political sense. P.S. Pines is heartily
in accord with the fusion idea and apparently
has no regard for the socialist movement."55
The product of this meeting with Douglas was an open
split in the leadership. A majority report recommended
repudiation of Douglas, but a minority report, signed by
Goldwell, argued that Douglas should be accepted if he
would undertake to withdraw the offending posters and
56
promise to follow the CCP manifesto. Only Coldwell's
threat to resign from the CCP in |he middle of the
campaign prevented the public rejection of Douglas as a
candidate. A further meeting after the election did
produce a majority for a definite resolution to reject
Douglas, but the right wing was strong enough to have it
referred for final decision to the Political Directive
54.
^"Transcript of the Meeting between the CCP Executive
and T.C. Douglas, CCP Papers, file No. 9, Archives of
Saskatchewan.
■^Miss E. Mathers to Williams, 28-9-35, ibid.
56
CCP minutes, Executive meeting, 9-10-35, Archives of
Saskatchewan.
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Board.Two months later Douglas accepted a motion of
censure from the Board and the incident was closed.
It was clear that the pendulum of power was
beginning to swing towards the urban reformers. The
final outcome was that George Williams was squeezed out
of the party leadership in 1941 and replaced by Tommy
Douglas, now recalled from the federal parliament for a
new task. Paradoxically, by this time Williams had
mellowed considerably and the party had long taken on
its reformist colours, so that the rise of Douglas was
58
the culmination of a long process. To show the
tolerance of opposition in the COP, Williams, returned
from the war, reappears as Minister of Agriculture in
the first Douglas government.
In this chapter I have tried to bring out the con¬
trasting organizational characteristics of leadership
and organization in the Social Credit League and the
Saskatchewan CCP, the former authoritarian, the latter
more democratic. I began by suggesting the importance
of looking at leadership as a social relationship, and
this had the consequence of focussing attention on the
nature of the legitimation of leadership. Much of the
final sections was concerned to bring out the close
57
^'CCP minutes, Executive meeting, 21-10-35, Archives of
Saskatchewan. The vote was five to two.
58
The party papers after 1948 were not available to the
author. Without such access it is difficult to
speculate about fac&onalism during the life of the
CCP government.
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association between legitimacy and organizational
processes (particularly government-party relations and
factionalism)•
Chapter Nine
Social Credit and the CCF as Populism
In this chapter I shall draw mostly on material
already presented in order to give an overall assessment
of Social Credit and the CCF as types of populism.
This will be followed by an explanation of why populism
in Alberta and Saskatchewan took different forms.
Finally I shall consider the rise and decline of
populism in western Canada in relation to other aspects
of the social structure,
9.1. Social Credit and the CCFt Authoritarian and
Democratic Populism
An attempt was made in the introduction to review
the discussions about the concept of populism and to
abstract the main characteristics of populism as a type
of political movement. How we are in a position to
reconsider Social Credit and the Saskatchewan CCF in
terms of the elements of populism outlined in the
introduction.
1. A response to the impact of capitalism.
Populist movements develop when large scale capitalism
brings about a reduction in the standard of living of
the small producer and those who depend indirectly on
his prosperity. In chapter two we saw how the western
agrarian frontier regions were created, in part, to
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promote the capitalist development of eastern Canada.
During periods of economic contraction, the prairie
farmer has suffered disproportionately to other classes
in the society (see, e.g., chapter 4, Table 4.1)J
equally important, farmers also saw themselves relatively
worse off than others during periods of prosperity.
Thus protest has been endemic in the west, the protest
parties of the depression period being a continuation of
earlier prairie reaction. Social Credit developed as a
mass movement during the world depression of the thirties
as an explicit attempt to solve the problem of mass
poverty by reforming financial institutions. Similarly,
the Saskatchewan CCP was a response to the impact of
capitalism, in particular to the financial and monopoly
industries, which threatened the viability of the family
farm. The CCP was born of the depression and came to
power when the memory of those days of disaster was
still strong.
2. Directed against outsiders. Populist anger is
directed against some group outside the local society,
the out group being defined as exploitative. This is
the basis for the nationalist or isolationist emphasis
of much populism. Supporters of both Social Credit and
the CCP turned in their frustration against the "Big
Interests" from the metropolitan east and against their
representatives in the west, the "old party" people in
the towns and villages - especially the bankers. In
attacking the eastern controlled banks, railway,
310.
mortgage companies, grain companies and industrial
corporations, supporters of both Social Credit and the
CCP were continuing a long tradition of such agrarian
protest (see chapter 3). Emphasis in Social Credit was
mostly on the financial institutions, leading in its
most extreme development to a theory of world Jewish
conspiracy aiming to dominate the common people. There
is no evidence of such scapegoat theorizing in the CCP,
"but there was a recognition that the party stood for the
west against the east. Early in the nineteen-sixties,
when the CCP appeared to he losing ground in the country,
McCrorie found that in the district of Biggar (for years
the riding of M.J. Coldwell) 20 per cent of the farmers
defined the CCP as a socialist party? the others,
calling it a farmers1 party, stated "that it stood for
western rather than eastern industrial interests? that
it had built roads, hospitals, etc., for the rural
population."1
3. Populism emphasizes the worth of the common
people and advocates their political supremacy.
Reports of Aberhart's speeches emphasize the emotional
commitment he made to the plight of the common people.
For example, a small town business man said of him,
"above all, he had an absolutely great love for the
sufferings of the common people. This is what drew me
"'"J. McCrorie, "In Union is Strength", Saskatoon, 1965,
p. 42.
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2
to him." Similarly, a farmer reported, "He took up
our problems and made them his own. That's why I
3
worked for him." By explaining to the unemployed how
depression was not their fault, and by convincing them
of their personal worth, Aberhart restored a lost
dignity.^ In more abstract terms Social Credit theory
argued that the "general will" of the people must be
realized and this could be done within the Social Credit
movement under the inspired leadership of Aberhart.
Thus the Social Credit League was to represent the will
of all the people in one organization as against the
corrupt, class dividing parties of the old political
system. Within the CCF there were also many statements
rejecting the idea of traditional parties and identifying
with the common people, for example, Tommy Douglas in
1943s
"This is more than a political movement, it is
a people's movement, a movement of men and
women who have dedicated their lives to
making the brotherhood of man a living
reality."5
But, whereas in Social Credit populist emphasis on the
worth of the common people is shown mostly in the
paternalistic concern of the leadership for the
suffering of the people, in the CCP it is moBt evident
2
John A. Irving, "The Social Credit Movement in
Alberta", Toronto, 1959» p. 266.
3Ibid.
4Ibid.
5
T.C. Douglas, CCP minutes, 8th annual convention, 1943»
Archives of Saskatchewan.
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in the ideological commitment to popular control of the
political organization, which brings us to the next
major point.
4. Direct relationship between mass and leaders.
Ideally, populism involves a rejection of intermediate
associations between the mass and leaders. The
structure of the political organizations which
nevertheless do develop is influenced by the populist
ideal of a direct relationship between mass and leader¬
ship, although this relationship can take different
forms. Indeed, we can see from the detailed presenta¬
tion of the last chapter, that there are major
differences between Social Credit and the CCF in
organizational structure. In Social Credit Aberhart
claims to speak for the people as a whole, is charis-
matically legitimated, and has personal control of
decision-making, which he periodically reaffirms by
talking directly to the people. It is the voluntary
submission of the mass of Social Credit supporters to
the personal rule of Aberhart that justifies inter¬
preting Social Credit as an authoritarian populism.
On the other hand, in the CCF the populist emphasis on
the people took the more usual North American form of
emphasizing the need to control "leaders" from the mass
base. Therefore, the CCF developed a form of delegate
democracy in its organization, which required the
leaders to act as delegates of their constituents in the
organization, and which provided institutional
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mechanisms for the mass membership to exercise control
over their delegates. Thus the relationship between
mass and leadership is in contrast to that of Social
Credit. For want of a better term it seems reasonable
to label the Saskatchewan CCF as democratic populism.
5. Reformist programme. Populism demands the
reform of existing capitalist structure, not revolution;
it is liberal in the economic sense of the term.
Social Creditors emphasized that they did not threaten
private property, savings, or the principle of free
enterprise. Social Credit doctrine emphasizes that by
reforming the monetary system of capitalism, the
individual freedom of the people could be restored in a
humane, capitalist society. The panacea of monetary
reform, a common demand of North American populism,
meant relatively less emphasis on other favoured tech¬
niques of populist defence. Thus in Social Credit we
find relatively little attention to things such as
promotion of co-operatives, state control of monopolies,
and state welfare provisions. All such solutions would
be unnecessary after the financial system had been
reformed.
Although the CCF did not follow the same programme
as Social Credit, I have presented enough data in
chapters six and seven to bring out the reformist
character of the Saskatchewan CCF after 1934. The
elements of socialism that remained in the CCF programme
did not challenge the dominant form of the organization
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of production in Saskatchewan (small scale private
enterprise in the form of the family farm), but rather
sought to protect and provide for its future. That
such a policy might involve government control, and in
some cases public ownership, of the forces which affect
the farmer is consistent with populism, because innova¬
tion is accepted provided the intent of the innovation
is to make life more bearable for the ordinary people
under capitalism. The CCP leadership rejected Social
Credit monetary reform and so fell back on the staples
of North American agrarian populism - support for the
co-operatives, control of the banks and industrial
monopolies, state medicine, etc. The Saskatchewan CCP
was also influenced by the labour origins of some of its
leaders and by its association with the national party,
which was not agrarian dominated. Therefore, we find
the rather surprising appearance in an agrarian province
of legislation protecting the rights of industrial
labour, but again within the context of the existing
capitalist system.
In assessing the Saskatchewan CCP as populism, it
is necessary to come to terms with the evidence that
many leaders of the CCP saw it as a socialist party in
opposition to capitalism. But when we understand the
meaning of capitalism and socialism in Saskatchewan,
there is no longer any reason to change the populist
label. When CCP leaders attacked capitalism, they were
not attacking the idea of private ownership of property
315
or private profit accumulated from the control of the
means of production. As an example of the CCP attitude
to property, we may take George Williams' speech to win
the votes of small business men. Williams argued that
they had nothing to fear from a supposed attack on
profits because:
"Prom an economic point of view, a profit is
something over and above a fair and just
reward for a service rendered.... But the
small margin our retail merchants receive is
not in that class at all."6
To be against capitalism in Saskatchewan meant to be
against monopoly exploitation; it did not mean to be
against private enterprise, because this would have
meant challenging the whole way of life of prairie
farmers. The meaning of capitalism is made clear in a
speech by Tommy Douglas in reply to a challenge that his
proposals in 1947 to help private enterprise were in
contradiction to the official CCP policy of eradicating
capitalism.
"Premier Douglas said 'private enterprise' and
'capitalism' were not synonymous terms. The
reference to capitalism meant monopoly
capitalism where a small group of men were
able to control the whole economy of a
community...the Government recognized three
types of enterprise, public, co-operative and
private, and all had a place in the province's
economy. It was the government's intention
to encourage private enterprise wherever it did
not interfere with the welfare of the people•"7
g
George Williams, "Problems Confronting the Retail
Merchants of Western Canada", transcript of radio broad¬
cast, 4-1—39» CCP papers, pamphlet collection, Archives
of Saskatchewan.
7
T.C• Douglas, as reported by Regina Leader-Post, 1-4-47.
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Socialism also developed a peculiar meaning within the
CCP. In the late thirties public reference to
socialism was usually avoided in CCP speeches and
literature. When Douglas replaced Williams as party
leader, the concept of socialism reappeared in party
literature, but it was now defined as social ownership
through the extension of the co-operative movement. In
this policy the CCP continued the traditions of pragmatic
agrarian populism under another label. Co-operation
differs from socialism because:
"...the cooperative movement does not advocate
a basic change in capitalistic institutional
structure. It accepts profits and private
entrepreneurship; indeed, it seeks to extend
the benefits of these institutions to a
larger number."®
Thus it is misleading to accept the CCP's own statement
that "their fundamental principles and objectives are
Q
the same."^ The stigma of earlier socialism having
been forgotten, the CCP was able to win support as a
farmers' party committed to reform and co-operation.
I am forced to conclude that both Social Credit and the
CCP were basically examples of populism, advocating
innovation wherever necessary to protect or restore the
way of life of the petite bourgeoisie, which was the
8
J.W. Bennett and Cynthia Krueger, "Agrarian Pragmatism
and Radical Politics", in S.M. Lipset, "Agrarian
Socialism", rev. ed., New York, 1968, p. 351.
q
^"Socialism and Cooperatives", 1944, CCP papers,
pamphlet collection, Archives of Saskatchewan. See
also the Douglas attitude to socialism as expressed in
an interview published in Canadian Dimension, vol. 7,
No. 8, 1971, p. 32.
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backbone of their support. This interpretation only
begins to break down under the impact of post war
industrialization, a process which so far has had
greater effect on Alberta and Social Credit.
9.2. Why there were Two Types of Populism in the Weat
In order to understand why an authoritarian
populism developed in Alberta, we must look again at the
historical process, which led up to the rise of Social
Credit. Social Credit emerged out of the failure of
earlier agrarian populism, the United Farmers of Alberta
government. In chapter three the political organization
and philosophy of the United Farmers were described,
showing that thiB was what I have defined as a democratic
populist movement. Indeed, the United Farmers organiza¬
tion was directly involved in establishing the CCF.
In power since 1921, the United Farmers* government
had grown increasingly conservative in policy and its
leadership was out of touch with the rank and file
membership. When the economic depression of the
thirties struck, the government proved incapable of
•
producing legislation to protect the interests of the
petit bourgeois population. The townspeople were
already alienated from the government in that they were
barred from membership in the United Farmers* organiza¬
tion. Now the farming population also found themselves
rejecting their democratic populist organization because
it had proved insufficient to protect them in the
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economic disaster. Yet they could not turn to the
Liberal and Conservative parties, since these were both
associated with the forces of exploitation, especially
the banks and mortgage companies. With all the
existing political organizations discredited for some
reason, this created a political vacuum in Alberta. It
could not be filled by a revolutionary movement because
of the commitment of the petite bourgeoisie to existing
property institutions. Any new mass movement would
have to be consistent with the interests of the petite
bourgeoisie. The situation in Alberta in the thirties
had the potential for the development of a different
kind of populism, one in which allegiance would be given
to a "strong", mystical, personality, who claimed divine
inspiration for a simple plan to solve the unsolvable.
Such a personality was William Aberhart and the panacea
was Social Credit. Prom the conjunction of economic
crisis and failure of democratic populism Social Credit
was able to develop as apowerful authoritarian populism.
Why was there no repetition of Social Credit or a
similar authoritarian populism in Saskatchewan? Again
the answer lies in earlier Saskatchewan history.
Saskatchewan had been governed by the Liberal Party for
all but five years since 1905, when the first depression
election occurred. Fortunately for the Liberals,
1929-34 was the period when they were out of office.
It is true that the provincial Liberal Party had
absorbed many of the most able farming leaders and had
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been receptive to many demands of the organized farmers;
but it was equally true that the Liberal Party remained
associated for many people with the monopolies of
eastern Canada. What is most important for our
purposes is that the Liberal Party, no matter how many
farmers it absorbed, could never be described as a demo¬
cratic populist party like the CCP. Thus Saskatchewan
had never had a democratic populist government equi¬
valent to the United Farmers of Alberta; democratic
populism had not then been discredited in Saskatchewan
by failure to control the effects of depression.
Furthermore, the CCP was already being organized in
Saskatchewan before Aberhart and Social Credit appeared
as an alternative. There was also no provincial
election in Saskatchewan during the period of Aberhart's
maximum popularity in Alberta, 1935-37. The first
opportunity to test the strength of Social Credit in
Saskatchewan provincial politics was the summer of 1938,
but by then the CCP was well organized as a plausible
democratic populist alternative, while Aberhart was
suffering a crisis of legitimation, having failed to
introduce Social Credit monetary principles to Alberta.
It should also be noted that parts of Saskatchewan were
so depressed that neither populist party made much
headway.
Although it is untestable speculation, I would like
to suggest that had the Liberal government of
Saskatchewan delayed the date of the 1921 election until
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after the Grain Growers1 Association convention of that
year, then the Saskatchewan farmers' organization would
have taken power as the United Farmers of Alberta did in
the same year. The Saskatchewan government would then
have been discredited in the same way, and it could be
expected that an authoritarian populism would have
developed in Saskatchewan as well as in Alberta.
Perhaps in Saskatchewan the upsurge would not have been
as dramatic because of the inhibiting destitution of the
Palliser Triangle, although the religious qualities of
Aberhart's politics did prove effective in the Alberta
section of the Triangle. I have introduced this
speculation to suggest the basic similarity of the
populations, who supported in the one case a democratic
populism, in the other an authoritarian populism. In
this context, it is worth repeating a comment by Pinard
presented earlier:
"Given that the masses are, by and large,
neither sensitized nor interested in most
facets of the movement's ideology, we claim
that unincorporated masses, once faced with a
crisis, will choose the movement that appears
to them most likely to be successful, whether
it is conservative or progressive in the eyes
of the sophisticated observer. The ideology
of the existing movement at that point is of
little relevance to them."10
A similar process of the development of authori¬
tarian populism out of the failure of an earlier demo¬
cratic populism occurred in the United States of the
nineteen-thirties. Sometimes, perceiving superficial
10Maurice Pinard, "The Rise of a Third Party", Englewood
Cliffs, 1971, p. 95.
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resemblances to European fascism, students have labelled
the Coughlin, Long, Winrod and Pelly inspired movements
as American fascism.11 Ferkiss has summarized the main
features of American fascism as follows: an economic
programme appealing to the farmer and small business man
by attacking big business» especially finance, and
advocating monetary reform; a policy of isolation based
on a fear that international co-operation was a con¬
spiracy to destroy the freedom of the people; a despair
of liberal, democratic institutions, such as parties and
the press, coupled with theories of plebiscitarian rule
by strong leaders; and the interpretation of history as
a world plot by international finance, controlled by
Jews, and working through all opposition groups including
12
communists. In important respects such as all out
opposition to big business (in Europe there was an uneasy
alliance between business and fascists against communists)
and the adoption of an isolationist rather than an
imperialist policy, American "fascism" differs from the
European phenomenon; indeed, the American movements are
more comfortably included in the category of authoritarian
populism. Certainly, Social Credit, so similar to these
American movements, was rejected by fascists. Ezra
Pound, the noted American poet, who had adopted Douglas'
"E.g., Victor C. Perkiss, "Populist Influences on
American Fascism", Western Political Quarterly, vol. 10,
1957, pp. 350-73; S.M. Lipset, "Political Man", London,
1959» p. 167? R.G. Swing, "Forerunners of American
Fascism", New York, 1935.
12
Ferkiss, op. cit.. pp. 352-7.
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monetary theory, subsequently abandoned the English
Social Credit movement for Italian fascism, because he
saw Social Credit as too weak to introduce the needed
reform. In Canada, the German dominated Canadian
Union of Fascists thought Social Credit was an incipient
fascism, but that Aberhart had not realized the need for
14.
a corporate state to make it work.
All of the American movements are best known by the
name of their leaders, which is appropriate given the
authoritarian manner in which the leaders directed their
activities. The most interesting for our purposes are
the ones which were most popular in the wheat states -
Reverend Winrod's Defenders of the Christian Faith and
Father Charles E, Coughlin's National Union for Social
Justice. Both were at once more extreme and less
popular than Alberta's Social Credit. Winrod had his
main support in the wheat state of Kansas, particularly
among those of low income in the small towns and rural
areas. Winrod, like Aberhart, was a fundamentalist
preacher, but one who showed rather more extreme
tendencies. He was anti-communist, anti-Jewish, anti-
Negro, anti-Catholic and pro-Nazi, and even attacked
Roosevelt as an agent of communism and Jews. The
magazine in which he spread these views had a circulation
1*5
^Victor C. Ferkiss, "Ezra Pound and American Fascism",
Journal of Politics, vol. 17, 1955, pp* 173-97#
•^Harold J. Schultz, "Portrait of a Premier: William
Aberhart", Canadian Historical Review, vol. 45, 1964,
pp. 185-211.
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reaching 100,000 in the period 1936-40, most of it in
Kansas, where, as Republican candidate for the Senate in
1938, he got 53,140 votes (22 per cent of total),^
Of all the extremist groups, that led by Coughlin
had the widest support, mostly among Irish Catholics of
New England and in the west-central states. Statisti¬
cally, the most likely Coughlin supporter would be
Catholic, middle aged, of low socio-economic status, and
live in the country or in a small town,*^ Like Aberhart,
Coughlin depended on the radio to build a mass following
based on his attacks against international bankers, big
business and the communists. Coughlin was also similar
to Aberhart in advocating the issue of credits as a
solution to the depression, but he also adopted a strong
isolationist position and supported fascist Italy, In
1936, Coughlin handpicked William Lemke, US Senator and
17
well known for his activity in the Nonpartisan League,
to run as Union Party candidate for the presidency.
When the crunch came Lemke took only 900,000 votes and
made a significant impression only in his home state of
North Dakota, After this failure, Coughlin became more
extreme, supporting in 1938 the corporate state and the
18
abolition of political parties, a response to failure
IS
S,M. Lipset and Earl Raab, "The Politics of Unreason",
New York, 1970, pp, 160-62.
16Ibid., p, 175.
17
'On Lemke see Edward C, Blackorby, "William Lemke:
Agrarian Radical and Union Party Presidential
Candidate", Mississippi Valley Historical Review, vol.
49, 1962, pp, 67-84.
18
Lipset and Raab, op, cit.. pp. 167-71.
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which was mirrored in Douglas1 rejection of majority
rule. Coughlin*s movement was finally suppressed
during the Second World War.
"...while Coughlin served as a kind of proto¬
type of American fascism, the 15 or 25 per
cent of the population who in 1938 and 1939
supported him did not actually believe in
fascism."19
like Social Credit, the Winrod and Coughlin movements
are best classified as authoritarian populism developing
when the depression brought home the failure of earlier
democratic populism. Had not war intervened, or had
not prosperity quickly followed the war, then Social
Credit may well have joined the Coughlin movement in
degenerating from authoritarian populism to something
very close to an indigenous North American fascism.
9.3. Populism and the Social Structure of Western
Canada
In the introduction I examined existing studies
which tried to link prairie politics to the social
structure by some form of class analysis. I was most
impressed by MacPherson's analysis of the relation
between the ambiguous class position of the petite
bourgeoisie and the politics of Alberta. Populism,
both in authoritarian and democratic form, has been the
political expression of petit bourgeois radicalism in
Saskatchewan as well as in Alberta. If the interpreta¬
tion of populism as the radical side of the oscillating
19Ibid., p. 185.
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politics of the petite bourgeoisie is accepted, then it
follows that changes in the class structure of the
provinces should lead to changes in the dominant form of
politics* Industrialization eroded the numerical
importance of the petite bourgeoisie, especially the
rural segment, and so produced a concomitant decline in
populist politics. This was especially true in Alberta
where industrialization was earlier and quicker.
However, the time has come to modify the class theory
and destroy its attractive simplicity.
While it is common knowledge that the class of
petite bourgeoisie has been split in western Canada by
the division between town and country to which I have
frequently referred, it has been argued that there have
been relatively homogeneous sections, which have
developed concerted action based on the recognition of
common interests. However, although both provinces
have been the base of large scale, populist organiza¬
tions, the image of a unified, class conscious group of
farmers fighting an external metropolitan elite needs
much qualification. It is doubtful whether "agrarian
20
class unity was emerging out of economic conflict" to
the extent that we can talk of united class action.
And the "vigorous consciousness of common interests" to
which MacPherson refers in Alberta was never experienced
21
by all at any one time. The illusion of agrarian
20
Lipset, "Agrarian Socialism", op. cit.. p. 69.
21
C.B. MacPherson, "Democracy in Alberta", Toronto,
1953, p. 226.
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unity has "been encouraged by the overall preponderance
(until recently) of the agrarian petite bourgeoisie in
the populations of Alberta and Saskatchewan. Enough of
the farmers have combined with urban labour (in Saskat¬
chewan) or other sections of the petite bourgeoisie (in
Alberta) to maintain populist reform governments in the
provincial legislatures. In federal elections they
have been more divided between parties of the status quo
and parties of reform. Although the agrarians have so
much in common by virtue of their common subjection to a
metropolis of large scale capitalism, there has been no
united radical protest. Why not?
Among the major reasons why the unity of agrarian
class position has never been fully translated into
united, class conscious action are those based on
cultural associations of ranching as compared with grain
production. Bennett*s anthropological study of south¬
west Saskatchewan brings this out most clearly.
Farmers are stratified by the scale of their enterprise,
but more important are differences based on type of
22
agricultural production. The ranching tradition, as
compared with grain farming places greater value on
remoteness from the urban world and stresses the ideal
of individualism. Bennett emphasizes that among those
of European or American origin, the type of agriculture,
farming or ranching, divides the people more clearly
22
Bennett's work is summarized in "Northern Plainsmen:
Adaptive Society and Agrarian Life", Chicago, 1969*
327.
than ethnicity. For ranchers the extensive scale and
remoteness of livestock production reinforces a cultural
tradition emphasizing independence and the romance of
open spaces. In politics, the ranchers are highly
individualistic and opposed to government controls in
everything but water development in this semi-arid
region. Such attitudes have been fostered by the
relative economic security of ranching compared with
grain growing. As I emphasized in chapter three, the
problems of insecurity in wheat production encouraged
grain farmers to develop a powerful co-operative move-
23
ment, culminating in the CCF government.
"Ranchers are intensely local people; they
show little, or very selective interest in
the outside world, and dislike city life.
They are not inclined to enter politics in
the sense of campainging for political
parties or candidates, although their
political preferences are conservative....
Farmers, on the other hand, are less
localized in their orientations, enter
Provincial and national politics freely, and
attempt to exert their influence in the
political sphere more commonly than ranchers.
The orientation of the rancher makes the reformism of
Social Credit more attractive than the co-operative
emphasis of the CCF, although in Saskatchewan the
ranching areas of the south-west have tended to remain
23
John W. Bennett, "Social Adaptation in a Northern
Plains Regioni A Saskatchewan Study", in C.C. Zimmer¬
man and S. Russell, "Symposium on the Great Plains",
Fargo, N.D., 1968.
2^John W. Bennett, "Ecology, Economy and Society in an
Agricultural Region of the Northern Great Plains", in
Bennett, ed., "Social Research in Moisture-deficient
Regions", New Mexico State University, 1968, p. 48.
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Liberal strongholds. In Alberta, where ranching is
more widespread, ranchers have probably been an
important source of Social Credit support. In
Saskatchewan, the CCF government encouraged the develop¬
ment of mixed livestock-grain farming in order to give
greater security of income. Paradoxically, the success
of this policy contributed to the downfall of the CCF in
1964 because:
"With greater balance of income, and increased
prosperity, the grain-livestock farmer is
more selective of government interventions
because he is more concerned over taxation
for welfare measures."25
Although Bennett found that type of agriculture was
the source of most social divisions in south-west
Saskatchewan, elsewhere religious-ethnic divisions seem
to have been important, especially in the depression
years. However, all the analyses, which support this
statement, are ecological, and a warning to beware the
ecological fallacy must be stressed again. At best the
data is suggestive, at worst misleading, but there is
nothing else available.
The ambiguities of a class position, which lead the
petite bourgeoisie to have uncertain political affilia¬
tions as a class, have been accentuated in western
Canada by the historical patterns of immigration, which
have resulted in a diversity of religious and ethnic
groups on the prairies (Appendix A). Milnor has gone
25
^Bennett, "Social Adaptation in a Northern Plains
Region", op. cit.
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so far as to suggest that the interpretation of Social
Credit and the CCP as movements of economic protest must
be modified by recognising that they were movements of
26
ethnic protest. This argument is based on weak
ecological correlations between protest votes and areas
of non-Anglo-Saxon settlement from 1934 to 1948 in
Saskatchewan. He rejects the thesis that economic
depression was the basic cause of this ethnic voting
because the areas of central and east European settle¬
ment were not the ones hardest hit, but gives no
acknowledgement to theories of relative deprivation,
which can account for this finding. Nor were the
protest parties created by the ethnic groups referred
to, although Lipset shows that the CCP was probably more
27
open to East Europeans than were the older parties.
Milnor argues that both old parties became identified
with policies of legal discrimination against East
Europeans in the matter of citizenship rights and
separate schools. They also became associated with the
social rejection of the East European immigrant; hence
such groups were drawn towards the new parties, which
promised a commitment to policies of social justice.
Furthermores
"...the period of strongest ethnic reaction
would be that period when the minority ethnic
began to move out of his ethnic enclave into
26
A.J. Milnor, "Agrarian Protest in Saskatchewan", Ph.D.
thesis, Duke University, chapter 10.
27
Lipset, "Agrarian Socialism", op. clt., p. 235.
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the world of established (and counter) mores,
there to encounter social as well as political
discrimination."28
As a crude indicator of this process of out migration
and subjection to discrimination, we are presented with
data on the decline of illiteracy and the increase in
knowledge of English between 1921 and 1941, by when less
than nine per cent of the East European population could
not speak English. Milnor notes how this was related in
2Q
time to the upsurge of the CCP.
However, Milnor makes no attempt to come to grips
with the implications of ecological analysis by Lipset
at the rural municipality level, which suggests that the
highest level of CCP support was among Anglo-Saxons.
Of the major non-Anglo-Saxon groups only the Ukranians
(in 1938) appear from ecological analysis to have
given the CCP greater support than average. Reaction
against discrimination may have brought some disen¬
chanted minority ethnics to the CCP or Social Credit,
but not in large enough volume to justify an interpreta¬
tion of either party as grounded in ethnic protest.
In general, Silverstein's post war data support the
trends in the Lipset data. Usually, the support for
the CCP from strongest to weakest is areas with popula¬
tion of mostly British origin, next Scandinavian, then
Europeans, among whom Germans and Dutch give very low
support. When Social Credit run candidates they tend
OQ
Milnor, op. cit.. pp. 205-6.
29Ibid., pp. 206-7.
331.
Table 9.1. Per cent Deviation from the Mean CCF Vote
in Rural Areas.
CCP Votes
1934 1938 1944
Average CCP vote in all rural areas 29.6 36.3 58.1
CCP vote in all rural areas -
CCP vote in municipalities with
high proportion of ethnic groups
French - 5.4 - 4.6 - 8.5
Scandinavian +10.4 + 8.7 + 0.5
Mennonites (Dutch) -10.2 - 4.4 -13.1
Ukranian - 8.5 + 6.4 + 1.5
German - 5.6 — 1.8 - 4.1
Source: Calculated from S.M. lipset, "Agrarian
Socialism", rev. ed., New York, 1968,
Tables 19 to 23.
30
to get considerable German and especially Dutch backing.
Thus relatively low CCP support does not mean a
preference for the Liberal Party in areas of European
origin. Between 1952 and 1964 the French Catholic
areas appear to have given more support to the Liberals
than the CCP only once; and in no group of rural muni¬
cipalities analysed by Silverstein (except those
occupied by native Indians in 1964) did the Liberal
Party win a majority of votes.
Most of the ethnic-political correlations are weak,
30
Sanford Silverstein, "Occupational Class and Voting
Behaviour", in Lipset, "Agrarian Socialism", op. cit..
PP. 435-79.
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as are those between religion and voting. Here the
firmest relationships are between Roman Catholicism and
the Liberal Party, the United Church and the CCP (at
least until 1964 when United Church areas went equally
to the Liberal Party). Elsewhere I have recorded the
official opposition of the Roman Catholic Church to the
CCP, which was perceived as unacceptable socialism.
The Catholic hierarchy preferred the Liberal Party,
which had supported the Catholics * wish for a separate
school system in the "religious" election of 1929* But
after 1934 the Church did not have sufficient influence
on the everyday lives of people to prevent them from
supporting the CCP in sufficient numbers to destroy the
significant negative correlation between Catholic areas
and the CCP vote, which had been established in 1934.
This is not surprising since Roman Catholic conservatism
only prevents working class Catholics in the urban areas
of the United States and western Europe from identifying
with major parties of the left, when they are committed,
31
practising church members. Social Credit was
associated as we have seen with the sectarian protestant
* fundamentalism of its leaders, and so was in opposition
to the theology of Catholicism, but at least Social
Credit was not officially attacked by the Church. Thus
some of the committed Catholic voters, who wanted to
make a protest may have been drawn to Social Credit.
31v See, e.g., Lipset, "Political Man", op. cit«, pp. 244-6.
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Certainly its association with sectarian religion was no
hindrance to Social Credit in Alberta, where Aberhart
offered reform in sufficient quantity to attract the
disenchanted but not so extreme as to alienate a
basically conservative population.
In so far as any conclusions can be drawn from
ecological analysis, it seems that religious-ethnic
differences were significant factors in the political
division of the farming population in Saskatchewan until
the nineteen forties. For Alberta there is little
evidence of value, although in her study of the Hanna
region Burnet concludes that like most peasant immigrant
groups the large German-Russian (Lutheran) minority were
politically apathetic, and that those who did have an
%2
interest were probably Social Credit supporters. In
Saskatchewan the political implications of ethnic and
religious differences seem to have waned under the
combined processes of cultural assimilation and
secularization. Certainly the church seems to have
33
less influence today than formerly. ^ However, even
for the thirties, religion and ethnicity are not
powerful predictors of rural political alignment; there
must be some other ground for division. Possibly this
conclusion is biased by the lack of good data. I am
forced to rely on voting as the only measure of
32
Jean Burnet, "Next-Year Country", Toronto, 1951, p. 45.
"E.g., D.R. Whyte, "Rural Canada in Transition," in the
volume of the same title edited by M. Trembley and
W.J. Anderson, Ottawa, 1966, esp. pp. 80-3.
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political attachment and involvement, and even then only
on aggregate voting patterns. Furthermore, there is no
evidence on the meaning and importance of voting as an
intentional political act on the part of the farmers.
It is quite likely that for many voting was a product of
family tradition, which the organizational efforts of
the CCF and Social Credit could not break. In
Saskatchewan the liberal Party may have drawn rural
support from those culturally conservative farmers, who
remained outside the co-operative movement, with which
the CCF had such close connections. Finally, there was
the additional power which the Liberals acquired through
the distribution of patronage (and also, some charged,
by threatening withdrawal of relief payments
While all these factors may have had some influence,
the most satisfying solution comes from MacPherson's
thesis on the impossibility of united class conscious
action by the petite bourgeoisies
"The petite-bourgeoisie is at any time a
collection of different elements, all tending,
with the increasing subordination of all forms
of production to the direction of large
capital accumulations, to lose their original
functions and position. The very cause of
the existence of the petite-bourgeoisie, the
development of capitalist enterprise which
continually renders vestigial earlier forms
of enterprise in various sectors of the
economy and produces new transitional groups,
is the cause of the heterogeneity of the class
and of its lack of any consciousness of class."
Escott M. Reid, "The Saskatchewan Liberal Machine
before 1929"» Canadian Journal of Economics and
Political Science, vol. 2, 1936, pp. 27-40.
•*. k
MacPherson, op, cit.. p. 226.
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However, MacPherson finds that in western Canada a
section of the class, the farmers, have been united:
"...being more homogeneous than the petite-
bourgeoisie as a whole, (they) have been able
to organize both politically and economically
to promote their immediate interests, and in
the course of this organization they have
developed a vigorous consciousness of common
interests. But it is an agrarian conscious¬
ness, not a class consciousness...."36
I have already argued that the homogeneity is an
illusion of the investigator, but in so far as there is
an agrarian consciousness, it is necessary to agree with
MacPherson that it is based on an illusion of
independence, produced by farmers' activity as
independent commodity producers, (but producers who are
powerless to control the operation of the price system).
"The agrarian consciousness is thus at once
hostile to and acquiescent in the established
order. It is here that we find the funda¬
mental explanation of the oscillation between
radicalism and conservatism which is
characteristic of Alberta politics."37
But here MacPherson is concerned with oscillation over
time by the farmers as a whole in response to changes in
the impact of the price system on their income, whereas
I have been concerned in this section with the co¬
existence of agrarian conservatism and radicalism.
Farmers are indeed subjected to conflicting pressures of
commitment and opposition to the existing system, but
this does not mean that at any one time all farmers are
going to experience these pressures to the same degree.
36Ibid., p. 227.
37Ibid«, p. 229.
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Some may carry a hostility to the price system (and
those who are thought to control it) through even the
most prosperous period; others, less conscious of the
forces which control their living, may retain an
identity with the ideology of free enterprise, even
during depressions. What we find is not a history of
complete vacillation by the whole group in accordance
with economic changes, but rather a changing distribution
of orientations within the farming community. Hence
radical populism of both the CCF and Social Credit
variety can co-exist with conservative acquiescence.
This study has documented the development of the populist
movements and tried to establish the conditions under
which populism, the radical side of petit bourgeois
consciousness, predominated and declined in the
provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan.
Chapter Ten
Summary and Concluding Remarks
10.1. Summary
The development of populism in Alberta and
Saskatchewan has its historical origin in the confedera¬
tion of the Canadian state, the founders of which
envisaged the creation of a western frontier region,
which, when settled, would stimulate the growth of
eastern capitalism. This task was soon attempted when
the federal government promoted a series of national
policies, which were intended to bring about the settle¬
ment of the west, the expansion of the railroads, and the
growth of eastern manufacturing industry under a
protective tariff. Eventually a western satellite area
occupied by small scale producers of primary products
was successfully established (chapter two).
Prom the earliest days the people of the satellite
area felt exploited at the hands of the eastern railroad
company, elevator and milling companies, banks,
suppliers of manufactured goods, and speculators on the
Grain Exchange. The farmers began to unite for self-
protection by forming marketing and consumer co-opera¬
tives, and by challenging the existing parties in the
field of politics. In Alberta the United Farmers
actually elected a government committed to delegate
democracy, while in Saskatchewan the liberals remained
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in office (chapter three).
The severe depression of the thirties aggravated
long standing feelings of relative deprivation and
opposition to metropolitan based, monopoly capitalism.
Few third parties, Social Credit in Alberta, the CCF in
Saskatchewan, grew indirectly from the structural stress
created by the impact of depression and drought.
However, the extent of destitution was so severe and
produced such demoralizing effects over much of southern
Saskatchewan that the CCF was only able to win power
when conditions improved during the forties (chapter four).
In Alberta, William Aberhart popularized the economic
doctrine of Social Credit, which promised to be a panacea
for all social ills, including the cure of poverty, by
having the government issue credits to all citizens,
thus restoring their purchasing power. This, combined
with the long standing appeal to the oppressed of
Aberhart's fundamentalist protestantism, brought over¬
whelming victory to Social Credit in 1935. However,
Social Credit legislation was always thwarted by the
courts or the federal government, and Aberhart, surviving
an attack on his leadership, compromised by giving
conservative administration to the affairs of the
province until his death in 1943. Social Credit had
received enthusiastic support from all sections of the
petite bourgeoisie and some of the urban wage earners
(chapter five).
The Saskatchewan CCF was part of a national party,
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founded in 1932, which was identified at the beginning
with socialism. As long as the Saskatchewan seotion
retained policies which included the socialization of
land, it could make little progress. The CCF, after it
recovered from this early association with socialism,
warded off the 1938 invasion of Social Credit (which had
not produced the promised Utopia in Alberta), and won
power in 1944 as a pragmatic party of populist reform.
CCF members were outspokenly anti-capitalist, but to be
anti-capitalist in the west means to be against mono¬
polies in industry and finance; it does not mean
support for a fully socialized state. The electorate
to which the party had to appeal to win power, not an
entrenched party bureaucracy, was the main reason for
the Saskatchewan CCP moving in a conservative direction.
Its greatest support en route came from the farming
population, then the urban working class (chapter six).
Following World Y/ar II both parties retained power
in provinces which were now undergoing an urban,
industrial transformation, a change which each party
encouraged, but a change which reacted back on the
leadership inducing an increasing conservatism. In
each province, but more so in Alberta, a prosperous
electorate gave maximum support to conserving the gains
they had made. There was no need for a pragmatic
people to sanction further experiments in reform for
doctrinal purposes. Furthermore, the old social base
of support, the petite bourgeoisie, was declining in
340,
relation to the total population. Still the
Saskatchewan CCF did undertake major reforms in social
welfare, which were consistent with the populist history
of the party (chapter seven).
Having reviewed the history of change in policy and
considered the social sources of support, the nature of
leadership, legitimation and internal social relations
in each party were examined. Social Credit was found
to have a centralized, authoritarian organizational
structure compared with the more decentralized organiza¬
tion of the CCF, which emphasized membership participa¬
tion in decision-making (chapter eight).
Finally, each party was assessed against the
categories of populism which were presented in the
introduction - a reaction to the impact of capitalism;
directed against an out group; exalting of the common
people; advocation of a direct relationship between
leader and followers; reformist ideology. Each party
was found to contain all the suggested characteristics
of populism, but differences in organizational structure
were such that the CCF was interpreted as democratic
populism and Social Credit as authoritarian populism.
It was then suggested that the separate development of
Social Credit and the CCF can be explained in terms of
the earlier histories of the provinces. By 1935 the
United Farmers of Alberta, a democratic populist party,
had been in office for fourteen years and was condemned
by its failure to control the impact of depression.
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In this context people were more likely to confer
legitimacy on the charismatic claims of an authoritarian
leader such as William Aberhart, who promised to solve,
at a stroke, the immediate and pressing problems. The
pattern was not repeated in Saskatchewan where only the
"old" parties had held office. Next the development of
populism was considered in relation to other features of
the social structure in the provinces. Factors such as
differences in the type of production, ethnicity and
religion were considered as possible explanations for
the failure of the farming people to unite behind their
own populist parties. It was suggested that the best
explanation is found by modifying MacPherson's theory of
the ambiguity of the class position of the petite
bourgeoisie, which leads to oscillation between radical
and conservative political attachment. It waB suggested
that this tendency to oscillate operates to create
division not only between segments of the class (such as
shopkeepers and farmers) but within these segments at
any one time (chapter nine).
10.2. Some Concluding Remarks
In the course of this study I have viewed the
populism of Alberta and Saskatchewan as the expression
of the radical sector of the petite bourgeoisie, while
recognizing that this radicalism never amounted to more
than reformism. Populism represents the opposition of
satellite to metropolis, and because of this opposition
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I have tended to present it as if it were a divisive
force with regard to Canada as a whole. In closing the
study it is worth while to speculate about populism in
quite a different way. Although populism is a force
for reform and change, a movement of opposition to the
status quo, yet it may well contribute in a 'negative*
way to the survival of the Canadian federation. This
idea has its origin in Guenther Roth's research on "The
Social Democrats in Imperial Germany", in which he
interprets the SPD as having contributed to the survival
of Imperial Germany by channelling the revolutionary
impulse of the working class into an organization, the
leaders of which, although opposed to the existing
society in principle, became committed to maintaining
the place of the SPD (and hence their own positions) in
that society. Considering the SPD as a subculture Roth
writes:
"The subculture was 'negatively* integrated
into the dominant system because by its very
existence it provided an important means for
the controlled expression and dissipation of
conflict and thus contributed, for decades of
peacetime, to the stability of the Empire."!
Western populism never posed a revolutionary threat to
society like that of the German working class, nor were
western populists subject to similar repression. But
there are some Important similarities. The populist
parties of Alberta and Saskatchewan funnelled petit
bourgeois disenchantment through institutional channels.
"^Guenther Roth, "The Social Democrats in Imperial
Germany", Tdtowa, N.J., 1963, p. 315.
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Having once accepted institutional means to power and
social change, the populist politicians could be con¬
trolled if they went to any "excess" in reform, because
the institutionalized powers of the federal government
were superior in all important respects to those of the
provincial governments. Populism was a safety-valve
mechanism in the Canadian socio-economic system, which
was so dependent in the first half of the twentieth
century on petit bourgeois production of export
commodities. Paradoxically, populism may have
'negatively' contributed to the survival of the Canadian
federation during periods of crisis. (Federation
itself may be seen as a strategy of 'negative* integra¬
tion of the state.) Some support for this comes from
Mann's interpretation of Y/illiam Aberhart as integrative
for Albertas
"Aberhart's denunciations of greedy,
unscrupulous money lenders, of eastern
financial interests, and of wealthy churches,
merit special mention as furnishing an outlet
for the grievances of important marginal and
economically depressed groups. If utterly
suppressed, the deep hostilities of such
groups might ultimately have had serious
repercussions upon the province's social
stability."2
The same might be said with regard to the survival of
the Canadian state as a whole.
Such a functional theory is plausible, but it is
difficult to see on what grounds it might be rejected.
2
W.E. Mann, "Sect and Cult in Western Canada", in B.
Blishen etal•, eds., "Canadian Society", Toronto,
1968, pp. 518-9.
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It Is impossible to rerun history without our populist
movement being present, and so we can never be sure what
would have happened had it not been present. Nor can
we find support for the theory in evidence of the motiva¬
tion of participants, since there is no claim that
populism was intentionally encouraged by eastern
capitalists or politicians as a means of ultimately
preserving their society. The theory is plausible in
retrospect because Canadian society has survived without
revolutionary changes.
This study has thrown up for me a number of subjects
which could well stand further investigations, although
some would involve a research commitment of many years.
It proved impossible for me to undertake more than a
sketchy outline of post war developments in Alberta.
A history of the Social Credit government comparative in
depth to what Johnson has done for Saskatchewan remains
3
to be written. Such a study might also consider the
failure of the NDP to win support from the growing
working class of Albertan cities.
The research also threw up the absence of informa¬
tion on the meaning of politics in the lives of Canadian
people. By this I mean more than crude questionnaire
studies of party images, but research employing such
techniques as focussed depth interviewing to get at the
3
A.W. Johnson, "Biography of a Governments Policy
Formulation in Saskatchewan, 1944-1961", Ph.D. thesis,
Harvard, 1963.
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reasons for lack of interest and detailed knowledge of
parties, policies, government and the state, on the part
of many people. There is still a need for research
into the meaning of the act of voting, the results of
which form the basis of so much inference in political
sociology,
Further comparative research on populism in
different times and places would no doubt contribute to
a refinement of categories and theories about the origin
and development of populism. It is possible that the
concepts I have developed here will not stand up to
widespread comparative application (e.g., important
features of populism may have been ignored), but that is
how a science progresses - by building on or rejecting
earlier conceptualizations and theories. In relation
to research on populism, it seems that a study of the
relationship between populism and fascism in terms of
ideology, policy, leadership, social base of membership
and support, etc., would be a valuable, if difficult,
contribution to the sociology of politics. Perhaps
fascism of the thirties in Europe is best interpreted as
a special form of populism.
Finally, I would suggest that there is a need for a
sociological study of the development of the Canadian
federation, one which gives greater attention to social
class in Canadian development than we find in the work
of Canada's historians. Of course, this is not to
suggest that we ignore the long standing divisions
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between French and English Canada. The work of S.D.
Clark has opened many lines of investigation for a
sociological interpretation of Canadian history;* if
this study of populism in Alberta and Saskatchewan
contributes to that task, then it will have been worth
while.
4.
^See his "The Social Development of Canada", Toronto,
1942; "Church and Sect in Canada", Toronto, 1948;
"Movements of Political Protest in Canada", Toronto,
1959; and "The Developing Canadian Community",
Toronto, 1968.
i
Appendix A
Statistical Data on Class, Economic Development,
Religion and Ethnic Groups
for Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Ontario,
1901 - 1970
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Table 1. Population: Rural - Urban.
1901 1911 1921 1931 1941 1951 1961
Alberta
Total
popula¬
tion 73022 374295 588454 731605 769169 939501 1331944
$ urban 16.2 29.4 30.1 31.1 31.5 45.8 63.9
$ rural 83.8 70.6 69.9 68.9 68.5 54.2 36.1
$ rural
farm 51.3 48.2 36.7 21.6
Saskatchewan
Total
popula¬
tion 91279 492432 757510 921785 895992 831728 925181
$ urban 6.1 16.1 16.8 20.3 21.3 30.2 43.0
$ rural 93.9 83.9 83.2 79.7 78.7 69.8 57.0
$ rural
farm 61.2 57.4 48.0 33.0
Manitoba
Total
popula¬
tion 255211 461394 610118 700139 729744 776541 921686
$ urban 24.9 39.3 39.2 42.1 41.0 46.2 65.0
$ rural 75.1 60.7 60.8 57.9 59.0 53.8 35.0
$ rural
farm 36.6 34.2 28.2 18.8
Ontario
Total
popula¬
tion 2182947 2527292 2933662 3431683 3787655 4597542 6236092
$ urban 40.3 49.5 55.6 58.7 59.9 58.5 79.2
$ rural 59.7 • 50.5 44.4 41.3 40.1 41.5 20.8
$ rural
farm 23.3 18.6 15.3 8.4
Source: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Census of Canada, 1961,
Bulletin 7.1-2 and 5.3-1, 2 and 3.
Until 1951 urban population was defined as the population
residing in incorporated cities, towns and villages. The
rest was defined as rural. Beginning in 1951 the whole of
a metropolitan area, whether incorporated or not was classed
as urban. Any community of less than 1000 persons was now
classed as rural. The effect of these changes in 1951 was
to make the urban population for that year 8.7$ greater then
if the old definition had been used. However, inspection
of Table I (D.B.S., Census, 1961, Bulletin 7.1-2, p. 2) shows
that the changed definition had an opposite effect in Alberta
and Saskatchewan. This was especially marked for Saskatchewan
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because here there were large numbers of incorporated
villages below 1000 people which were formerly classed
as urban.
Beginning in 1931 the rural farm segment was defined
separately from the rural. The category "rural farm
population" refers to the population living on farms in
localities classes as rural. "Changes of definition of
rural and urban in recent censuses have made it
impossible to provide population figures on this subject
on a uniform basis back to the 1901 census." D.B.S.,
Census, 1961, Bulletin 7.1-2, p. 3.
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Table 2. Farms: Number, Area, Improved Acres.
1921 1931 1936 1941 1946 1951
Number of
farms
Alberta
Saskatchewan
Manitoba
Ontario
82954
119451
53252
198053
97408
136472
54199
192174
100358
142391
57774
99732
138713
58024
178204
89541
125612
54428
84315
112018
52383
149920
Average size
(acres)
Alberta
Saskatchewan
Manitoba
Ontario
353.1
368.5
274.5
114.3
400.1
407.9
279.2
118.9
403.9
399.6
271.1
433.9
432.3
291.1
125.6
462.9
473.0
306.2
527.3
550.5
338.5
139.2
$> of farms
over 640
acres
Alberta
Saskatchewan
Manitoba
Ontario
15.2
19.1
8.7
4.8
16.8
20.4
9.6
5.7
21.8
30.9
12.8
8.1
Improved land
(thousand
acres)
Alberta
Saskatchewan
Manitoba
Ontario
11768
25037
8058
13169
17749
33549
8522
13273
18363
33632
9829
20125
35577
9773
13263
20032
35590
10761
22271
38807
11454
12693
73212
93924
43306
t of totaland area in
farms
Alberta 18.4 24.5 27.2 27.9
Saskatchewan 31.2 39.5 42.6 43.8
Manitoba 10.8 11.2 12.5 13.1
Ontario 10.6 10.7 10.5 9.8
645
686
420
28.9
42.0
19.7
10.4
29.7
45.7
13.4
8.7
Source: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Census of Canada,
1921, 1931, 1941, 1951, 1961; Census of the
Prairie Provinces, 1936, 1946.
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Table 3. Farms and Tenure Characteristics.
1921 1931 1941 1951 1961
Alberta
$> of farms owner
operated 79.5 72.6 62.5 62.7 59.1
i tenant operated 9.7 12.2 17.1 11.6 9.2
part owner operated 9.9 14.9 19.8 25.0 31.1
i manager operated 0.9 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.6
Saskatchewan
i of farms owner
operated 76.7 66.1 52.6 54.6 51.5
i tenant operated 10.8 15.4 24.6 14.7 10.1
i part owner operated 11.6 18.2 22.4 30.2 38.0
i manager operated 0.9 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.4
Manitoba
i of farms owner
operated 81.0 69.7 66.0 71.0 64.9
i tenant operated 11.4 18.2 18.9 9.7 8.0
i part owner operated 6.7 11.7 14.4 18.6 26.7
i manager operated 0.9 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.4
Ontario
i of farms owner
operated 84.4 81.5 78.4 81.7 80.1
i tenant operated 10.2 11.2 12.1 5.9 4.6
i> part owner operated 4.6 6.9 8.6 10.6 14.7
i manager operated 0.8 0.4 0.9 1.8 0.6
Source: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Census of Canada,
1961, Bulletin 5.3 - 1, 2, 3.
Part owner operated farms refers to those farms which
are composed of land which is owned by the operator and
additional land which he has rented. In recent years
this has been a common way for farmers to increase the
size of their operations without the considerable expense
of buying new land.
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Table 4. Farms and A^e of Operator, 1921-1961.
Alberta
i of operators less
than 25 years old
i 25-34 years
i° 35-39 years
% 60 and older
Saskatchewan
io of operators less
than 25 years old
i 25-34 years
i° 35-39 years
i 60 and older
Manitoba
i of operators less
than 25 years old
% 25-34 years
i 35-39 years
io 60 and older
Ontario
i of operators less
than 25 years old
i° 25-34 years
i° 35-39 years
i 60 and over
1921 1931 1941 1951 1961
5.2
27.9
57.5
9.4
5.3
20.8
61.1
12.8
3.4
18.5
60.6
17.5
4.3
20.2
58.4
17.1
3.2
16.2
62.6
18.0
4.5
30.3
57.1
8.1
4.5
19.9
64.4
11.2
4.3
19.8
58.3
17.6
5.5
22.2
54.4
17.9
3.6
15.7
62.0
18.7
4.7
26.2
57.1
12.0
2.9
17.8
61.9
17.4
2.9
18.8
59.6
18.7
3.6
21.1
59.1
16.2
2.7
14.2
64.1
19.0
3.3
17.6
58.6
20.5
1.9
14.1
58.1
25.9
2.0
12.9
57.9
27.2
2.5
14.8
60.6
22.1
1.9
12.8
61.6
23.6
Source: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Census of Canada,
1961, Bulletin 5.3 - parts 1, 2, 3.
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Table 5. Employment in Agriculture, 1921-61.
1921 1931 1936 1941 1946 1951 1961
Agricultural
labour force1
Alberta
Saskatchewan
Manitoba
Ontario
114202
174486
86908
295104
145707
204473
93431
305304
158386
217315
101626
141196
187396
92230
269677
121795
163965
80688
114830
147701
73695
201482
104162
119520
59924
172171
No. of
farmers and
stockraisers
Alberta
Saskatchewan
Manitoba
Ontario
81946
116193
52464
117369
92027
122751
48864
165689
93610
126767
52228
92182
123759
53979
159980
85343
117710
52438
82076
108980
49104
132803
65140
85343
38694
96159
Farmers as $
of labour
force2
Alberta
Saskatchewan
Manitoba
Ontario
37.9
43.5
24.2
15.0
32.2
36.2
18.1
12.3
31.3
36.6
19.4
29.5
36.4
18.6
10.8
28.2
37.9
18.7
23.2
36.0
16.4
7.0
13.3
26.2
11.3
4.0
No. of agri¬
cultural ,
wage earners
Alberta
Saskatchewan
Manitoba
Ontario
16734
31324
17243
54420
26291
37870
20108
66017
31888
41087
20243
23002
27566
16166
57424
14923
17547
10762
18990
18591
10769
42641
17624
13450
8477
41473
Workers hired
the year round
Alberta
Saskatchewan
Manitoba
Ontario
7200
11744
6118
25276
9267
11421
5787
4805
5636
3096
17820
3700
4851
3236
8113
6928
4769
21768
7699
4389
3086
18419
Wage earners^
as of agri¬
cultural p
labour force
Alberta
Saskatchewan
Manitoba
Ontario
14.7
18.0
19.9
18.4
18.0
18.5
23.6
21.6
20.1
18.9
19.9
16.3
14.7
17.5
21.3
12.3
10.7
13.3
16.6
12.6
14.6
21.2
16.9
11.3
14.1
24.1
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Table 5 (contd.)
1921 1931 1936 1941 1946 1951 1961
Farms having
hired labour
as a io of
all farms4
Alberta
Saskatchewan
Manitoba
Ontario
40.5
41.8
42.7
44.7
43.2
43.2
42.4
36.4
34.0
39.8
46.9
31.4
29.6
38.9
39.2
38.7
43.1
45.4
39.1
35.5
34.5
43.2
Average weeks
of hired
labour per
farm having
any hired
labour4
Alberta
Saskatchewan
Manitoba
Ontario
26.3
27.1
31.2
28.3
28.4
24.5
29.3
27.9
23.9
28.1
29.7
23.8
20.4
21.7
24.2
16.3
20.5
36.7
Unpaid family
labourers
Alberta
Saskatchewan
Manitoba
Ontario
27039
43581
23674
66881
32141
49002
27698
26173
35513
22010
52154
13697
20031
12775
24568
11407
10253
11874
18799
Farmers plus
unpaid family
labour as
of labour
forced
•
Alberta
Saskatchewan
Manitoba
Ontario
41.6
49.1
26.8
17.3
42.1
50.7
29.6
37.9
46.9
26.2
14.3
27.0
42.7
20.7
8.3
15.6
29.4
14.8
4.8
Source: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Census of Canada t
1921 to 1961; Census of the Prairie Provinces,
1936 and 1946.
Notes
1 Before 1951 the gainfully occupied concept was used rather
than the labour force. The main difference is that the
labour force concept measures employment at a given point
in time, whereas the gainfully occupied concept does not
specify the time interval to which the question refers.
D.B.S., Census of Canada, 1961, Bulletin 7.1-12, p. 2.
Before 1936 data was collected on the occupations of those
10 years and over; from 1936 to 1946 all those 14 years
and over were considered; from 1951 the lower age limit
became 15 years.
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2 These calculations are based on raw data from the
censuses*
3 Includes managers of farms.
4 The figures here refer to the year preceding the year
of the census.
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Table 6. Percentage Distribution of the Labour Force,
15 years of age and over, by Occupation Division,
for Alberta and Saskatchewan, 1911-1961.3-
Occupation
1911
Alberta Saskat
1921
Alberta Saskat
1931
Alberta Saska-
Professional
and
Managerial 7.9 6.0 10.5 9.7 9.9 9.2
Clerical 3.1 2.2 5.2 3.9 4.5 3.4
Agricultural 49.9 63.9 52.8 65.2 50.9 60.3
Fishing,
hunting,
trapping,
logging 1.0 1.1 0.4 0.3 0.9 0.7
Mining 3.2 0.3 3.4 0.1 3.1 0.2
Manufacturing 4.8 3.2 4.3 2.3 5.0 3.4
Construction 4.7 3.9 2.6 2.0 2.7 2.1
Transporta¬
tion 5.4 3.6 4.7 3.4 4.8 4.1
Commercial 3.0 2.8 3.7 3.6 4.2 3.7
Financial 0.3 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.5
Service 6.3 5.3 6.6 5.6 7.7 7.1
Labourers 10.5 7.7 4.6 3.2 5.9 5.5
Dot stated — — 0.1 _
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Table 6 (contd.)
1941 1951 1961
Occupation Alberta Saskat Alberta Saskat Alberta Saska-
Professional
and
Managerial 10.6 9.8 14.0 13.9 17.6 15.5
Clerical 4.7 3.5 8.3 6.2 11.0 7.9
Agricultural 49.0 59.3 32.5 48.8 21.3 36.7
Pishing,
hunting,
trapping,
logging 1.4 1.1 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.7
Mining 2.6 0.3 2.1 0.3 1.1 0.6
Manufacturing 6.5 4.2 8.3 5.3 9.2 6.4
Construction 2.8 1.7 5.1 2.5 4.8 3.4
Transporta¬
tion 5.2 4.5 7.4 6.8 8.0 7.4
Commercial 4.3 3.9 5.8 5.1 6.6 5.3
Financial 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.8 0.5
Service 9.0 8.8 10.0 7.7 12.2 9.8
Labourers 3.6 2.6 4.7 3.0 4.5 3.3
Not stated 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.5 2.4 2.4
^Percentages may- not add to 100 due to rounding.
Sources Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Census of Canada,
1961, Ottawa, Bulletin 3.1-1, Table 3.
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Table 7. Average Per Capita Personal Income, for Alberta.
Saskatchewan and Ontario, 1926-1970 (in dollars;.
Alberta Saskat Ontario Alberta Saskat Ontar:
1926 488 437 491 1950 1019 858 1205
1927 559 448 512 1951 1299 1266 1355
1928 500 469 540 1952 1343 1418 1440
1929 430 309 569 1953 1368 1300 1499
1930 387 264 532 1954 1236 914 1489
1931 276 159 453 1955 1318 1178 1561
1932 234 161 366 1956 1499 1341 1665
1933 197 127 342 1957 1466 1158 1758
1934 245 159 342 1968 1580 1272 1798
1935 248 197 397 1959 1595 1302 1862
1936 251 191 431 I960 1615 1461 1904
1937 332 163 462 1961 1607 1146 1908
1938 352 219 461 1962 1711 1604 2007
1939 340 296 478 1963 1767 1788 2111
1940 399 310 549 1964 1821 1616 2222
1941 413 306 668 1965 1992 1879 2409
1942 660 646 777 1966 2281 2154 2648
1943 581 517 857 1967 2419 2089 2842
1944 728 787 900 1968 2658 2396 3064
1945 705 646 931 1969 2918 2517 3371
1946 867 773 • 930 1970 3074 2391 3584
1947 905 762 977
1948 1054 933 1091
1949 1033 958 1140
Sources Data supplied by Dominion Bureau of Statistics,
National Income and Expenditure Division,
Ottawa, 1971*
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Table 8. Selected Components of Personal Income, Alberta and
Saskatchewan, 1926-1970: Net Farm Income; Income
from Interest, Dividends and Miscellaneous Invest¬
ments; Wages, Salaries and Supplementary Labour
Income (millions of dollars).
Interest, Wages, Salaries,
Net Farm Income Dividends, Supp. Labour
Miscl* Inv. Income
Alberta Saskat Alberta Saskat Alberta Saska-
1926 98 166 13 10 135 119
1927 142 173 13 11 142 124
1928 101 181 15 12 153 134
1929 55 48 16 13 164 143
1930 52 35 16 13 154 134
1931 10 -33 15 13 132 114
1932 13 - 3 14 13 108 92
1933 4 -16 14 12 97 81
1934 32 - 4 14 12 104 86
1935 27 26 14 12 110 90
1936 19 15 13 11 117 94
1937 62 -38 14 11 131 103
1938 80 27 14 11 128 97
1939 63 93 14 11 133 101
1940 84 85 15 11 147 112
1941 63 59 16 11 171 124
1942 195 271 16 11 185 132
1943 106 151 18 12 208 144
1944 190 323 19 12 233 163
1945 124 169 23 13 244 176
1946 186 238 26 15 289 204
1947 215 235 30 20 323 219
1948 285 351 35 21 385 242
1949 232 335 38 21 437 262
1950 177 237 46 23 485 277
1951 377 521 58 27 544 310
1952 344 602 57 27 628 342
1953 287 469 63 26 742 404
1954 170 128 66 28 762 434
1955 183 298 79 31 832 445
1956 232 386 90 37 1000 505
1957 149 167 100 46 1051 544
1958 213 198 104 53 1115 575
1959 200 205 118 65 1214 616
I960 162 272 121 73 1274 634
1961 185 60 140 82 1333 635
1962 233 396 170 101 1430 663
1963 265 521 178 116 1505 700
1964 214 302 200 133 1624 749
1965 269 447 211 142 1821 829
1966 352 572 238 159 2073 927
1967 262 341 258 176 2334 1058
1968 365 447 299 195 2604 1168
1969 276 420 399 220 3057 1241
1970 207 158 380 242 3383 1276
Source: Data supplied by Dominion Bureau of Statistics,
National Income and Expenditure Division,
Ottawa, 1971.
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Table 9. Net Value of Commodity Production by Industry,
Alberta and Saskatchewan, 1948-1963 (in millions
of dollars).
Alberta
Agric. Mining Elec. Power Manufact. Construction Other
1948 360 77 11 107 120 12
1949 277 107 12 115 143 9
1950 346 123 14 124 148 11
1951 506 152 17 142 187 13
1952 522 171 20 178 205 14
1953 430 227 22 200 300 11
1954 307 257 26 219 309 14
1955 339 304 29 263 339 15
1956 402 381 33 286 406 17
1957 292 378 36 312 415 18
1958 358 309 41 339 432 15
1959 357 337 46 346 451 19
I960 341 353 49 353 446 24
1961 320 460 51 369 491 23
1962 360 527 53 385 438 28
Saskatchewan
1948 430 45 8 45 67 7
1949 386 32 9 47 66 5
1950 489 27 10 49 64 7
1951 697 39 11 61 73 7
1952 810 30 13 81 94 5
1953 667 33 15 80 125 6
1954 250 36 17 105 171 5
1955 514 45 19 113 151 9
1956 625 76 22 114 199 9
1957 314 130 24 107 196 7
1958 353 159 26 . 119 191 7
1959 368 161 30 124 187 7
I960 538 165 32 120 191 8
1961 219 169 36 132 207 7
1962 685 182 39 135 210 8
1963 881 208 43 140 225 8
Value of Agriculture as Percentage of Total Value
of Production
Alberta Saskatchewan Alberta Saskatchewan
1948 52.3 71.4 1957 20.1 40.2
1949 41.9 70.8 1958 24.0 41.1
1950 45.2 75.7 1959 22.9 41.9
1951 49.8 78.5 I960 21.8 51.0
1952 47.0 78.4 1961 18.7 28.4
1953 36.1 72.0 1962 20.2 54.4
1954 27.1 42.8 1963 58.7
1955 26.3 60.4
1956 26.4 59.8
Sources Alberta Bureau of Statistics, "Alberta: Industry
and Resources", Edmonton, 1964, p. 13;
Saskatchewan Economic Review, No, 18, March, 1964,
p. 7.
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Table 10. Distribution of the population by specified
ETHNIC group for the provinces. 1901-1961.
1901 1911 1921 1931 1941 1951 1961
Alberta
British Isles 47.8 57.5 59.8 53.2 50.2 48.1 45.2
French 6.2 5.5 5.3 5.2 5.4 6.0 6.3
German 10.7 11.1 6.0 10.2 9.8 11.5 13.8
Italian 0.1 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 1.1
Jewish — 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3
Dutch 0.5 0.9 1.6 1.9 2.6 3.1 4.2
Polish 0.6 0.6 1.2 2.9 3.4 3.2 3.0
Russian 6.6 2.1 3.6 2.2 2.4 1.6 1.3
Scandinavian 5.4 7.9 7.6 8.1 8.0 7.5 7.2
Ukranian 0.9 4.7 4.0 7.6 9.0 9.3 8.0
Asiatic 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.8 0.9
Indian and
Eskimo 18.4 3.0 2.5 2.1 1.6 2.3 2.1
Other East
European 1.9 3.8 5.9 4.5 4.8 4.1 5.4
Saskatchewan
British Isles 43.9 54.7 52.9 47.5 44.4 42.3 40.4
French 2.9 5.2 5.6 5.5 5.6 6.2 6.5
German 12.9 14.4 9.0 14.0 14.5 16.3 17.1
Italian - 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3
Jewish 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.2
Dutch 0.4 0.6 2.2 2.7 4.0 3.6 3.2
Polish 0.7 0.8 1.1 2.8 3.1 3.1 3.1
Russian 11.9 3.6 6.0 3.8 2.9 2.3 2.4
Scandinavian 1.6 7.1 7.7 7.9 7.7 7.5 7.3
Ukranian 1.2 4.5 3.7 6.9 8.9 9.4 8.5
Asiatic 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5
Indian and
Eskimo 19.4 2.4 1.7 1.7 1.5 2.7 3.3
Other East
European 4.5 5.4 8.7 6.0 5.2 4.8 6.5
Manitoba
British Isles 64.4 59.9 57.5 52.6 49.4 46.7 43.0
French 6.3 6.8 6.7 6.7 7.3 8.5 9.1
German 10.7 7.6 3.2 5.4 5.7 7.0 10.0
Italian 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.7
Jewish 0.6 2.4 2.7 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.1
Dutch 0.4 0.7 3.4 3.6 5.4 5.5 5.2
Polish 0.7 2.7 2.7 5.7 5.0 4.9 4.8
Russian 1.3 1.7 2.3 1.7 0.9 1.1 0.9
Scandinavian 4.7 3.8 4.4 4.5 4.5 4.2 4.1
Ukranian 1.5 6.7 7.2 10.5 12.3 12.7 11.4
Asiatic 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.5
Indian and
Eskimo 6.4 2.9 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.7 3.2
Other East
European 2.5 2.9 6.8 3.5 3.3 2.9 3.4
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Table 10 (contd.)
1901 1911 1921 1931 1941 1951 1961
Ontario
British Isles 79.3 77.2 77.8 74.0 72.1 67.0 59.5
French 7.3 8.1 8.5 8.7 9.9 10.4 10.4
German 9.3 7.7 4.4 5.1 4.4 4.8 6.4
Italian 0.2 0.8 1.1 1.5 1.6 1.9 4.4
Jewish 0.2 1.1 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.0
Dutch 1.1 1.4 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.1 3.1
Polish 0.1 0.4 0.5 1.2 1.4 2.0 2.4
Russian - 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5
Scandinavian 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.0
Ukranian - 0.1 0.3 0.7 1.3 2.0 2.1
Asiatic 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.6
Indian and
Eskimo 1.1 1.1 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8
Other East
European 0.2 0.9 1.5 2.7 3.0 3.6 5.6
Source: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Census of Canada,
1961, Bulletin 7.1 - 6, Table 3.
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Table 11. Population by Religious Denomination, Alberta
and Saskatchewan. 1901-1961 (to nearest thousand).
1901 1911 1921 1931 1941 1951 196:
Alberta
Adventist 2 4 4 5 5 5
Anglican 10 56 99 113 113 123 157
Baptist 3 20 28 31 32 35 42
Christian Science 1 2 2 2 2 2
Churches of Christ
'
;
1 1 1 2 2 3
Confucian/Bhuddist 1 3 2 2 2 3
2
Congregationalist 3 3
Doukhobor 1 1 1
Greek Orthodox 5 18 36 26 35 40 47
Jehovah's Witnesses 1 1 1 1 8
Jewish 1 3 4 4 5 6
Lutheran 6 44 60 83 85 87 123
Mennonit®"1" 1 2 3 8 12 14 16
Methodist^ 11 63 90
Mormon 3 10 11 13 15 18 26
Pentecostal 1 4 8 10 15
2
Presbyterian 12 67 122 72 69 55 55
Roman Catholic 16 63 98 131 152 186 299
Salvation Army 1 2 2 2 2 3
Ukranian Catholic^ 38 39 38 35
United Church 1 177 194 277 419
Other 5 23 23 19 21 36 68
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Table 11 (contd.)
1901 1911 1921 1931 1941 1951 1961
Saskatchewan
Adventist 1 3 3 4 3 3
Anglican 16 76 116 127 118 95 95
Baptist 2 19 24 23 19 16 16
Christian Science 1 1 1 1 1
Churches of Christ 1 1 2 2 1 2
Confucian/Bhuddist 1 1 2 2
?
Congregationalist 2 3
Doukhobor 9 9 7 8 8 5 3
Greek Orthodox 3 25 47 31 38 35 32
Jehovah's Witnesses 1 3 2 5 8
Jewish 1 3 4 4 5 6
Lutheran 6 57 92 114 105 91 95
1
Mennonite 4 15 21 31 33 26 28
Methodist2 12 79 101
Mormon 1 1 2 1 1 2
Pentecostal 1 5 8 8 9
2
Presbyterian 16 98 162 68 55 33 25
Roman Catholic 18 91 148 190 201 199 243
Salvation Army 1 2 2 2 2 2
3
Ukranian Catholic 44 43 37 35
United Church 3 244 231 247 296
Other 4 16 18 18 20 22 28
Fotes
1 Includes Hutterites.
2 These churches combined to form the United Church of Canada.
3 Until the 1931 census Greek Orthodox and Ukranian Catholic
were combined under the Greek Church.
Source: D.B.S., Census of Canada, 1961, Bulletin 7.1-11,
Table 1.
Appendix B
Voting Statistics
for
Alberta and Saskatchewan,
1917 - 1971
The following tables contain a summary of the results of
all provincial general elections held in Alberta and
Saskatchewan between 1917, the election prceding the
rise of the United Farmers of Alberta, and 1971#
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Table 1. Legislative Seats and Percentage of the Popular
Vote for Parties in Alberta Provincial General
Elections, 1917-1971.1
Election
1917 1921 1926 1930 1935 1940 1944
Total number
of votes 151499 298087 175047 179364 328545 340368 295180
Total number
of seats 58 59 60 63 63 57 57
Parties
Conservative:
i° of total
vote 30.0 12.0 23.0 14.0 7.0
Seats won 19 1 4 6 2 - -
Liberal:
°/o of total
vote 36.0 34.0 26.0 25.0 23.0 1.0
Seats won 34 15 7 11 5 1
U.F.A.:
i° of total
vote - 29.0 41.0 39.0 11.0
Seats won - 38 43 39 - -
CCF:
fo of total
vote ... 11.0 25.0
Seats won ------ 2
Social Credit:
% of total
vote - 54.0 43.0 52.0
Seats won - - - - 56 36 51
2
Other :
io of total
vote 34.0 26.0 10.0 23.0 5.0 45.0 23.0
Seats won 5 7 6 7 0 20 4
367.
Table 1 (contd.)
Total number
of votes
Total number
of seats
Parties
Conservative:
$> of total
vote
Seats won
Liberal:
1° of total
vote
Seats won
U.F.A.:
fo of total
vote
Seats won
CCE/NDP:
i<> of total
vote
Seats won
Social Credit:
i> of total
vote
Seats won
Other:
io of total
vote
Seats won
Election
1948 1952 1955 1959 1963 1967 1971
312700 321195 417112 413515 403444 426622 639862
57 61 61 65 63 65 75
18.0
2
19.0
2
56.0
51
7.0
2
4.0
2
22.0
4
14.0
2
56.0
52
4.0
1
9.0
3
31.0
15
8.0
2
46.0
37
5.0
4
24.0
1
14.0
1
4.0
56.0
61
2.0
2
13.0
20.0
2
55.0
60
3.0
1
26.0
6
11.0
3
9.0 16.0
45.0
55
3.0
1
46.0
49
1.0
11.0
1
41.0
25
3.0
Notes
1 Percentage may not sum to 100 due to rounding to nearest
whole number.
2 Up to 1940 the "other" category included both independents
and Labour party members. In 1940 and 1944 Liberals and
Conservatives joined together as independents to run
against Social Credit.
Source: Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs, 1917-1935;
Howard A. Scarrow, "Canada Votes", New Orleans, 1962,
for elections 1921-1955; David E. Smith, "A Compari¬
son of Prairie Political Developments in Saskatchewan
and Alberta", Journal of Canadian Studies, vol. 4,
1969, PP. 17-26, for 1917 and 1959-67; Alberta.
"Returns: Provincial Election held on August 30,
1971", Edmonton, 1971.
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Table 2, Legislative Seats and Percentage of the Popular
Vote for Parties in Saskatchewan Provincial
General Elections. 1917-1971.1
1917 1921 1925 1929 1934 1938 1944
Total number
of votes 187635 180955 247764 361268 429620 440273 397117
Total number
of seats 59 63 63 63 55 52 52
Parties
Conservative!
^ of *to"fesX
vote 36.0 3.0 18.0 36.0 27.0 12.0 11.0
Seats won 7 2 3 24 - - -
Liberal!
tfo of total
vote 57.0 52.0 51.0 46.0 48.0 45.0 35.0
Seats won 51 46 50 28 50 38 5
CCFj
$> of total
vote - 24.0 19.0 53.0
Seats won - - - - 5 10 47
Social Credit:
i« of total
vote - - - - - 16.0
Seats won - - - - - 2 -
Other2!
<fo of total
vote 7.0 45.0 30.0 18.0 1.0 8.0 1.0
Seats won 1 15 10 11 - 2
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Table 2 (contd.)
Election
1948 1952 1956 I960 1964 19673 1971
Total number
of votea 492906 537692 551698 679243 666497 411109 444003
Total number
of seats 52 53 53 55 59 59 60
Parties
Conservative:
io of total
vote 8,0 2.0 2.0 14.0 19.0 9.0 2.0
Seats won - - - - 1 - -
liberal:
of "total
vote 31.0 39.0 30.0 33.0 41.0 46.0 43.0
Seats won 19 11 14 17 33 36 15
CCF/ftDP:
i of total
vote 48.0 54.0 45.0 41.0 40.0 45.0 55.0
Seats won 31 42 36 38 25 23 45
Social Credit:
i of total
vote 8.0 4.0 21.0 12.0 0.4
Seats won - - 3 - - - -
Other:
i of total
vote 5.0 1.0 1.0 0.4 - - -
Seats won 2 ----- -
Notes
1 Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding to nearest
whole number.
2 The large percentage of votes in the "Other" category from
1921 to 1929 is composed of Independents and Progressives.
The interpretation of these figures for 1921 is especially
difficult because the election was called at short notice
leaving little time for the opposition to organize. That
year the Liberals took 16 of the 63 seats by acclamation.
3 Prom 1967 the multiple-member city constituencies were
divided into single-member constituencies. This change
accounts in part for the large decline in the total number
of votes cast.
Source: David E. Smith, "A Comparison of Prairie Political
Developments in Saskatchewan and Alberta", Journal
of Canadian Studies, vol. 4, 1969# pp. 17-26;
Saskatoon Star Pheonix, 24-6-71 and 30-6-71;
Saskatchewan Archives Board, "Elections 1905-53",
Regina, 1954.
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